concurring.
Although I agree with the majority’s disposition of this case, I must voice my objection to the majority’s reliance upon Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974) and subsequent cases for the purpose of invalidating a guilty plea entered years before any of those cases were decided. Those cases and the new rules of criminal procedure which they announced are based upon procedural, rather than constitutional, principles, and should have only prospective effect. Therefore, for the reasons enumerated in the opinion by this writer in Commonwealth v. Minarik, 493 Pa. 573, 427 A.2d 623 (1981), I do not concur in the premise underlying the majority opinion, namely, that a guilty plea colloquy which occurred in 1970 must comply with procedures mandated by this Court’s cases after 1970.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. In 1970, when appellant pled guilty,
[t]o be Constitutionally valid, a plea of guilty must have been voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, i.e., with an understanding of the nature of the charges against him, his right to a jury trial and an awareness of the consequences of his plea.
Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 445 Pa. 311, 317, 285 A.2d 448, 450-51 (1971) (citation omitted, emphasis in original). See also Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 106, 237 A.2d 196, 198 (1968) (a trial court’s examination of a defendant should include “an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences”).
Appellant’s guilty plea falls far short of this standard. Although the trial judge in this case conducted an on-the-record colloquy, that colloquy included no explanation of the nature of the charges against appellant, no mention of appellant’s right to a jury trial, and no explanation of any of the consequences of a guilty plea.
*572Since the colloquy in this case was inadequate to show that appellant’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, even under the standards which existed in 1970,1 agree with the majority that the order of the PCHA court must be reversed, appellant’s guilty plea must be vacated, and the case must be remanded for a new trial.
FLAHERTY and KAUFFMAN, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.