(dissenting) — This case presents several issues which, if resolved, would not only provide essential guidance to legislators whose current decisions are heavily dependent on the viability of Initiative 601, but would assist the government and public in understanding how and if an initiative can amend the state constitution. I, therefore, cannot agree with the majority’s failure to address the merits of this case. To restart this case at a later date would develop no new facts necessary to decide this issue and wastes judicial resources.
The Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus, barring five state officials from engaging in various activities mandated by Initiative 601, on the basis certain provisions of the initiative are unconstitutional. Specifically, the Petitioners challenge portions of sections 13, 8, 4, and 3 of Initiative 601 as unconstitutional. Based on binding legal authority and acknowledgement of the broad overriding import of the issues presented, I would review the merits of each of these challenges.
My foremost disagreement with the majority is over its dismissal of Petitioners’ challenge to section 13 of the initiative. The majority’s dismissal of this claim is raised sua sponte, is premised on two untenable grounds, and fails to apply the ordinary test of justiciability.
Section 13 requires the State to certify any bills which contain changes to the tax structure to the general ballot for approval by a majority of the voters:
*427the state may raise existing taxes, impose new taxes as authorized by law, or make revenue-neutral tax shifts only with approval of a majority of the voters at a November general election.
(Italics mine.) Initiative 601, § 13(1). The Petitioners allege this provision violates Const. art. 2, § 1(b)1 as well as Const. art. 7, § 1.2
Even assuming the issue of justiciability was properly raised,3I cannot agree with the majority. The majority advances, in essence, two reasons for dismissing the claim. First, it concludes the claim is not yet justiciable mainly because it argues three of four bills mentioned by the Petitioners as falling within the ambit of section 13 do not actually fall within the scope of section 13 and because the fourth bill contains ambiguities. Second, the majority appears to conclude that because the Petitioners have failed to request a writ specifically directed at any bill or state official, this court is without the authority to craft so specific a remedy.
Neither premise is supportable. First, the status and substance of the four bills are inapposite to the issue presented here. The real issue is: Should section 13 — triggering immediate and direct obligations on Ralph Munro, burdening taxpayers who financially support Munro’s office and the *428operation of elections, and impeding the work of legislators who are currently functioning under the effect of section 13 — be reviewed? The answer to this question is yes, irrespective of the status or substance of the bills discussed by the Petitioners.
Even if the substance of the bills subject to section 13 were germane to the determination whether a challenge to section 13 of Initiative 601 is justiciable, the reasons given by the majority for finding a lack of justiciability are unpersuasive. The majority notes that because three of the four bills go into effect without voter referral, unless a court declares referral is required under Initiative 601, they do not fall within the ambit of section 13. As a point of fact, only two of the four bills, SSB 6307 and ESHB 2326, contain a provision which indicates voter referral is unnecessary unless a judicial declaration to the contrary is issued. One of the remaining two bills, EHB 2670, may be subject to the requirement of voter referral;4 and the other, E2SHB 2319, is subject to voter referral and thus supports justiciability of Petitioners’ section 13 claim.
Ignoring EHB 2670, the majority charges that because E2SHB 2319 is "ambiguous”, Petitioners’ section 13 claim is not yet justiciable. Its claim of ambiguity is unfounded. One alleged ambiguity is the fact the tax measures of E2SHB do not become effective until July 1, 1995. As noted, the fact the tax provisions of E2SHB 2319 do not go into effect until July 1, 1995, is inapposite to the justiciability of Section 13. That section of the initiative triggers immediate and direct obligations on Munro, burdens taxpayers who financially support Munro’s office and the process of elections, and burdens the legislators who are currently operating under the effect of section 13.
The other alleged ambiguity is quite curious in the context of the majority’s overall opinion. According to the major*429ity, the presence of a provision which stipulates the bill will be referred to the general population unless a court declares Initiative 601 invalid renders E2SHB 2319 ambiguous. The majority remarks just a few pages earlier that other bills, which become effective without voter referral unless a court declares referral would be necessary to comply with Initiative 601, should be interpreted as being effective without voter approval since there is no allegation the alternative procedure has been triggered. See majority, at 422. Thus, according to the majority, in the absence of an allegation an alternative enactment procedure has been triggered by a specified event, the original procedure stipulated by the statute governs. The majority’s claim E2SHB 2319 is ambiguous by virtue of the existence of a conditional referral provision, therefore, is, by the majority’s own reasoning, insupportable.
The majority’s contention the Petitioners have failed to request a writ with adequate specificity is similarly indefensible. The assertion contradicts legal authority as well as the record. The majority writes: "Without a request in the Petition for a specific writ directed to prohibit the Secretary of State from certifying E2SHB 2319 to the ballot, we will not, on our own, craft such a remedy”. Majority, at 423. The record contradicts the assertion the request is not sufficiently specific. In the original petition, the Petitioners requested a "writ of mandamus ... to prohibit [Respondents] from implementing and enforcing Initiative 601”. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus and for Declaratory J. and Inj. Relief, at 1-2. The Respondents include Munro. One of Munro’s obligations under Initiative 601 is to refer bills falling within the ambit of section 13 to the voters. In addition, in their brief, Petitioners state: "in the case of the measures recently enacted by the Legislature in its 1994 session, Respondent Munro must be directed not to certify any of them to the ballot. . .”. Br. of Pet’rs, at 42.
Moreover, the legal authority underlying its assertion the Petitioners do not seek relief with adequate specificity does not control the resolution of the issues raised by this case. In *430State ex rel. Pacific Am. Fisheries v. Darwin, 81 Wash. 1, 142 P. 441 (1914), this court noted the petitioners:
do not ask for the performance of any specific act. The most they ask is that this court define the duties of the fish commissioner and compel him to perform them as thus defined. But, as we have attempted to show, this is not the province of any court, much less the province of a court of revisory and appellate jurisdiction.
Pacific Am. Fisheries, at 12. In contrast, Petitioners here do not seek judicial definition of the scope of the Respondents’ duties, but rather a writ enjoining state officials from engaging in the specific actions mandated by Initiative 601. Moreover, whereas the court in Pacific Am. Fisheries expressly noted the case "present[ed] no unusual or extraordinary conditions”, Pacific Am. Fisheries, at 13, the case before this court affects all citizens of this state in a current, far-reaching, and profound manner, thereby reflecting an unusual and extraordinary circumstance which deserves immediate judicial attention.
The majority also neglects to apply the general test of justiciability. For purposes of declaratory judgment actions, the following must generally exist:
(1) . . . an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive.
Nollette v. Christianson, 115 Wn.2d 594, 599, 800 P.2d 359 (1990) (quoting Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wn.2d 811, 815, 514 P.2d 137 (1973)). The majority’s failure to apply this test explicitly results in its consequent failure to reach the proper conclusion Petitioners’ section 13 claim satisfies the test. An actual dispute exists since section 13 has already been enacted and imposes immediate obligations on Secretary of State Munro, including the obligation to certify bills to the public. Clark Cy. Sheriff v. Department *431of Social & Health Servs., 95 Wn.2d 445, 626 P.2d 6 (1981) (writs of mandamus may be directed toward future acts).5
Second, at least some of the parties have genuine and opposing interests. The state officials, including Munro, have a genuine interest in upholding the constitutionality of section 13 and certifying bills subject to it for a vote by the public; and the Petitioners on the other hand have a genuine interest in preventing the expenditure of state resources on certifying bills to the public and taking a public vote if the authority pursuant to which such actions are demanded is void.
Third, the interests of at least some of the parties are direct and substantial. Munro’s interest is direct and substantial since he is the individual who must certify bills pursuant to section 13. The taxpayer Petitioners have direct and substantial interests in the expenditure of state resources. The legislator Petitioners have direct and substantial interests in abandoning their current approach toward the introduction and enactment of legislation, an approach which they claim is currently premised on unconstitutional demands. Representative Appelwick’s affidavit reflects that "[t]he requirement of submission of revenue enhancement measures to public vote has had a chilling effect on taking legislative action which would otherwise have proceeded in the normal course”. Decl. of Appelwick (Facts Ex. N), at 2.
Finally, a judicial determination would be conclusive because it would either permit the section to stand as is, relieving legislators and the public from the uncertainty around the parameters of section 13 of Initiative 601, or conclusively void the section, rendering unconstitutional referrals of bills to the public as well as unconstitutional *432restrictions on the Legislature’s power to tax no longer necessary.
The Petitioners’ section 13 claim is also justiciable under a second important test. Under appropriate circumstances, this court has employed a "broad overriding public import” test of justiciability to reach the merits of various issues which are not otherwise justiciable. See, e.g. Seattle v. State, 100 Wn.2d 232, 668 P.2d 1266 (1983); Citizens Coun. Against Crime v. Bjork, 84 Wn.2d 891, 529 P.2d 1072 (1975); Huntamer v. Coe, 40 Wn.2d 767, 246 P.2d 489 (1952). Under this test, a court may, in its discretion, analyze a question not otherwise properly before the court where:
. . . the question is one of great public interest and has been brought to the court’s attention in the action where it is adequately briefed and argued, and where it appears that an opinion of the court would be beneficial to the public and to the other branches of the government. . ..
State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Inst., Inc. v. Kinnear, 80 Wn.2d 175, 178, 492 P.2d 1012 (1972); Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The majority attempts to distinguish away a whole line of cases supporting this principle. However, the cases collectively stand for the proposition that, under appropriate circumstances, this court may exercise its discretion in favor of reaching an issue which is not otherwise justiciable. If Distilled Spirits and other cases like it are indeed anomalous as the majority suggests, such anomalous nature in no way renders the authority nonbinding. Rather, the anomalous nature of such cases characterizes the legal precedent as authority to be used in anomalous situations demanding immediate attention for the benefit of the public such as the one currently before the court.
The Petitioners’ section 13 claim is based on a law which is already in effect, involves the expenditure of state resources on certifying bills and placing them on a statewide ballot, and has been briefed extensively by the parties, intervenors, and amici. Moreover, a conclusive resolution would be extremely beneficial to the public and to officials of the *433other branches of government, including the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, and the State Treasurer. Accordingly, I would review this claim not only pursuant to the 4-part test of justiciability but also pursuant to this court’s discretion to reviews claims of broad overriding public import.
Because of the vast public interest at stake and pursuant to the broad overriding public import test, I would also review Petitioners’ claims involving sections 8, 4, and 3. Section 8 provides:
No fee may increase in any fiscal year by a percentage in excess of the fiscal growth factor for that fiscal year without prior legislative approval.
The Petitioners claim this provision violates Const. art. 2, § 37 which provides "No act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length”. Petitioners’ section 8 claim is based on a provision of the initiative which is already enacted and currently in effect. In addition, the claim implicates the state coffers as well as services for the citizenry of this state, and has been briefed extensively by the parties, intervenors, and amici. I disagree with the majority’s suggestion the Petitioners should have "analyzed” each amended statute individually. The allegation is simple and needs no specific "analysis”. Finally, because the security and reliability of budgetary planning as well as other legislative decisions would be enhanced, a conclusive resolution would be extremely beneficial to the public and other branches of the government.
Sections 4 and 3 of the initiative require approval by two-thirds of the members of each house of the Legislature before various measures may be taken. Petitioners claim the super-majority requirements of these two sections violate Const. art. 2, § 1(b) (see footnote 1), Const. art. 2, § 22,6 and *434Const. art. 7, § 1 (see footnote 2). The public benefit to securing a prompt and determinative decision on the constitutionality of sections 4 and 3 is enormous. The claim is one of great public interest because it involves allegations of improper limitations on the appropriation and use of state coffers. The claims based on both sections have been extensively briefed by the parties, intervenors, and amici. Finally, an opinion would be extremely beneficial to both the public and to other branches of government. Because legislators are representatives who are paid by the public to further its collective interests and who must currently introduce and take positions on legislation which will imminently be subject to a super-majority requirement, the provisions have a current and allegedly deleterious effect on legislation being proposed. I take issue with the majority’s claim "[i]t is possible that acts which are deemed to fall within section 4(1) will pass by two-thirds of the votes and so this greater voting requirement will have no real effect”. Majority, at 413. The legislator Petitioners have claimed the law has already had a "chilling effect” on the nature and substance of legislation proposed. There is therefore no need to also show that a piece of proposed legislation has failed the super-majority requirement. In addition, the security and reliability of budgetary planning as well as other legislative decisions would be greatly enhanced by an opinion from this court. In particular, it would be enormously helpful to Brian Ebersole and Joel Pritchard who Petitioners allege face a conflict between Const. art. 2, § 32 and Const. art. 2, § 22 on the one hand, and sections 3 and 4 of the initiative on the other hand.
In sum, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to avoid the merits of Petitioners’ challenge to section 13 of the initiative. Nor can I agree with the majority’s decision with respect to the challenges to sections 8, 4, and 3 which decision fails to recognize the broad overriding import of the issues presented and the fact the initiative may be operating *435as an impermissible departure from our time-tempered methods of amending the constitution.
Johnson, J., concurs with Utter, J.
Const. art. 2, § 1(b) provides: "The second power reserved by the people is the referendum, and it may be ordered on any act, bill, law, or any part thereof passed by the legislature, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions, either by petition signed by the required percentage of the legal voters, or by the legislature as other bills are enacted . . ..”
Const. art. 7, § 1 provides in relevant portion: "The power of taxation shall never be suspended, surrendered or contracted away”.
I note my strenuous objection to the majority’s decision to raise the issue of justiciability sua sponte. First, Respondents do not contest justiciability of this claim in their briefs. See Br. of Resp’ts, at 42-49 (only challenging claims relating to sections 8,4, and 3), and Reply Br. of Resp’ts, at 6-7 (describing section 13 as "arguably ripe for review”, "currently controlfling] the procedure for the enactment of’ a bill and standing "fi]n contrast” to those sections of the initiative not in effect until July 1, 1995). Moreover, the facts of this case, evidencing current and momentous consequences of failing to address the merits of the Petitioners’ section 13 claim, conflict with the majority’s decision to raise the issue of justiciability sua sponte.
Petitioners argue the proposed increase in the amount of the principal residence tax exemption for qualifying individuals (effectively reducing their taxes) will have the inevitable effect of raising taxes for others, and therefore represents a revenue-neutral tax shift which must be subject to voter referral.
The majority contends Clark Cy. Sheriff was premised in part on the fact the official against whom the mandate was directed had engaged in infringing behavior on many occasions in the past. See majority, at 408. However, the holding was simply that because a precise statutory duty existed, because the writ could he worded specifically, and because the command to act did not vary according to circumstances, a writ was appropriate. The same circumstances exist here.
Const. art. 2, § 22 provides: "No bill shall become a law unless on its final passage the vote be taken by yeas and nays, the names of the members voting *434for and against the same be entered on the journal of each house, and a majority of the members elected to each house he recorded thereon as voting in its favor.”