(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. While I agree that the Board and Superior Court could not properly consider the "private home” issue, I disagree with the disposition reached by the majority because I believe the "worker” issue was properly before the superior court.
The Board’s final order of September 10,1991, affirmed the original Department order rejecting Hanquet’s claim. Thus the Department prevailed at the Board level. Hanquet initiated the appeal by giving notice that he was appealing "from each and every part of the order entered ... on September 10, 1991”. The majority holds that at this point the Depart*667ment also needed to file a notice of appeal in order to vest the Superior Court with jurisdiction to review the "worker” issue. Majority, at 664.
A requirement for a notice of cross appeal is a commonplace in appellate rules. RAP 5.1(a) and 5.2(f), as well as RALJ 2.1(b) and 2.4(a), require any party seeking relief from a decision, not just the party initially seeking review, to make a timely filing of á notice of appeal. It is noteworthy that even under these formal rules, the appellate court will expand its scope of review to grant affirmative relief to a respondent notwithstanding the absence of a notice of appeal if the necessities of the case demand. RAP 2.4(a); Seattle v. Marshall, 54 Wn. App. 829, 831, 776 P.2d 174 (1989), review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1008 (1990).
More significantly, these rules do not apply here, even by analogy, because the jurisdiction of the superior court to entertain appeals from the decisions of the Board is vested only in the manner specified by the act. Department of Labor & Indus. v. Cook, 44 Wn.2d 671, 672, 269 P.2d 962 (1954).
RCW 51.52.110 sets forth procedures to be followed by a "person aggrieved by the decision and order of the board”. Nothing in the statute requires the Department to file a notice of appeal when it is the prevailing party. The Department’s right to initiate an appeal, found in the proviso at the end of RCW 51.52.110, arises only when the Board has made a decision and order reversing the Department’s original order. Here the Board’s Final Decision and Order upheld the Department’s original order rejecting Hanquet’s claim.
The majority points to Perry v. Department of Labor & Indus., 48 Wn.2d 205, 292 P.2d 366 (1956) in support of its holding, but Perry was a case where no one, including the aggrieved claimant, appealed a final order of the Board within the time period required. Majority, at 665. The order itself was not before the court. Here, Hanquet’s appeal brought the Board’s Decision and Order before the court.
The trial court conducts a hearing de novo only on issues of law or fact that were properly before the Board. RCW 51.52.115. The Board’s entire record is certified to the court. *668RCW 51.52.110. The court has no limitation on the intensity of its review of the record, except that it cannot go beyond the Board’s record and take additional evidence. Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 45 Wn. App. 335, 340-41, 725 P.2d 463 (1986). The court steps into the shoes of the Board and may decide every issue that the Board itself properly considered as shown by the record.
Every appeal to the Board is a challenge to the Department’s original determination of the fundamental question of coverage — "whether a 'compensable injury’ has occurred and the extent thereof.” Brakus v. Department of Labor & Indus., 48 Wn.2d 218, 221, 292 P.2d 865 (1956). The Superior Court could not decide this fundamental question without reviewing the entire record and resolving the "worker” issue.
Even assuming that the scope of the trial court’s review must be limited to the issues identified by the appellant in the petition for superior court review, see Garrett Freightlines at 341, Hanquet’s Notice of Appeal to Superior Court stated that he was appealing from "each and every part” of the Board’s order. The majority concludes as a matter of "common sense” that Hanquet’s Notice of Appeal did not mean what it said. Majority, at 664 n.3. In my view, we should not engage in judicial rewriting of a party’s pleading when the result is not only to deprive a court of jurisdiction, but also to deprive the opposing party of its day in court as a sanction for having read the notice of appeal literally. Common sense suggests just as persuasively that the reason Hanquet’s attorney had a standard notice of appeal form, used in all appeals from the Board and altered only by insertion of the appropriate claim number and date, is precisely because all appeals from the Board to superior court bring up for review the entire record and all issues pertaining to coverage. The court in Garrett Freightlines, confronted with an identical standard notice seeking review of "each and every part of’ the Board’s order, found no basis for limiting the trial court to reviewing only those issues the appellant chose to argue. Garrett Freightlines, at 340-41.
*669I would hold that once the Board’s decision denying coverage came before the court on Hanquet’s appeal, the Superior Court had jurisdiction over every issue pertaining to coverage that was properly before the Board, and was not obligated to limit its scope of review only to those issues pressed by Hanquet.
It is undisputed that the Department’s original order denied coverage on the basis that Hanquet was a sole proprietor or partner, not a worker; that this determination was properly heard by the industrial appeals judge as the sole issue in the case; and that it was the sole issue set forth in the Department’s Notice of Appeal to the Board. Hanquet had a full opportunity to present evidence and argument on the issue in all proceedings below. There is no basis for believing that Hanquet was in any way prejudiced by the Superior Court’s consideration of this issue.
I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Review denied at 125 Wn.2d 1019 (1995).