dissenting.
The issue presented by appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief is whether or not the record of the guilty plea proceeding demonstrated a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel. In order to do so the record must disclose that the defendant was aware of the constitutional right to counsel and that he freely chose to relinquish or give up that right. Hatcher v. State, (1981) Ind., 414 N.E.2d 561. At the *208heart of this matter is the special nature of the right to counsel. It is among the most fundamental and important constitutional guarantees serving to insure the fair trial of criminal cases, and courts have consistently demonstrated a perceptibly greater degree of diligence in insuring it. To illustrate this, Judge Miller for the Fourth District Court of Appeals quoted the following from Faretta v. California, (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562:
“[w]hen an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forego those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. [458] at 464-465 [58 S.Ct. 1019 at 1022-1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461]. Cf. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 [68 S.Ct. 316, 323-324, 92 L.Ed. 309] (plurality opinion of Black, J.). Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. [269] at 279 [63 S.Ct. 236 at 241, 87 L.Ed. 268].” 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.
In the present case, it was recorded only that the trial judge accepting the plea of guilty stated that appellant had the right to an attorney and that he had a right to talk to an attorney. There is nothing in those flat, unembellished statements of the judge, or in the responses of appellant, that shows appellant was aware of any of the “traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel" or the “dangers and disadvantages” of serving as one’s own lawyer. This record is simply barren of any rational basis upon which to infer that at the time appellant uttered his responses to the judge, he was aware of the significance of waiving the right to counsel. This being so, the evidence presented to the post-conviction court leads inescapably to the conclusion that appellant was entitled to withdraw his former plea of guilty.
I am therefore in accord with the opinion of the Fourth District that the judgment must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.