dissenting.
I dissent. The majority has misconstrued the issue in this appeal: the focus of the Commonwealth’s appeal is not on whether appellee’s contempt was direct or indirect, but is, rather, on whether appellee’s contempt was committed in open court, thus justifying the imposition of a term of imprisonment.1
In this case, the trial court found that appellee’s failure to appear in court pursuant to a lawful subpoena constituted indirect criminal contempt as defined in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131(2),2 and that the contempt was not committed in open court. In accordance with its findings, the trial court imposed a fine of $300, but no term of imprisonment.
The punishment of imprisonment for those criminal con-tempts defined in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131 “shall extend only to such contempts as shall be committed in open court.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132. Thus, the distinction between direct and *589indirect criminal contempt is irrelevant for purposes of sentencing under this statute and for purposes of resolving this appeal.3
This Court has defined “open court” as a court “ ‘which has been formally convened and declared open for the transaction of its proper judicial business.’ ” Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 487 Pa. 392, 400, 409 A.2d 407, 411 (1979). The defendants in Ferrara were convicted of contempt for their failure to appear in court when required,4 and this Court concluded that “[ajppellants’ failure to appear on the scheduled dates for arraignment and for trial were acts committed in ‘open court’ (that is, in a court ‘convened and declared open for the transaction of its proper judicial business’) and therefore, their contemptuous conduct can be punished by imprisonment.” Id.
In this case, appellee was subpoenaed to appear as a witness in a criminal trial — in a court convened and declared open for the transaction of its proper judicial business. Therefore, appellee’s contempt was likewise committed in open court. The trial court thus committed an error of law when it concluded that the contempt in this case was not committed in open court within the meaning of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132, and that appellee could not be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for her contumacious behavior.
I am also at a complete loss as to the majority’s reason for quashing the instant appeal. The majority cannot have it both ways: it cannot decide this appeal on the merits, and then quash the appeal because this Court lacks jurisdiction. Even though a direct appeal to this Court was not available in cases of indirect criminal contempt at the time this case *590arose,5 appellee’s failure to object to such a lack of jurisdiction operates to perfect this Court’s jurisdiction:
The failure of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court within such time as may be specified by general rule, shall, unless the appellate court otherwise orders, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court ....
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 704(a). See also Rule 741(a), Pa.R.A.P.
I would vacate the judgment of sentence and remand this case for resentencing.
. The Commonwealth, in its brief before this Court, states: “The sole question before this Honorable Court is whether the contempt herein was a contempt in ‘open court’ warranting the imposition of a term of imprisonment.”
. The criminal contempt in this case is defined as follows:
The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue attachments and to inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases:
(2) Disobedience or neglect by ... witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court.
. The majority’s reliance upon double jeopardy arguments is likewise irrelevant for purposes of resolving this appeal.
. The defendants in Ferrara were charged with contempt under Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 23, 17 P.S. § 2041 (replaced as of June 27, 1978 by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131), and, like appellee in the present case, were convicted of contempt for their “disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court.”
. The instant appeal is from an order of the Allegheny County Court of Common-Pleas filed on July 1, 1980. At that time, this Court had jurisdiction over direct appeals in cases of direct criminal contempt. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 722(4), as it existed prior to its amendment in September, 1980.