dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Anderson police officers' initial stop of Lark's vehicle was not supported by a reasonable suspicion in violation of Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, the evidence leading to his eventual apprehension and arrest flowed from an illegal traf-fie stop.
Here, the trial court denied Lark's motion to suppress on the basis that there was a reasonable articulable basis for the officer to believe that Lark had stopped his vehicle and blocked traffic, which served a legitimate basis for the officers to make an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Because the police officers only observed Lark's vehicle stop for ten to fifteen see-onds and Lark was not committing a crime there was no evidence to support a reasonable belief that criminal activity was about to occur,. The police officers did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Lark's vehicle, and therefore, violated Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Indiana has "adopted the Terry6 rationale in determining the legality of investigatory stops under Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution." Wilson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The "reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied when the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has or is about to occur." Id.
At the suppression hearing, the arresting officers testified that at approximately 2:00 a.m., when they turned the corner onto Cedar Street in their police car, they saw: a car parked in the street in front of a nightclub; a man standing outside the car, leaning into the car, cars parked on both sides of the street; and a car traveling towards them in the opposite direction. However, the police officers further testified that they observed the car parked in the street for approximately ten or fifteen seconds. Moreover, the record reveals that the police officers did not stop Lark's vehicle until he turned from Cedar Street and had drive four blocks from the place where the police officers had observed his vehicle stopped for ten to fifteen seconds. Finally, the police officers testified that when they stopped Lark's vehicle, their intention was not to give Lark a citation for obstructing traffic, but instead, to warn Lark not to obstruct traffic. Therefore, I am not persuaded by the majority's holding that the police officers were justified in stopping Lark's vehicle because he had committed a traffic violation. In fact, Lark never received a citation for obstructing traffic. The police officers testified that their intention was to merely give Lark a warning not to obstruct traffic.
Therefore, based upon the facts of this case, I cannot agree that the police officers had a reasonable articulable basis to stop Lark's vehicle and there was no evidence to support a reasonable belief that criminal activity was about to occur.
*1158I would reverse the trial court's denial of Lark's motion to suppress.
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).