(Concurring Opinion)
Faulconer, J.— I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. This appeal presents to this court the question whether either or both paragraphs of appellants’ complaint stated a cause of action. The demurrer filed by appellees and sustained by the trial court was on the. ground that neither paragraph stated a cause of action. The memorandum accompanying appellees’ demurrer stated that neither paragraph alleged the giving of notice to appellee, City of Huntingburg, as required by Acts 1935, ch. 80, § 1, p. 235, § 48-8001, Burns’ 1963 Replacement. The first paragraph is an action for damages for the death of appellant’s spouse caused by negligence of the City of Huntingburg which owned and operated a municipal electric plant. Therefore, notice was required and the demurrer was properly sustained as to the first paragraph.
*71Appellants contend that the second paragraph, although for damages for the death of her spouse, is an action for breach of contract and, therefore, the notice statute does not apply and notice need not be given.
As to the second paragraph, we must interpret §48-8001, supra, which reads as follows:
“Hereafter no action or actions of any kind for damages arising from any negligence, wilfulness,' nuisance, or other tort of any municipal corporation that causes injury to any person, or loss, injury or damage to any property, or any wrongful death, and regardless of to whom any such action or actions may accrue, shall be brought or maintained aganist any municipal corporation of this state unless there is first served upon either the mayor or clerk of any such city or a member of the board of trustees of any such town, either by delivery thereto in person or by registered mail with return card, a written notice of the occurrence complained of, setting out therein a brief general description of the date and time, the place, the conditions and cause, the nature and extent of the injury to person and loss, injury or damage, if any, to property, the date and 'cause of any resulting death charged as wrongful and the nature of the damages arising to anyone therefrom, all as associated with and caused by such occurrence.. Such notice shall be dated and signed by the person giving the same and must be served as aforesaid so as to be received by some municipal official aforesaid within sixty [60] days after the occurrence complained of, regardless of tuhat causes of action may arise or result therefrom, except that where snow or ice is associated with such occurrence as the cause thereof, in whole or in part such notice shall be so served within thirty [30] days after such occurrence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
If is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that the courts should attempt to discover and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. State ex rel. Rogers v. Davis (1952), 230 Ind. 479, 482, 104 N. E. 2d 382.
' Ordinarily such intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. State ex rel. v. Graham, Trustee (1953) , 231 Ind. 680, 686, 110 N. E. 2d 855 Such language must be reasonably and fairly interpreted so as to give it *72efficient operation and to give effect, if possible, to the expressed intention of the Legislature. 26 Ind. Law Encyc., Statutes, § 113, p. 315, 316.
“In construing a statute to ascertain the intention of the legislature, the court should consider the object or purpose to be attained by the statute.” 26 Ind. Law Encyc., Statutes, § 113, p. 317, supra.
Our Supreme Court and this court have many times enunciated the purpose of this statute to be to afford municipal authorities an opportunity to investigate the facts concerning an accident allegedly caused by the negligence of such municipality while such evidence is available. City of Gary v. Russell (1953), 123 Ind. App. 609, 614, 112 N. E. 2d 872; City of Logansport v. Gammill (1957), 128 Ind. App. 53, 60, 145 N. E. 2d 908; Aaron v. City of Tipton (1941), 218 Ind. 227, 230-231, 32.N. E. 2d 88.
The broad statement, “no action or actions of any kind” found in the statute (§ 48-8001, supra) is limited by the specification that it must be for damages. Not all actions for damages are covered however, only those actions for damages “arising from any negligence, wilfulness, nuisance, or other tort of any municipal corporation.”
To make the statute apply the Legislature has specified that the conduct of a municipal corporation must cause “injury to any person, or loss, injury or damage to any property, or any wrongful death.” In other words, my interpretation of this part of the statute is that the action must first be for damages; the damages must arise from the municipal corporation’s negligence, wilfulness, nuisance, or other tort; and that the conduct must have caused an injury to the person, or loss, or injury or damage to property, or wrongful death.
The statute further provides that the notice must be served within a certain time “regardless of what cause of action may arise or result therefrom.” (My italics.)
Therefore, in my opinion, the giving of notice is a prerequisite to the filing of an action for damages arising from *73any negligence, wilfulness, nuisance, or other tort of any municipal corporation that causes injury or damage to property, or wrongful death, regardless of what causes of action may arise or result therefrom.
In the second paragraph of appellants’ complaint it is alleged that appellees breached the contract to install and maintain electrical power lines across appellants’ property in that appellees “allowed and permitted said high voltage line and wire to become dislodged from and come off of the cross-arms atop of the electric poles on said real estate and thereby sag and drop upon one of the said wire fences on said farm. . . .”
The second paragraph of appellants’ complaint, although alleging a breach of contract, contains, in my opinion, all the elements of the statute. It is an action to recover damages for the death of appellant’s spouse which death arose out of the negligence or other tort of a municipal corporation. Therefore, the giving of notice was a prerequisite to maintaining the action alleged in the second paragraph of complaint.
We are, in my opinion, limited to the allegation of the second paragraph of appellants’ complaint. I feel that this interpretation satisfies the purpose of this statute, as well as giving effect to the words used and considers the Act in its entirety. If all of the elements set out in the statute are present, then notice must be given regardless of the cause of action.
Note. — Reported in 213 N. E. 2d 709.