concurring in result.
I agree that the FSSA's interpretation of IND. CODE § 12-7-2-28.6-defining a child care home-controls the outcome of this case. For two reasons: 1) the FSSA1 is empowered to enforce the statute; and 2) its interpretation of the statute is reasonable.
*624"An interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless the interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself" LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin, 7830 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind.2000). When a court is faced with two reasonable interpretations of a statute, one of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute, it should defer to the agency. Sullivan v. Day, 681 N.E.2d 718, 716 (Ind.1997) (holding that the trial court erred in not deferring to the FSSA's "plausible" interpretation of a statute since the FSSA was "charged with interpreting" that particular statute). So, as a matter of appellate adjudication, when a court determines that an administrative agency's interpretation is reasonable, it should "terminate[ ] its analysis" and not address the reasonableness of the other party's interpretation. Ind. Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. State ex rel. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 695 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ind.1998) (holding that the Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission's interpretation was reasonable, so that the analysis of the other parties' interpretation was unnecessary).2
A court is to continue to apply traditional principles of statutory construction in deciding whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable. See id. (examining both the text of the statute and statutory history in determining whether the agency's interpretation was reasonable). But after applying such principles and determining that an agency's interpretation is reasonable, a court should "terminate[ ] its analysis." Id. Here, the majority seems to weigh the two contrary interpretations even after acknowledging that the FSSA's interpretation was reasonable. See op. at 622 ("Finally, where a statute is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must consider the consequences of a particular construction."). The majority should have "terminated its analysis" when it concluded that the FSSA's interpretation was reasonable. Such deference, as commanded by our supreme court, "acknowledgles] the expertise of agencies empowered to interpret and enforce statutes and increasing public reliance on agency interpretations." Ind. Wholesale, 695 N.E.2d at 105.
. The "Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, Division of Family and Children" originally appeared as the plaintiff in this suit, R. at 5, but the Notice of Appeal lists the "Indiana FSSA" as the party appealing the summary judgment. ILC. § 12-17.2-2-1(1) specifically grants the Division of Family and Children (DFC) the responsibility of licensing and monitoring child care homes. See IND. CODE § 12-7-2-69(a)(2)(F) (specifying that the general term "division" used in IC. § 12-17.2-2-1(1) means the DFC). Regardless, the FSSA can be said to be the administrative agency with ultimate responsibility for enforcing the statute. First, the FSSA is the umbrella agency for the DFC and the two other main social service divisions. See IND. CODE § 12-8-1-5(3) (giving the FSSA the responsibility of providing technical *624assistance for the management and administrative performance of each division). Second, a recent opinion of this court used the words "division" and "IFFSA" interchangeably with respect to the licensing of child care homes. See Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Jones, 691 N.E.2d 1354, 1355 (Ind.Ct. App.1998).
. In Indiana Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. State, those challenging the Commission's interpretation were non-agency parties: National Wine and Spirits Corporation and Olinger Distributing Company, Inc. 695 N.E.2d at 101.