I agree with the majority that Civil Code section 1950.5 does not apply to defendant landlords’ nonrefundable security and administrative fees. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 121, 140-141.) I also agree that defendants have not been denied due process (id. at p. 140) and that the remedial order in this case, understood as foreclosing the possibility of double recovery by accommodating any evidence of prior payment, does not raise due process concerns (id. at p. 138). I dissent, however, from the majority opinion to the extent it holds the unfair competition law, Business and Professions Code1 section 17200 et seq. (UCL), does not permit the trial court’s order that defendants disgorge the proceeds of their illegal acts into a trust fund for the benefit of residential tenants in the affected jurisdiction, generally, as well as defendants’ identifiable direct victims. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 121, 126-139.)
Reversing a unanimous Court of Appeal, the majority reasons, essentially, that “fluid recovery” is not authorized as a remedy in private UCL actions because it is authorized in class actions. I cannot join in such fallacious reasoning. The majority’s conclusion, without support in the UCL’s plain language, flies in the face of our previous pronouncements and lower court decisions in which the Legislature has for decades acquiesced. With its decision, the majority today permits the landlord defendants in this case to retain nearly half a million dollars in illegal gains from unfair competition, while significantly diminishing consumers’ equitable and statutory protections against unfair business practices. This result is contrary to the legislative history, the language and the spirit of the UCL.
Background
The trial court found that defendants, large residential landlords, for many years engaged in unfair and unlawful business practices by charging tenants in their approximately 2,000 San Francisco apartments fees and deposits that violated Civil Code sections 1950.5 (security for residential rentals) and 1671 (liquidated damages). These illegal business practices, the court found, “have been systematically carried out by [defendants] for many years, beginning well before April 1, 1990 and continuing unabated since then.” Among other things, the trial court specifically found that, within the applicable four-year limitations period, defendants obtained illegal liquidated damages—sometimes as “security deposits”—in an average amount of $700 per tenant.
The trial court’s remedial order permanently enjoined defendants from continuing their illegal practices. The trial court also ordered defendants to *144pay specific restitution, including restitution for illegal liquidated damages, in various amounts to various named plaintiffs. Additionally, the trial court ordered defendants to disgorge, to identifiable present and former tenants “who may, with due diligence, be found” and then to a trust fund, the proceeds of their illegal acts, including $448,000 corresponding to unlawful liquidated damages (plus interest). Finally, the court’s order provides that any amounts paid as restitution to identified claimants shall be deducted from amounts required to be disgorged to the trust fund.
The trial court’s order also provides that the trust fund created by defendants’ disgorgement shall be administered “for the purpose of providing financial assistance for the advancement of legal rights and interests of residential tenants in the City and County of San Francisco.” The trust fund is to be administered for the court by three trustees, one appointed by the San Francisco District Attorney, one by the Executive Director of the Bar Association of San Francisco, and the third by the other two. The trial court expressly retained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter “for the purpose of further proceedings to secure implementation and enforcement of the remedial and injunctive provisions of this judgment” and provided that “[t]he specific charter for the trust fund, as well as more specific criteria and arrangements for administering the fund and authorizing disbursements from it, shall be approved by the Court and shall be the subject of further proceedings.”
Finally, the trial court ordered defendants to provide “written or published notice of this judgment, in a form and manner to be approved by the Court, to all current tenants and former tenants who rented and occupied defendants’ apartments from or after April 6, 1990.”
A unanimous Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Discussion
The majority does not dispute that defendants violated Civil Code section 1671 and the UCL by requiring tenants to pay illegal liquidated damages. Nor does the majority criticize the trial court’s computations resulting in the corresponding disgorgement order. The majority holds, however, that the judgment of the trial court for disgorgement of sums collected to secure liquidated damages “may be enforced only to the extent that it compels restitution to those former tenants who timely appear to collect restitution.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 138.) In support, the majority asserts that, to the extent the trial court ordered disgorgement to a fund benefiting San Francisco tenants, generally, “the award was not authorized by the UCL and was not a permissible exercise of the court’s equitable powers.” (Ibid.)
*145For the following reasons, I disagree.
The UCL’s language
As the majority acknowledges, section 17203 “grants the court the power to make orders necessary to prevent the use of unfair business practices.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 129.) Specifically, section 17203 expressly authorizes courts to “make such orders or judgments ... as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in [the UCL], or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.” In my view, this language plainly authorizes the trial court’s order in two ways— both as “necessary to prevent the use or employment” of unfair competition and as “necessary to restore to . . . person[s] in interest . . . money . . . which [defendants] . . . acquired by” unfair competition.
As it did in other parts of the UCL, the Legislature used the disjunctive in section 17203, authorizing orders “necessary to prevent . . . unfair competition ... or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property” (italics added), expressly thereby articulating two broad categories of permissible UCL remedies. Orders necessary to “prevent” future unfair competition and orders necessary to “restore” proceeds of past unfair competition are both authorized. (See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 561 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 731, 950 P.2d 1086] (Stop Youth Addiction) [Legislature’s use in section 17204 of the disjunctive when listing the entities empowered to bring UCL actions for relief “ ‘plainly suggests it meant to designate such entities in the alternative’ ”]; Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548, 973 P.2d 527] [as “ ‘section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent’ ”]; see generally Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. (1979) 442 U.S. 330, 339 [99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931] [canons of statutory construction “ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings”].)
The trial court’s remedial order in this case amply satisfies each of section 17203’s alternative remedial categories.
The trial court’s order is “necessary to prevent” future unfair competition because, as we have recognized, an “ ‘injunction against future violations, while of some deterrent force, is only a partial remedy’ ” (Fletcher v. *146Security Pacific National Bank (1979) 23 Cal.3d 442, 451 [153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51] (Fletcher)). Permitting defendants to retain any portion of their illicit profits would “ ‘impair the full impact of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforcement’ ” of the UCL is to be achieved. {Ibid.) In fact, the trial court’s order would seem crafted for maximum preventive impact—directing, as it does, both that defendants fully disgorge the proceeds of their illegal acts and that any disgorged funds not returnable to defendants’ reasonably identifiable direct victims be devoted, in trust and on appropriate terms, to the maintenance and defense of the legal rights and interests of the jurisdiction’s residential tenants. (See State of California v. Levi Strauss & Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 460, 474 [224 Cal.Rptr. 605, 715 P.2d 564] (Levi Strauss) [under one form of fluid recovery, “uncollected funds are disbursed to a responsible governmental organization for use on projects that benefit noncollecting class members and promote the purposes of the underlying cause of action”].)
The trial court’s order also is “necessary to restore” the proceeds of defendants’ illegal acts to appropriate interested persons, i.e., defendants’ present and former tenants, and tenants in the affected jurisdiction or their advocates. (See Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 474; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 773 [259 Cal.Rptr. 789] [court in a UCL suit “is empowered to grant equitable relief, including restitution in favor of absent persons”]; People v. Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 330, 343 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 34] (Powers) [where compensating a direct victim is not possible, “the theory of fluid recovery permits an award of the funds to an interested third party”]; People ex rel. Smith v. Parkmerced Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 683, 693 [244 Cal.Rptr. 22] (Parkmerced) [nonparty residents’ organization with “vested interest” in outcome was appropriate recipient of unclaimed remedial refunds in action to recover illegal rental fees].)
In creating a tenants’ trust fund as a repository permitting full disgorgement to interested parties of defendants’ illegal gains, the trial court invoked the concept of “fluid recovery”; it is this fluid recovery aspect of the trial court’s order to which the majority objects. But “fluid recovery,” as the majority acknowledges, is simply a term California courts have sometimes adopted when referring to “ ‘the application of the equitable doctrine of cy pres in the context of a modem class action.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 127; accord, Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 472.) Interchangeably, we have used the term “fluid distribution.” (See Levi Strauss, supra, at p. 474.)
The cy pres doctrine originated in the common law of charitable trusts: “Where compliance with the literal terms of a charitable trust became *147impossible, the funds would be put to ‘the next best use,’ in accord with the dominant charitable purposes of the donor.” (Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 472, citing Estate of Tarrant (1951) 38 Cal.2d 42, 49 [237 P.2d 505, 28 A.L.R.2d 419].) For over a century, California courts have applied the cy pres doctrine to achieve remedial equity in a variety of contexts. (See, e.g., Estate of Hinckley (1881) 58 Cal. 457, 512 [declaring that “in the general devolution upon the Courts of this State of all judicial power, with respect to charities, is included in the power cy pres”]; Estate of Tarrant, supra, at p. 49 [gift earmarked for nonexistent railway pension fund directed under cy pres to nonprofit corporation benefiting railway employees]; In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 210-212 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 620, 900 P.2d 1170] [ordering that attorney who mass-mailed misleading advertisements about homesteading pay $170,000 “cy pres restitution” to consumer protection prosecution trust fund].)
Amicus curiae, the California District Attorneys Association (District Attorneys), a statewide organization comprised of public officers charged with enforcing the UCL, explains that California courts for many years have used the cy pres concept in ordering disgorgement of unlawfully obtained funds where direct compensation of victims cannot practically be effected. Taking a position diametrically opposed to the majority, the District Attorneys state that barring fluid disgorgement in private, uncertified UCL actions (as the majority does today) will undermine the UCL’s function as “an efficient alternative to class actions as a means of addressing unlawful conduct through equitable remedies.” As public prosecutors, the District Attorneys emphasize that private UCL enforcement is a vital supplement to their efforts against illegal business practices in this state.
Under existing precedent, the District Attorneys note, courts have discretion to require class-action-like procedures in particular UCL matters, although they are not required to do so. (See generally Fletcher, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 454; see also Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 644, 660-661 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 419].) UCL actions often are formally incompatible with class treatment, as class plaintiffs must be “truly representative of the absent, unnamed class members” (Bartlett v. Hawaiian Village, Inc. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 435, 438 [151 Cal.Rptr. 392]) while, in keeping with the UCL’s broad remedial purposes, a private party has UCL standing regardless of whether he or she is directly aggrieved. (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 560-561; Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 211, 215 [197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660] (Children’s Television).) The District Attorneys, therefore, quite understandably oppose any rigid restriction on fluid *148recovery such as the majority announces today, because such a restriction will severely limit the remedies available in a critical class of UCL actions— those brought by personally unaggrieved plaintiffs.
Although this is not a publicly prosecuted UCL action and the majority does not state it would bar cy pres or fluid recovery in such actions, one implication of the majority’s construction of the UCL is to call into question the basis for these remedies in UCL actions generally. As the District Attorneys point out, section 17203, in describing permissible UCL remedies, draws no distinction between public and private actions. The District Attorneys emphasize, moreover, that complete disgorgement is a common remedial goal in publicly prosecuted UCL actions, as well as in private actions. In expressly construing the UCL to ban fluid recovery in private, uncertified UCL actions, therefore, the majority must accept responsibility for articulating a rationale that threatens to undermine public prosecutorial prerogatives as well.
I agree with the District Attorneys that we should retain a flexible construction of section 17203, permitting trial courts to countenance the full range of equitable and statutory UCL remedies, including in appropriate cases cy pres fluid recovery, even absent class certification. The District Attorneys amply demonstrate that the deterrent effect of private UCL actions is an essential component of California’s scheme for combating unfair competition. And, as we have understood for over 20 years, obtaining “ ‘the full impact of the deterrent force [of UCL remedies] is essential if adequate enforcement [of the law] is to be achieved. One requirement of such enforcement is a basic policy that those who have engaged in proscribed conduct surrender all profits flowing therefrom.’ ” (Fletcher, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 451, first brackets added; see also Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1267 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545], superseded by statute on another point [Legislature considered UCL deterrence “so important that it authorized courts to order restitution without individualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury”].)
Contrary to the majority’s apparent implication (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 127 & fn. 11), nothing in section 17203—or anywhere else in the UCL— suggests the Legislature’s use of the phrase “any person in interest” (§ 17203) was intended to restrict a court’s inherent equitable powers when crafting UCL remedies. As the majority points out, this language originated in the 1972 amendments to section 17535 and subsequently was added to the UCL. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 131.) We previously have noted that “whenever the Legislature has acted to amend the UCL, it has done so only to expand its *149scope, never to narrow it.” (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 570.) In describing one category of permissible UCL remedies, section 17203 refers genetically to orders “necessary to restore” unfair competition proceeds, but notably does not employ the more specific term, “restitution.” Thus, as the majority recognizes, an order that a defendant disgorge money obtained through an unfair business practice “may include a restitutionary element, but is not so limited.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 127.)
Nor, contrary to the majority’s apparent implication, does any statutory language constrict the UCL’s “restorative” prong to “persons who had an ownership interest in the property.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 127.) The majority cites several statutes, apparently meaning to suggest they illustrate the Legislature’s use of the phrase “person in interest” in section 17203 was intended to limit UCL “restor[ation]” to direct return of ownership interests to identifiable owners. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 127, fn. 11, citing § 17535 [false advertising remedies]; § 19214 [substandard insulation remedies]; Code Civ. Proc., § 873.810 [disbursement of partition sale proceeds]; id., § 1235.125 [eminent domain]; Pub. Resources Code, § 25966 [gas appliance ignition devices].)
None of the majority’s cited statutes mention the UCL or otherwise supports any narrowing of section 17203. In fact, we long ago construed the relevant language contrary to the majority’s implication. (See, e.g., Children’s Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 211 [if necessary for deterrence under § 17203 or § 17535, a “court may also order restitution without individualized proof of . . . injury”].) Business and Professions Code sections 17535 and 19214 and Public Resources Code section 25966 use broad remedial language substantially identical to that used in section 17203, but do not contain any qualifying language or provision supporting a narrow construction of that language, let alone the particular narrow construction at which the majority hints. Code of Civil Procedure sections 873.810 (partition of real property) and 1235.125 (defining “interest” in property as “right, title, or estate”) each use the word “interest,” but neither contains anything that suggests the Legislature meant to refer to interests outside those specialized statutory schemes. Code of Civil Procedure section 1235.125, in fact, is qualified expressly by a proviso that, unless the provision or context otherwise requires, “these definitions govern the construction of this title” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1235.110), i.e., the eminent domain law.
One Court of Appeal has remarked that it is “significant that the Legislature chose to use the word ‘restore’ in labeling that which an offending defendant may be ordered to do” (Day v. AT & T Corp. (1998) 63 *150Cal.App.4th 325, 338 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 55]), as the choice indicates sections 17203 and 17535 do not contemplate purely punitive monetary sanctions. (See generally Day, supra, at pp. 338-339.) Even so, the same court recognized that these statutes and the cases construing them “allow[] for a fluid recovery, as opposed to a restoration to identified individuals or classes, [if] the amount being restored [is] objectively measurable as that amount which the defendant would not have received but for the unfairly competitive practice.” (Id. at p. 339, italics added; Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d 460; Parkmerced, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 683.) The majority does not dispute that the amounts the trial court ordered disgorged in this case are objectively measurable as those that defendants would not have received but for their unfair practices.
Nor is the majority correct in assuming that, as a policy matter, “[w]hen restitution is made to a person in interest, fluid recovery is unnecessary.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 129.) Appropriate interested parties may not be individually identifiable, or identifiable at the time disgorgement is ordered. (See, e.g., Parkmerced, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 693; Powers, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 343.) It is neither possible nor desirable that we attempt to prescribe in advance all of the circumstances that might justify designating appropriate interested parties by class or description. Rather, as an equitable device, “ ‘[t]he propriety of Fluid Recovery in a particular case depends upon its usefulness in fulfilling the purposes of the underlying cause of action.’ ” (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 750 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 889 P.2d 970].)
The majority also seems to suggest that, simply in specifying the remedy or relief available, section 17203 “thereby limit[s] the extent of equitable relief’ courts may grant in UCL actions. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 131, fn. 14.) Exactly what the majority means here by the “extent” of equitable relief is difficult to discern, but, in any event, the majority offers no authority for its novel suggestion. The majority also fails to explain how the Legislature’s express authorization of “such orders ... as may be necessary” (§ 17203) to deter unfair competition or restore its proceeds can, either linguistically or logically, be construed as a limit on courts’ inherent equitable powers. “[W]hen the Legislature has desired to limit UCL remedies, it has ‘expressly provided’ (§ 17205) for such limitation” (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 573), but section 17203 contains no such express limit. Nor does the UCL or any other statute contain an express limitation on cy pres or fluid recovery. To the contrary, “the Legislature has clearly stated its intent that the remedies and penalties under the [UCL] are cumulative to other remedies and penalties.” (Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court *151(1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 284 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 895 P.2d 56], citing § 17205.)
As we previously have observed, “it is unlikely the Legislature, in providing courts with broad equitable powers to remedy violations under section 17203, intended those powers be limited in an illogical, unfair and counterproductive manner.” (ABC Internat. Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1247, 1270 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 931 P.2d 290] (ABC).) Section 17203 does not “restrict the court’s general equity jurisdiction ‘in so many words, or by a necessary or inescapable inference.’ ” (People v. Superior Court [(Jayhill Corp.)] (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, 286 [107 Cal.Rptr. 192, 507 P.2d 1400, 55 A.L.R.3d 191] (Jayhill) [discussing § 17535].) “In the absence of such a restriction a court of equity may exercise the full range of its inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice between the parties, restoring if necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved.” (Ibid.)
Thus, as we held in Fletcher, supra, 23 Cal.3d 442, which addressed the court’s power to order restitution for false advertising under section 17535, and confirmed in Children’s Television, supra, 35 Cal.3d 197, with regard to the substantially identical wording of section 17203, when seeking restitution on behalf of absent third parties, individualized proof of the injury to those absent persons is not required “if the court determines that such a remedy is necessary ‘to prevent the use or employment’ of the unfair practice” (Fletcher, supra, at p. 453; see also Children’s Television, supra, at p. 211).
After all, in describing permissible UCL remedies, the Legislature emphasized not what may have been taken from victims of unfair competition, but what “money or property . . . may have been acquired by” (§ 17203, italics added) UCL violators. Such an emphasis suggests the Legislature intended that courts in UCL actions retain sufficient remedial flexibility to achieve complete disgorgement of unfair competition proceeds. In light of our previous pronouncements, the Court of Appeal unanimously so concluded, and I agree.
As we recently reaffirmed, under the UCL “as construed by this court and the Courts of Appeal, ‘a private plaintiff who has himself suffered no injury at all may sue to obtain relief for others.’ ” (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 561.) In my view, the UCL is clear and unambiguous in authorizing “any person” (§ 17204) to seek UCL remedies benefiting others, including any “orders or judgments ... as may be necessary” (§ 17203) to *152deter unfair competition or restore its proceeds to interested persons. The trial court’s order in this case falls well within the plain language of these statutes. As the “plain language of the statute establishes what was intended by the Legislature,” further judicial construction is not necessary to decide the case, and we “should not indulge in it.” (People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 937 [67 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189].)
Legislative history
Even while acknowledging its consonance with section 17203’s plain language, the majority largely invalidates the trial court’s remedial order in this case, asserting that “permitting orders for disgorgement into a fluid recovery fund would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s decision to expressly authorize fluid recovery in class actions and to provide that Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) suits on behalf of the plaintiff and other similarly situated consumers may be brought as class actions, . . . while failing to authorize fluid recovery in representative UCL actions.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 137; see also id. at p. 132, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 384.)
Any validity to the majority’s legislative history argument is not self-evident, as there would be nothing logically inconsistent with the Legislature’s intending, or our construing, the separate schemes governing class action residuals and disgorged unfair competition proceeds each to permit fluid recovery, or a cy pres remedy. (Compare Code Civ. Proc., § 384, subd. (a) [Legislature’s intent is that unpaid class action residuals shall be “distributed, to the extent possible, in a manner designed either to further the purposes of the underlying causes of action, or to promote justice for all Californians”] with Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203 [authorizing “such orders or judgments” as “may be necessary” to deter unfair competition or to restore its proceeds to interested persons].)
Moreover, the premises of the majority’s legislative history argument are flawed. First, the majority speaks of Code of Civil Procedure section 384 as having been enacted to “expressly authorize fluid recovery in class actions” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 132), but section 384 does not use the term “fluid recovery” at all. Rather, as noted, section 384 authorizes disbursement of class action residuals “in any manner the court determines is consistent with the objectives and purposes of the underlying cause of action.” (§ 384, subd. (b) .) Second, the majority accurately describes the Legislature as providing that certain Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) suits “may be brought as class actions” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 137, italics added), thus conceding *153the CLRA contains no requirement of class treatment. The CLRA provides that any consumer entitled to bring a CLRA action “may, if the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused damage to other consumers similarly situated,” seek the court’s permission to proceed on behalf of a class. (Civ. Code, § 1781, subd. (a).) The CLRA directs courts to permit class treatment only “if all of [certain listed] conditions exist.” (Civ. Code, § 1781, subd. (b) [listing traditional class action prerequisites].) That the Legislature has neither required class treatment of CLRA actions, nor specifically limited cy pres or “fluid recovery” to class actions, fatally undermines the majority’s legislative history argument to the extent it is premised on the contrary assumptions.
The majority’s own authorities refute its legislative history argument. The Legislature stated when enacting the CLRA in 1970 that “[t]he provisions of this title are not exclusive” and “[t]he remedies provided . . . shall be in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided for in any other law.” (Stats. 1970, ch. 1550, § 1, p. 3157; as amended, see now Civ. Code, § 1752.) In 1975 amendments, the Legislature clarified that, “[i]f any act or practice proscribed under [the CLRA] also constitutes a cause of action in common law or a violation of another statute, the consumer may assert such common law or statutory cause[s] of action under the procedures and with the remedies provided for in such law.” (Stats. 1975, ch. 615, § 1, p. 1344; now Civ. Code, § 1752.) It follows that, contrary to the core rationale of the majority’s legislative history argument, the Legislature did not intend, either when enacting or amending the CLRA, to displace cy pres, fluid recovery, or any other statutory or common law procedure or remedy available in unfair competition actions.
In fact, all three of the statutes on which the majority relies for its core “inconsistency” rationale (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 137) provide that their remedies are cumulative and do not displace others. First, the UCL states unambiguously that, “[u]nless otherwise expressly provided, the remedies or penalties provided by [the UCL] are cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this state.” (§ 17205.)2 Second, as just discussed in detail, the CLRA sweepingly declares its *154provisions are “not exclusive” and are “in addition to any other procedures or remedies” in “any other law.” (Civ. Code, § 1752.) Finally, albeit somewhat less broadly, Code of Civil Procedure section 384 declares it “shall not be construed to abrogate any ■ equitable cy pres remedy which may be available in any class action with regard to all or part of the residue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 384, subd. 3 Thus, the majority’s attempt to justify its ipse dixit ban on UCL fluid recovery on the ground that the CLRA and Code of Civil Procedure section 384 somehow displace a court’s traditional cy pres or “fluid recovery” authority in the UCL context simply cannot be reconciled with the plain language of those statutes.
Finally, the majority’s legislative history argument is contrary to the history of both the fluid recovery remedial device and that of the UCL.
The majority asserts that “[fjluid recovery in class actions was not authorized in this state until 1981” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 132, citing Bruno v. Superior Court (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 120 [179 Cal.Rptr. 342]), but even if correct that is beside the point, where the issue is the validity of fluid recovery in nonclass UCL actions. As discussed, “fluid recovery” is simply cy pres in the context of a modern class action (Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 472) and, as we long have recognized, California courts’ authority to utilize cy pres was included “in the general devolution upon the Courts of this State of all judicial power . . . .” (Estate of Hinckley, supra, 58 Cal. at p. 512.) Thus, California courts have utilized the common law cy pres doctrine for over a century and have for many decades fashioned “fluid” remedies, both in and out of the class action context.
This court itself employed a fluid recovery device, as the majority’s own authority notes,4 as early as 1946. In Market St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission (1946) 28 Cal.2d 363 [171 P.2d 875] (Market St. Ry. Co:), not a class action, a fund of money was established representing overcharges made by a *155street railway company. In staying a fare rollback ordered by the Railroad Commission, we had required the railway company to post a bond and deposit with the court certain securities against the need to make refunds in the event that we might ultimately affirm the Railroad Commission’s decision. When few eligible patrons filed refund claims, we did not return the money to the railway company, but instead awarded it to the City of San Francisco which, having recently purchased the railway, would, we noted, use the funds for the benefit of railway patrons, generally. (Id. at pp. 371-373.) In ordering such distribution, we invoked our “power and the responsibility of protecting the fund and of disposing of it in accordance with the applicable principles of law and equity for the protection of the litigants and the public whose interests are affected by the final disposition thereof.” (Id. at p. 367.) We also noted this court’s freedom, “in the discharge of that duty and responsibility, to use broad discretion in the exercise of its powers so as to avoid an unlawful or unjust result.” (Ibid., citing United States v. Morgan (1939) 307 U.S. 183, 194 [59 S.Ct. 795, 801, 83 L.Ed. 1211].) In Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d 460, we noted that Market St. Ry. Co., supra, 28 Cal.2d 363, “though not a class action, provides an example” of one “form of fluid distribution” (41 Cal.3d at p. 474), thus recognizing that fluid recovery, as a remedial device, is not necessarily confined to class actions.
Levi Strauss itself was brought as a class action by the Attorney General on behalf of persons overcharged by a clothing manufacturer. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that established a fund of money to be repaid to the relevant consumers, but many did not file claims and a substantial amount of money was left after legitimate claims had been paid. We noted that the equitable doctrine of cy pres provided a solution. After considering various forms that “fluid recovery” might take—including division among individual claimants, distribution to an appropriate governmental organization and the creation of a consumer trust fund—we remanded the matter, noting that “trial courts should have the full range of alternatives at their disposal” and that “disposition of the residue on remand is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.” (Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 479.)
In Parkmerced, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 683, a nonclass action pursuant to sections 17203 and 17206 seeking injunctive relief, civil penalties and reimbursement of illegal fees, remedial refunds due former tenants who could not be located were ordered turned over to a residents’ association. The Court of Appeal upheld the order, thus permitting both restitution to identifiable direct victims and disgorgement to an interested third party. The *156court declared that, while the residents’ organization was not a party, “it took a continuing interest in the matter, assisted the district attorney in gathering pertinent information, and had a vested interest in its outcome. Refunding the unclaimed securities to the organization for its use in representing the interests of the Parkmerced tenants is an appropriate disposition of the penalty funds.” (.Parkmerced, supra, at p. 693.)
Applying both Market St. Ry. Co., supra, 28 Cal.2d 363, and Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d 460, the Court of Appeal in Powers, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 330, not a class action, held that the doctrine of fluid recovery permits a trial court in a UCL action to require disgorgement of unfair competition proceeds to a fund benefiting “an interested third party,” there a governmental entity funding moderate-income housing. (Id. at pp. 339-344.) The court found “nothing in logic or in law supporting a theory that a wrongdoer should be entitled to retain its illegal profits simply because there is no cognizable direct victim” (id. at p. 341) and observed section 17203 “expressly entitles a court to take such actions as may be necessary to prevent the use by any person of any unfair business practice” (Powers, supra, at p. 340). Noting the deterrence rationale this court has discerned to underlie section 17203, the court, after reviewing fluid recovery cases, explained they “did not turn on the ability to name specific persons as victims, but on the equities of preventing the defendant from benefiting from the illegal transaction and of reversing the harm of the wrongful act to the greatest extent possible.” (Powers, supra, at p. 343.)
At least partly on the basis of this history, it has long been regarded as settled that, under the UCL, “an individual acting for himself or the general public may bring the action and obtain equitable relief, including restitution in favor of absent persons, without certifying a class action.” (11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (1999 supp.) Equity, § 95, p. 359.)5
The majority asserts there is “nothing ... in the legislative history of sections 17203 and 17535 to suggest that the Legislature intended to authorize fluid recovery in representative UCL actions when it made the power to order restitution statutory” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 132), but I disagree. As discussed above, California courts’ authority to order cy pres restitution (called “fluid recovery” in the class action context) long predated the Legislature’s 1972 amendment of section 17535 and its subsequent parallel *157amendment of the UCL, and the majority acknowledges “the Legislature added express power to order restitution to section 17535 only to clarify the law.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 132; see also Fletcher, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 453, fn. 6; Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 1 [1972 amendments to § 17535 were “simply to clarify existing law”].)
That the Legislature did not in terms discuss “disgorgement to absent parties” or use the words “fluid recovery” or “cy pres restitution” when enacting section 17203 (or in 1972, when amending § 17535), opting instead for a general description encompassing “such orders ... as may be necessary” to deter or restore the fruits of unfair competition, does not imply it meant to deprive courts of these established powers. To the contrary, when a legislative body “entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory purposes.” (Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry (1960) 361 U.S. 288, 291-292 [80 S.Ct. 332, 335, 4 L.Ed.2d 323].)
Senate and Assembly legislative history sources respecting the 1972 amendments to section 17535 “indicate that the Legislature was concerned to affirm the ‘general equity power’ of the courts, particularly the power to order restitution.” (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 774, citing Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1763 (1972 Reg. Sess.) May 1, 1972; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1763 (1972 Reg. Sess.) undated.) As discussed, California courts’ “general equity power,” then as now, encompassed cy pres and fluid remedies; accordingly, these contemporaneous legislative history documents plainly do not support—but, rather, refute—the majority’s tortured attempt to demonstrate that, when the Legislature amended section 17535 and the UCL, concededly thereby “confirming]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 132) California courts’ equitable powers, it somehow at the same time restricted those powers so as to foreclose full enforcement of orders, like the trial court’s in the instant case, that employ such equitable devices.
Quite recently, we reaffirmed our general understanding that “ ‘ “[t]he laws against unfair business practices were drafted in large part to prevent a wrongdoer from retaining the benefits of its illegal acts.” ’ ” (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 575, fn. 11, quoting ABC, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1270.) The “general equity power” that the majority acknowledges is preserved by sections 17203 and 17535 has always included a “full range of . . . inherent powers ... to accomplish complete justice between the parties, restoring if necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may be achieved” (Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 286).
*158“It cannot be too often repeated that due respect for the political branches of our government requires us to interpret the laws in accordance with the expressed intention of the Legislature. ‘This court has no power to rewrite the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed intention which is not expressed.’” (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 633 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 671, 927 P.2d 1175].) The majority today transgresses that fundamental principle, judicially rewriting the UCL to include a partial ban on fluid recovery that the Legislature neither expressed nor intended.
Due process
As noted at the outset, the majority holds that defendants have not been denied due process (maj. opn, ante, at p. 121) and that the remedial order in this case, understood as foreclosing the possibility of double recovery by accommodating any evidence of prior payment, does not raise due process concerns (id. at p. 138). I agree. In reaching these conclusions, however, the majority repeatedly alludes to “the due process concerns of defendants” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 138; see also id. at pp. 121, 125, 137), at one point opining in dictum that “allowing fluid recovery in representative UCL actions might implicate the due process concerns raised by defendants here and noted by the Court of Appeal in Bronco Wine Co. [v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms], supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at page 717]” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 137). As the majority explains, defendants have argued that UCL fluid recovery (both in the trial court’s order in this case and generally) creates a risk of “multiple suits and duplicative liability,” adequate protections against which are, according to defendants, “available only in a class action.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 138.)
For several reasons, I disagree that UCL fluid recovery (either in this case or generally) creates for defendants a risk either of oppressive litigation or of being forced to pay more than once for a single injury.
Initially, I agree with Justice Kennard that repetitive suits by nonparties in this case is not a realistic possibility. (Cone. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at p. 142.) Were the court to enforce the trial court’s disgorgement order (minus its provisions respecting “Tenant Initiation Expense Reimbursement” or TIER fees), and were a former tenant not a party to this action subsequently to sue under the UCL based on defendants’ actions between April 1990 and *159April 1994,6 no court entertaining such an action could award additional disgorgement because, by virtue of the judgment in this case, defendants would have given up all their ill-gotten gains and, as a matter of law, would have nothing left to disgorge.7 Nor, were such a potential future plaintiff to restrict her remedial plea to restitution of amounts she herself paid, would the suit threaten doubly to penalize defendants, as in such a case the plaintiff would be referred to the previously established fluid recovery fund for reimbursement as eligible. Neither scenario implicates due process, either for defendants or plaintiffs.
The majority does not suggest there would be any due process problem if, after issuance of a particular UCL fluid recovery order, a subsequent plaintiff, before the statute of limitations had run, commenced and prosecuted to judgment a claim based on the same conduct by the defendant and recovered in that subsequent action other or greater remedies for other or greater injuries than were redressed or proven in the former action. Nor would there be a due process problem to the extent such a plaintiff’s actual recovery in the second action might (on the defendant’s application or the court’s own motion) appropriately be fashioned to account for availability of remedies established in the first action (such as restitution from a fluid recovery fund) for the same injuries.
In UCL actions, generally, remedial fluid recovery funds necessarily are governed by section 17203; therefore, a court may, in administering any fluid recovery scheme, “make such orders or judgments ... as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition . . . or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property . . . which may have been acquired” thereby. (§ 17203.) As previously noted, we recently reaffirmed that section 17203 “provid[es] courts with broad equitable powers” (ABC, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1270) to fashion flexible UCL remedies.
Thus, in UCL actions seeking fluid recovery, as in all UCL actions, a court has power and authority to fashion a constitutional remedy. For example, as discussed, a trial court has discretion, in the exercise of its broad equitable powers under the UCL, in an appropriate case to require class action procedures, or to require advance notice to nonparties. The majority does not dispute a trial court’s equitable power not to award fluid recovery in *160particular cases, or to award it on terms designedly protective of constitutional rights. Nothing in the UCL—or any other statute, so far as I am aware—prevents a defendant from insisting upon, or a court in the exercise of the “full range” of its equitable powers from ordering, controls and procedures that ensure against any risk of double disgorgement. (See generally ABC, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1269; Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 286.)
In actions that may arise subsequent to a UCL fluid recovery order, just as California courts are served by legal and equitable principles empowering them to craft remedies in light of relief previously awarded, so too they are bound by others forbidding them to permit any kind of double recovery. (See, e.g., City of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1158 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 959 P.2d 752] [citing the rule that “employees who settle their claims for lost wages and work benefits as part of a [Labor Code] section 132a proceeding could not recover these damages as part of a subsequent FEHA proceeding” as an example of how “equitable principles preclude double recovery for employees”]; Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, 994 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 103, 928 P.2d 1181] [to prevent double recovery, damages awarded employee in trial against third party tortfeasors must be reduced by amount of workers compensation benefits received]; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 909 P.2d 981] [invoking “the rule against double recovery of tort and contract compensatory damages”].)
Accordingly, in UCL actions generally, the trial court plainly possesses authority and discretion to fashion fluid recovery orders that achieve the UCL’s remedial purposes while assuring fundamental fairness to the parties.
In this case, the fluid recovery fund should be governed by the trial court’s order creating it. As the majority concedes, the likelihood that any former tenant could presently overcome a statute of limitations barrier and separately recover against defendants is remote. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 138.) Thus, the possibility of such actions poses no practical due process threat. In any event, to the extent unresolved claims exist of which we are not apprised (which seems unlikely in view of defendants’ presumed interest in bringing such to our attention), their resolution would be governed by the principles set forth above and, as I have explained, this court is in a position to remind the lower courts of their power and obligation to fashion and administer UCL remedies in accordance with due process and general equitable considerations.
Even to the extent any theoretical risk remains of future duplicative suits, however, no practical possibility exists of double disgorgement. The fluid *161recovery fund created by the trial court would be “administered as a trust fund for the purpose of providing financial assistance for the advancement of legal rights and interests of residential tenants in the City and County of San Francisco,” but only after 90 days’ due diligence is conducted and restitution is made to plaintiffs and other former tenants found thereby. The court ordered restitution payments to be deducted “from the amount required for disgorgement,” and reserved all issues concerning award of attorney fees and costs. Finally, the court retained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action for the purpose of further proceedings to secure implementation and enforcement of its remedial order.
In light of the fluid recovery order’s numerous express provisions for continuing court oversight and administration, I conclude that the trial court, exercising its “broad equitable powers” (ABC, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1270) to fashion fair and effective UCL remedies, crafted a specific fluid remedy that constitutes no substantial threat to defendants’ due process rights. In the event unanticipated complications were to arise and threaten either party’s rights, the court could adjust the terms of the order and the administration of the trust fund to accommodate the circumstances. It was in order to retain such flexibility, presumably, that the trial court retained jurisdiction over the fund and provided that “[t]he specific charter for the trust fund, as well as more specific criteria and arrangements for administering the fund and authorizing disbursements from it, shall be approved by the Court and shall be the subject of further proceedings.”
For the foregoing reasons, I reject any suggestion that UCL fluid recovery inherently poses due process concerns.
What the majority accomplishes today is judicial legislation, plain and simple. Proposals for limiting UCL recovery to individuals directly harmed (after the fashion of the majority opinion), or for otherwise circumscribing UCL actions, repeatedly have been rejected by the Legislature.8 No matter— the majority today fiats judicially what the UCL’s detractors long have sought, and been denied, legislatively.
*162The trial court ordered defendant landlords to disgorge $448,000 (plus interest) in liquidated damages they illegally collected while leasing apartments over four years, but the majority today declines to enforce that order except to the extent any money disgorged is paid as restitution to identified former tenants. The trial court’s order identifies $2,255 in illegal proceeds payable as such. The difference is $445,745, plus interest. That this court should reach out, contrary to plain statutory language, legislative history and longstanding judicial precedent in which our Legislature consistently has acquiesced, so as to permit defendants to retain these ill-gotten gains, is regrettable.
Our task is not to favor or disfavor the UCL, but to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. In this case, the trial court’s order directing disgorgement of defendants’ illegal profits did just that. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied July 19, 2000.
Except as otherwise noted, undesignated statutory references are to this code.
Nowhere in any of the statutes cited by the majority is it “expressly provided” that UCL remedies are displaced or even limited. “The term ‘ “expressly” means “in an express manner; in direct or unmistakable terms; explicitly; definitely; directly.” ’ ” (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 573, citing Webster’s New Intemat. Diet. (3d ed. 1981) p. 803.) In order to conclude, as the majority states, that the mere existence of the CLRA and Code of Civil Procedure section 384 impliedly bars UCL fluid recovery, “we would have to read the word ‘implicitly’ into section 17205 or read the word ‘expressly’ out of it. Our office, of course, ‘is simply to ascertain and declare’ what is in the relevant statutes, ‘not to insert what *154has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.’ ” (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, at p. 573, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 1858.) “We are not authorized to insert qualifying provisions not included, and may not rewrite the statute to conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language.” (Stop Youth Addiction, supra, at p. 573.)
That Code of Civil Procedure section 384, subdivision (d) expressly preserves cy pres remedies only “in any class action” is not surprising given the section’s exclusive focus on “the unpaid residuals in class action litigation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 384, subd. (a).) Nothing in the statute suggests the Legislature even imagined section 384 might be thought to displace equitable or statutory cy pres outside the class action context. As we previously have noted, the Legislature has stated that its intent was just “ ‘to ensure that the unpaid residuals in class action litigation are distributed’ ” appropriately. (Granberry v. Islay Investments, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 751, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 384, subd. (a).)
See majority opinion, ante, at page 127; Levi Strauss, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 474.
Bronco Wine Co. v. Frank A. Logoluso Farms (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 699 [262 Cal.Rptr. 899] is no authority to the contrary. The Court of Appeal there expressly did not reach the issue of “whether it is proper to maintain an individual, representative action for unfair competition outside the confines of a class action.” (Id. at p. 720.)
The period covered by the applicable four-year statute of limitations in this suit filed on April 6, 1994, and for which the trial court calculated its remedial order.
See also concurring opinion of Kennard, J., ante, at page 142, explaining that “to the extent UCL restitution already paid overlaps with damages suffered as a result of the non-UCL claims, the defendant would be entitled to credit in [a] subsequent action . . . .”
See Anderson, Complaining More Efficiently, San Francisco Daily Journal (Sept. 16, 1999) page 1 (noting that for years “state business groups have pushed unsuccessfully for legislation to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to pursue unfair business practice claims” [id. at p. 9] and describing the repeated failure of bills to require class certification in UCL actions or more narrowly define “unfair competition”). A recent attempt by UCL opponents to legislate such limits, Assembly Bill No. 2186 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), was defeated in the Assembly Judiciary Committee. (See Bridge, Tort Reformers Try Hard, but Odds Are Long, S.F. Recorder (May 3, 2000) p. 1.) One observer called Assembly Bill No. 2186 “the Legislature’s likeliest candidate for failure” should it return. (Id. at p. 12.)