dissenting. I concur with the majority that the trial justice erred when he denied the defendant Murphy’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the indictment charging bribery. I also concur with the majority that when the trial justice considered Murphy’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy indictment there was evidence in the record from which the .jury could find a conspiracy between Murphy and Fontaine and that consequently the trial justice did not err in denying Murphy’s motion. In considering the defendant’s appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial *583■on the conspiracy indictment however, I have concluded that the trial justice committed error when he denied the defendant's motion.
It is significant that the trial justice in denying defendant's motion for a new trial stated that Gilbert impressed him as telling the truth, but that Murphy had lied under oath and his testimony was not worthy of belief. It is true that the trial justice in considering the testimony of a witness may accept or reject the entire testimony or may accept part and reject part thereof. If he accepts a part and rejects a part of the testimony, it is incumbent upon •him to point out in the record what part he accepts and what part he rejects. Here the majority indicates that only a portion of Murphy’s testimony was rejected by the trial justice. However, on my reading of the record, especially in the absence of any statement by the trial justice as to what portions are accepted and/or rejected, I conclude that the entire testimony of Murphy was rejected by the trial justice when he stated that Murphy's testimony was not worthy of belief. I might also point out that the state in its brief concedes that the entire testimony of Murphy was rejected by the trial justice.
There is no claim by Murphy that the trial justice failed to exercise his independent judgment or misconceived or overlooked material evidence. Murphy does not question the ruling of the trial justice as to credibility. He does not question the conclusion of the trial justice that Fontaine made an approach to Gilbert with an offer of money. The defendant disputes, however, the conclusion of the trial justice that the record indicates that he knowingly helped Fontaine in making such an offer to Gilbert. Murphy ■argues strenuously that the evidence and the inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom are insufficient to sustain a finding that he had knowledge of the offense charged in the indictment. The defendant urges that we follow *584the approach adopted by this court in State v. Montella, 88 R. I. 469, 477, 149 A.2d 919, 923 (1959), wherein we said:
“Our conclusions are based not on the credibility of witnesses but rather on the insufficiency of the evidence to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis but defendants' guilt. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the trial justice was clearly wrong in denying the motions for a new trial.”
In determining the issue as raised by defendant, we are required to accept as truthful all competent evidence, which, if believed, would support the verdict, and then decide whether that evidence is sufficient to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Contreras, 105 R. I. 523, 253 A.2d 612 (1969). In this case there is no direct evidence that Murphy conspired as charged in the indictment. Proof of guilt can be found, if at all, only by inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the established facts.
Before there can be a conspiracy, there must be an agreement or joint assent of the minds of two or more persons, and such agreement or joint assent need not be proved by direct evidence, but there must be evidence to prove the agreement or joint assent directly or such a state of facts that an agreement or joint assent may be legally inferred. Conspiracies cannot be established by a mere suspicion, nor does evidence of a relationship or association between the parties show a conspiracy. Johnson v. State, 208 Ind. 89, 194 N. E. 619 (1935).
The standard of proof necessary to sustain a criminal charge is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In a case where there is no direct evidence, as here, a finding of guilt will be warranted only if all the facts and circumstances necessary to establish that guilt, taken together, not only are consistent with the hypothesis that defendant was guilty, but also are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis *585that he was innocent. State v. Franklin, 103 R. I. 715, 241 A.2d 219 (1968); State v. Montella, supra. Where the evidence is consistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, it necessarily gives rise to a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. State v. Rose, 112 R. I. 402, 311 A.2d 281 (1973).
Richard J. Israel, Attorney General, Donald P. Ryan, Asst. Attorney General, for plaintiff. McKinnon & Fortunato, Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., for defendant.Since I consider the trial justice’s statement that Murphy’s testimony was not worthy of belief to be a rejection, of the defendant’s entire testimony, the action of the jury and the trial justice must be viewed as based entirely on the evidence presented by the state. I do not dispute that it may be reasonable to infer from the state’s evidence that Murphy had knowledge of and was a party to a conspiracy to bribe Gilbert, yet I cannot agree that the same facts do not support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence of such a conspiracy. I consequently conclude that the evidence fails to exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and that the evidence adduced has not proved the defendant guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. I therefore conclude that the trial justice was clearly wrong in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Accordingly I would sustain the appeal of the defendant as to the denial of his motion for a new trial. I therefore dissent from the opinion of the majority insofar as it relates to the defendant Murphy’s appeal from the trial justice’s denial of his motion for a new trial on the conspiracy indictment.
Motion for reargument denied.