I respectfully dissent.
I
Like Judge Kay, I cannot agree with the majority that the county ordinance at issue here—banning all aerial spraying of designated herbicides throughout the county—can coexist with the state statutory scheme.
As the majority recounts, over the past three and a half decades the Legislature has adopted a series of enactments which provide for the comprehensive regulation of the use of pesticides and herbicides in California by the state Department of Food and Agriculture (hereafter department). As section 11501 of the Food and Agricultural Code makes clear, the purpose of this legislation is not only to protect the health and safety of the public and the environment from the dangers of pesticides, but also “[t]o provide for the proper, safe, and efficient use of pesticides essential for production of food and fiber” and “[t]o permit agricultural pest control by competent and responsible licensees and permittees under strict control of the director and commissioners.”1 Thus, the department’s mission requires it to consider both the potential hazards and benefits of pesticides and herbicides in regulating their use for agricultural purposes throughout the state.
Pursuant to its statutory authorization, the department has promulgated detailed license and permit regulations pertaining to the aerial spraying of the herbicides at issue, specifying not only who may do the spraying, but also when and where such herbicides may be used, the permissible height at which the herbicides may be discharged, and the maximum wind velocity when discharge is permissible. (See, e.g., Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 3, §§ 2450, 2452, 2458.) Although county commissioners, who administer the state permit procedure, have discretion to impose additional requirements in light of local needs and problems (§§ 11503, 14006.5), as Judge Kay *496notes, even a local commissioner’s authority in this regard is expressly subject to the state director’s appro val. (§§ 11503; 14009.) Given this legislative scheme, I see no room for recognizing a broad legislative power in the county to prohibit all aerial spraying of a pesticide that is specifically authorized by a state-granted permit.
In upholding the ordinance, the majority relies heavily on section 14007 which provides that “[ejvery permit . . . issued [pursuant to the department’s regulations] ... is conditioned upon compliance with the law and regulations and upon such other specified conditions as may be required to accomplish the purposes of this chapter.” (Ante, at p. 483 [maj.’s italics].) Since a county ordinance is a “law,” the majority reasons that section 14007 recognizes a county’s power to impose any additional restrictions on the use of pesticides it desires, including by necessary implication an entire ban on the use of a pesticide that has been specifically approved by the department.
In my view, this reading of the statute strains credulity. While section 14007 recognizes a permit-holder’s obligation to comply with generally applicable county ordinances that do not unreasonably impinge on the activities specifically authorized by the state-authorized permit, the section cannot properly be read to afford a county the authority effectively to revoke the state-granted permit by proscribing the state-authorized activity. If the Legislature had intended to give counties a veto power over the use of a particular pesticide or the granting of a permit, it certainly would have expressed that thought in language clearer than section 14007.
The majority’s additional reliance on the air and water pollution statutes is similarly unavailing. While those enactments do provide that local entities may adopt stricter air or water pollution standards than those imposed by the relevant state or regional air and water pollution agencies, nothing in those statutes relates to the specific subject of pesticides or gives any indication that the Legislature intended to affect the Department of Food and Agriculture’s authority in this area. Indeed, legislation enacted in 1978— after the air and water pollution provisions cited by the majority—makes it quite clear that the Legislature has determined that the department is the appropriate agency to consider the environmental impact of pesticide use in this state. (Stats. 1978, ch. 308, §§ 1-9, pp. 643-648. See Comment, The Regulation of Pesticide Use in California (1978) 11 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 273, 295-297.) A more recent statute—enacted in 1983—reconfirms the legislative intent in this regard. (Stats. 1983, ch. 1047, § 2, pp.---, adding §§ 14021-14026.)
*497As noted above, the state pesticide legislation requires the department to consider both the dangers and benefits of pesticides in its regulatory measures. If an individual county, for its own reasons, could totally bar the use of a pesticide which the department has found essential to the state’s agricultural interests as a whole, one important purpose of the pesticide legislation would be defeated. Accordingly, I conclude that the ordinance is preempted by state law.
II
Although, in light of the above conclusion, I need not reach the federal preemption issue, I disagree with the majority’s resolution of that issue as well. Granted that, under normal circumstances, a federal statute which expressly authorizes “a State” to impose more restrictive regulations than are provided by federal law can reasonably be interpreted to permit political subdivisions of a state to exercise a like power, the legislative history of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972 strongly demonstrates a contrary congressional intent in this instance.
As the majority acknowledges, the report of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee on the 1972 act expressly stated: “The Senate Committee considered the decision of the House Committee to deprive political subdivisions of States and other local authorities of any authority or jurisdiction over pesticides and concurs with the decision of the House of Representatives. Clearly, the fifty States and the Federal Government provide sufficient jurisdictions to properly regulate pesticides. Moreover, few, if any, local authorities whether towns, counties, villages, or municipalities have the financial wherewithal to provide necessary expert regulation comparable with that provided by the State and Federal Governments. On this basis and on the basis that permitting such regulation would be an extreme burden on interstate commerce, it is the intent that Section 24, by not providing any authority to political subdivisions and other local authorities of or in the States, should be understood as depriving such local authorities and political subdivisions of any and all jurisdiction and authority over pesticides and the regulation of pesticides.” (Italics added.) (Sen. Rep. No. 92-838, 2d Sess. (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 3, at p. 4008.)
The majority seeks to dismiss this language by suggesting (1) that the relevant House committee had a different view of the permissibility of local regulation under the proposed federal act and (2) that the quoted report of the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee was superseded by a subsequent compromise with the Senate Commerce Committee. (Ante, pp. 492-*498493.) Both suggestions are based on an untenable reading of the legislative record.
In its initial report on the bill in question, the House Committee on Agriculture stated that while the relevant provision of the legislation would permit “[t]he States . . . completely [to] prohibit the use of these ‘restricted use’ pesticides within their jurisdictions,” “the Committee rejected a proposal which would have permitted political subdivisions to further regulate pesticides on the grounds that the 50 States and the Federal Government should provide an adequate number of regulatory jurisdictions.” (Italics added.) (H.R.Rep.No. 92-511, 1st Sess. p. 16 (1971).) This is a plain statement that the House committee did not intend to permit supplementary regulation by local political subdivisions. Although the majority suggests that this language should be interpreted to mean that the house committee simply intended to refrain from affirmatively authorizing local regulation as a matter of federal law but did not intend to prohibit states from delegating such authority to political subdivisions, that reading manifestly does not square with the committee’s conclusion that “the 50 States and the Federal Government should provide an adequate number of regulatory jurisdictions. ”
The majority’s treatment of the Senate proceedings is similarly flawed. As the majority points out, after the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee issued its report clearly stating that local regulation was to be prohibited, the Senate Commerce Committee proposed an amendment to the bill which, along with many other substantial changes, would have expressly permitted such local regulation. (Sen.Rep.No. 92-970, 2d Sess. (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 3, pp. 4111-4112, 4128.) Thereafter, the two Senate Committees met and worked out a compromise which settled the numerous differences in the bills that had emerged from the two committees. (See Explanation of Compromise Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 3, pp. 4088-4092.) With respect to the provision involved in this case, the text proposed by the Agriculture and Forestry Committee was adopted; the Commerce Committee’s amendment was dropped. (Id., at p. 4091.)
This history again plainly shows an intent to prohibit local regulation. In refusing to draw this conclusion, the majority states: “The explanation of the compromise stated that the Committee on Commerce amendment giving local governments authority to regulate was deleted but it did not state that the views of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry were adopted in their entirety on this issue or that the compromise adopted or rejected the middle ground which would leave the states to determine how to allocate *499their regulatory resources. The history of the Senate proceedings establishes only that there was a compromise and that under that compromise the Committee on Commerce’s intention to authorize local government regulation was rejected.” (Ante, p. 493.)
With all respect, I find this reasoning specious. Since the compromise bill adopted the Agriculture and Forestry Committee’s version without change, ordinary principles of statutory construction suggest that the provisions should be interpreted in light of the intent expressed in that committee’s report. If there had been any intent to modify the effect of the provision as expressed in that report, it would surely have been noted in the explanation of the compromise. Absent any such indication, the conclusion the majority draws from the Senate proceedings is unsupportable.
Thus, the legislative history from both houses of Congress indicates that the drafters of the legislation did not intend to permit supplementary regulation by local political subdivisions.
Accordingly, even if the ordinance in question were compatible with state law, it does not withstand a federal preemption challenge. (See L.I. Pest Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Huntington (1973) 72 Misc.2d 1031 [341 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96], affd. 43 App.Div.2d 1020 [351 N.Y.S.2d 945].)
I would affirm the trial court judgment granting summary judgment for the state.
Grodin, J.—Concurred in Part II.
In 1978, in enacting legislation which led to the department’s current regulations relating to the consideration of the environmental impact of pesticides in granting or withholding permits, the Legislature made the following findings, among others: “(a) Agriculture is a major and essential component of California’s economy, [t] (b) The proper, safe, and efficient use of pesticides is essential for the protection and production of agricultural commodities and for health protection, [f] (c) Timeliness in the application of pesticides is paramount in good pest management and is essential in the prevention of economic waste, [f] (d) Reasonable environmental review of such pesticide use is prudent and appropriate. ” (Stats. 1978, ch. 308, § 1, subds. (a)-(d), p. 643.)
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Food and Agricultural Code.