(concurring in the result) — I concur with the result of the majority and would also remand for a new sentencing hearing. There are three matters in which I disagree with the analysis of the majority.
I
Since the imposition of the death penalty is reversed on other grounds, it is unnecessary for the court to reach the issue as to whether the death penalty violates Const, art. 1, § 14. Nevertheless, my position is contrary to that of the majority. I believe the death penalty does violate Const, art. 1, § 14. The views of the Supreme Court of California in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972) on the issue of the death penalty as "cruel punishment" are congruent with mine.
In addition to citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976) as authority for its views, the majority argues this court should not substitute its moral judgments for those of the people. It further points out the people of California amended their constitution subsequent to People v. Anderson so the death penalty was, in California, no longer deemed cruel.
I fully agree with the majority that the judiciary must defer to the moral judgments contained in our constitution. If the meaning and application of our Bill of Rights, and the judgments contained therein, were fully revealed, there would be no need for this court to sit on cases involving our Bill of Rights as the popular will would always be manifest. Unfortunately, the constitutional language defies this easy escape for the judiciary. Thus, rather than decline to articulate the meaning of the constitution and its application, it is the duty of this court to express its understanding of the *712moral judgments rendered by the people in their constitution. If the people then believe the court is in error, the means to correct that error are available through the appropriate mechanism to amend our basic document. Const, art. 23.
Regardless of my views or the views of the majority, however, we need not determine the applicability of Const, art. 1, § 14. We should follow the long established practice of this court that when a case can be decided on other grounds we decline to consider constitutional issues. Ohn-stad v. Tacoma, 64 Wn.2d 904, 395 P.2d 97 (1964).
II
Our decision in State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) (Bartholomew II) is directly contrary to the refusal of the majority to admit the polygraph of Monte Yovetich. Bartholomew II holds polygraph interrogations are admissible in the sentencing phase as evidence of mitigation. Bartholomew II, at 645-47. It was error for the trial court to refuse to allow the polygraph to be used by defendant.
III
I agree the evidence of defendant's gun collection should not have been admissible in the case in chief of the State at the sentencing stage. I do not agree that Const, art. 1, § 24 is the appropriate vehicle by which to reach this conclusion. While I do not necessarily disagree with the construction placed by the majority on this constitutional provision, I believe the analysis for the admissibility of evidence by the State at the sentencing hearing we adopted in Bartholomew II is directly on point. Evidence from the State of nonsta-tutory aggravating factors must be "limited to defendant's criminal record, evidence that would have been admissible at the guilt phase, and evidence to rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant." Bartholomew II, at 642. The testimony on defendant's gun collection was submitted by the prosecution in its case in chief. It is inadmissible under *713the rule in Bartholomew II. We need not reach Const, art. 1, § 24.
Stafford and Pearson, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J., as to parts II and III.
Reconsideration denied August 7, 1984.