dissenting.
Had I been given the opportunity, I would have voted to deny the petition for an order granting certiorari. Since I was away from the court on the day the issue was considered by the other justices and therefore not given the opportunity to express my thoughts, I take this occasion to say that it is my judgment that the writ was improvidently granted.
The Writ-of-Certiorari Crisis Introduction
“ * f * Not being weary in search of substantial justice, he sues out a writ of error, and brings his case to this court, where substantial justice is known to be administered in all its purity.” 1 (Emphasis added.) Garbanati v. Beckwith, 2 Wyo. 213 (1880).
First addressing Chief Justice Rooney’s concurring opinion, in which he criticizes my dissenting position in this matter as he *646undertakes to show that a bill of exceptions is not the exclusive means by which the State may seek to review in this court an adverse ruling made during the trial and that certiorari is appropriate for this purpose, I am blessed by not having to do a great deal of responsive research since he and Chief Justice Raper (now retired) have done it for me in State v. Selig, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786 (1981) and State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 (1976). In State v. Selig, supra, 635 P.2d at 788, where the State sought review of an adverse ruling made during a criminal trial, Chief Justice Rooney, writing for the court, holds as follows:
“A bill of exceptions is the exclusive means for the prosecution to seek review of an adverse ruling made during the trial. State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 (1976); State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938); State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906). It is now a statutory proceeding, and the statutory requirements must be met. State v. Ginther, supra, and State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra.”
In State v. Heberling, supra, 553 P.2d at 1043, Chief Justice Raper (now retired), writing for the court, said:
“A bill of exceptions is the only way by which the State may challenge and have reviewed any adverse ruling of the district court in criminal prosecutions. State v. Benales, Wyo. 1961, 365 P.2d 811; State v. Ginther, 1938, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803. Even then, as provided in § 7-291, W.S.1957:
“ ‘The judgment of the court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state.’ ”
As the author of the majority opinion in the case at bar writes, the threshold question here is this court’s authority to review a district court’s order suppressing evidence in a pretrial criminal proceeding. The majority find, by authority of City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983), that certiorari could and should be used for this purpose. In my judgment, it is in utter disregard of the law for this court to hold that City of Laramie v. Mengel furnishes authority for us to grant cer-tiorari in the case at bar or that we are possessed of any jurisdiction whatever which would permit our utilization of cer-tiorari for these purposes. Before I explain my objection to the majority opinion in this and other relevant respects, I pause to notice the prophetic observations of former Chief Justice Raper (now retired), as he authored his concurrence in State v. Faltynowicz, Wyo., 660 P.2d 368 (1983). Faltynowicz was properly here on a bill of exceptions taken by the State from a County Court ruling dismissing a Criminal complaint. We sustained the bill of exceptions, but Chief Justice Raper saw the case as a “ * * * catalyst to point up some misleading and poor Wyoming jurisprudence.” 660 P.2d at 372.
He said:
“It is my concern that in this ease an appeal through the district court, rather than through the bill of exceptions procedure, by the State of Wyoming would have been the proper means of bringing the issue to the supreme court.” (Emphasis added.) 660 P.2d at 372.
Justice Raper thought it bad law — the historic rule of this court which holds that a bill of exceptions is the only way by which the State can bring an adverse ruling in a criminal case to this court’s attention for decision.2 He then concluded that his concern extended to
“ * * * instances where a trial judge may have, in a pretrial proceeding, sup*647pressed evidence necessary to the State in proceeding with the prosecution *
I disagree with Chief Justice Raper’s belief that the State of Wyoming has, under its Constitution, statutes, case law or court rules, an interlocutory-appeal right from a trial court’s adverse decision in a criminal case — a right which would even authorize the appeal of a pretrial evidentiary ruling— but I must say that his concurring opinion certainly started something. Since Falty-nowicz, we find the State’s petitions for writs of certiorari from pretrial and final orders in criminal prosecutions to be raining down about our heads in torrents. In entertaining these petitions — where the State is the petitioner in a criminal proceeding as exemplified in the case at bar — we are, without jurisdiction,3 inviting a myriad of appellate and trial-court problems.
The majority opinion in this appeal represents the first time in the history of Wyoming jurisprudence that this court has granted the State of Wyoming appellate review of an adverse ruling in the criminal-trial process.
It is fundamental to the consideration of the issues and their ramifications that the granting of certiorari has raised in this appeal, that the applicable Wyoming constitutional provisions be identified and considered.
The Constitution of the State of Wyoming, Art. 5, § 8, provides — with respect to writs of certiorari — as follows:
“The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers, and in habeas corpus. The supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, cer-tiorari, and other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.)
There are no “rules and regulations” pertaining to certiorari under Art. 5, § 2, which section provides:
“Supreme court generally; appellate jurisdiction.
“The supreme court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law” (emphasis added),
nor have regulations been adopted under Art. 5, § 18, which provides:
“Appeals from district courts to supreme court.
“Writs of error and appeals may be allowed from the decisions of the district courts to the supreme court under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." (Emphasis added.)
This leaves the applicable constitutional provisions in a position in this state whereby the supreme court has the “power” to issue writs of certiorari “in the exercise of its appellate * * * jurisdiction” but the “power” is present in circumstances in which there is no constitutional requirement for the issuance of such writs and no implementing “rules” and/or “regulations” have been adopted.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has historically — and with good reason — refused to even consider the merits of the State’s appeals in a criminal case on the oft-repeated ground that, there being no common-law right of appeal (State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938); Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo. 183, 83 P. 218 (1905)), and since the statutory bill-of-exceptions procedure (§§ 7-12-101 through 7-12-105, W.S.1977) is an exception to the common law, the bill of exceptions provides the only source of this court’s jurisdiction to review the State of Wyoming’s adverse criminal trial-court rulings (State v. Heberling, supra; State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906)).
As early as 1905, this court said in Mau v. Stoner, supra, 83 P. at 219, that, unless *648the Constitution guarantees an appeal as a matter “of right,”4 it is the legislature that has the implementing authority as contemplated by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18 of the Wyoming Constitution. We said:
“ * * * It is well settled that, in the absence of a direct constitutional requirement, the right of.appeal does not exist unless expressly conferred by statute. The right to have a judgment of an inferior tribunal reviewed by writ of error or appeal is not a natural or inherent right. It pertains merely to the mode of judicial procedure or the remedy. Unless it is guaranteed as a matter of right in the Constitution, the Legislature has power to pass laws not only regulating the mode of proceeding, but limiting the cases in which the right may be exercised. The remedy, by appeal was unknown to the English common law, hence it may be said that in both England and the United States the whole matter of appellate review is regulated almost entirely by statute law.”
It was the court’s task in Mau v. Stoner to decide whether a right of appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court was denied by a statute which provided that a trial court’s decision would be “final.” It was contended, without success, that the Constitution of the state guaranteed appellant access to this court. We said:
“Since the Legislature has declared that the judgment of the district court shall be final * * *, it becomes important to determine whether, under the Constitution of this state, the right of appeal is guaranteed in all cases.” 83 P. at 218.
The author of the Mau opinion wrote that Art. 5, § 2 of our Constitution, supra, defines the appellate jurisdiction of this court
“ * * * without attempting to define the manner of appeal or the class of cases in which appeals may be taken,” 83 P. at 219,
and the court then held that the supreme court’s jurisdiction is limited by the following Art. 5, § 2 language:
“ * * * under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law.”
The court said:
“ * * * We think the expression ‘under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law’ refers to and limits all the powers conferred by the section, in other words, prescribes how the exercise of these powers may be regulated and limited.” 83 P. at 219.
It was one of the court’s conclusions in Mau that it was the intention of the framers of our Constitution that the subject of appeals to this court would be left to the legislature, the court saying:
“ ‘ * * * It is quite clear from the provisions of Sections 18 and 20 that the framers of the fundamental law intended to leave the power over the subject of appeals to the Legislature, to be exercised in such manner as public policy and the best interests of the people might require.’ ” Quoting from McClain v. Williams, 10 S.D. 332, 73 N.W. 72, 43 L.R.A. 287 (1897).
In emphasizing that the right of appeal even though authorized must nevertheless be “prescribed by law” (i.e., by the legislature), the Mau court referred to this court’s earlier decision in In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875 (1895), where we said:
“ * * * [W]e have no direct constitutional provision allowing appeals as a matter of right in criminal cases, except that this court is clothed with appellate jurisdiction in criminal as well as in civil causes, and is vested with a general superintendence and control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as are prescribed by law (Const. Wyo., art. 5, § 2) * * 39 P. at 878.
It was the court’s conclusion in Mau that, since there had been no rules or regulations promulgated under Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, the respondent had no right of appeal.
*649The requirement that there be express statutory authority where the State seeks adverse ruling review through the utilization of certiorari was discussed in Annot., 109 A.L.R. 793, 794-795, “Right of state to writ of certiorari in criminal case”:
“But against the State’s contention that authority to entertain a petition by the State for certiorari in a criminal case, in which a conviction had been reversed by the Court of Appeals (an intermediate court), was conferred by a constitutional amendment providing that it should be competent for the Supreme Court ‘to require by certiorari or otherwise any case to be certified ... for review and determination with the same power and authority as if the case had been carried by writ of error,’ the Supreme Court held that it did not have such authority in State v. B’Gos (1932) 175 Ga. 627, 165 S.E. 566, and relied, in part, upon the general statement in 8 R.C.L. p. 168, that ‘the state has no right to sue out a writ of error on a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment was rendered on a verdict of acquittal or on the determination by the court on a question of law,’ in connection with decisions to the effect that the State was not entitled to appeal criminal cases; and observed that the amendment relied upon had reference only to the nature of the cases to be reviewed, and not to the right of any particular party or litigant to appeal.”
Bill of Exceptions or Writ of Certiorari What Is the Difference?
The difference between our granting cer-tiorari for the purpose of deciding a question in a criminal case, on the one hand, and agreeing to decide an issue framed by a bill of exceptions, on the other hand, is far-reaching and fundamental. Even though the substantive issues are addressed in both procedures, in the first instance, the particular defendant whose criminal prosecution gives rise to the controverted opinion or decision of the district court is affected and bound by our decision, while in the second this is not so. In the latter case, this court’s opinion is binding upon the courts of Wyoming in future “similar” cases but will not affect the judgment of the court “in the case in which the bill was taken.” 5 I therefore concede here that the bill-of-exceptions proceeding which is authorized by Wyoming statutes, will not provide the relief that the State seeks as it petitions in certiorari since the defendant Heiner in whose pretrial proceeding the suppression issue is raised will not be affected. Even though this is so, the overriding response to this objection is that the State has no inherent or common-law right to appeal adverse trial-court rulings in a criminal prosecution (State v. Benales, supra, and State v. Ginther, supra), and it only has authority to exercise its constitutional appellate prerogatives “under such rules and regulations as are prescribed by law,” Mau v. Stoner, supra. There being no rules or regulations for the exercise of interlocutory appellate authority through certiorari, and it being noted that the legislature has in fact furnished a review process through the bill-of-exceptions statutes, the right of appeal claimed in these proceedings cannot, therefore, be found to exist.
The bill-of-exceptions procedure is the only method by which this court may take jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding questions raised by trial-court rulings in a criminal prosecution which are alleged by the State to be adverse to its interests. State v. Ginther, supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra. Since the bill of exceptions is itself an exception to and in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed and applied.6
*650 The Common Law and the Statutory Exception
The argument is made, however, that the bill-of-exceptions statute furnishes the State with no right of appellate review as respects the particular defendant in whose prosecution the controversial issue arises in the trial court and, since certiorari is authorized by the Constitution (Art. 5, § 3), and since one of the offices of certiorari is to furnish litigants appellate relief where no other avenue of appeal is available (City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra), it must be that certiorari was intended to serve as a vehicle for the State to appeal adverse criminal trial-court rulings which, if the appeal is successful, will be binding upon the defendant in whose prosecution the question is raised. The silent predicate to which this contention is anchored is that the State possesses a right to have its adverse rulings in criminal prosecutions reviewed as on appeal. This is just not so. State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra.
The Common-Law Rule
This court has noted long ago that the common-law rule is that the State has no right to appeal adverse criminal rulings unless the right is expressly given.
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659 submits the commón-law rule to be:
“Under the common law as generally understood and administered in the United States, the state or federal government has no right to a writ of error, to an appeal, or to exceptions in a criminal case unless it is expressly conferred by * * * statute * * * ” (emphasis added),
citing Wyoming’s State v. Benales and State v. Ginther for the proposition that Wyoming is one of the states that holds to this rule of the common law. The rule is reported in Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1095, 1096, “Right of prosecution to writ of certiorari in criminal case,” where it is said:
“As a general rule the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right.” (Emphasis added.)
To the same effect see 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 268, pp. 762-763.
In any case, without specific statutory permission, neither the State nor the defendant can appeal an adverse ruling of the court in a pending criminal action since it will be held to be interlocutory in nature and thus not appealable. In United States v. Rosenwasser, 145 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.1944), the court said:
“ * * * However, if a party to a pending criminal action seeks the suppression of evidence together with the return of the seized papers and if the principal purpose of the motion is to suppress evidence at the criminal trial, the proceeding is incidental to the criminal action, and the resulting order is held to be interlocutory and not appealable. Cogen v. United States, 1929, 278 U.S. 221, 49 S.Ct. 118, 73 L.Ed. 275; Jacobs v. United States, 1926, 9 Cir., 8 F.2d 981; United States v. Marquette, 1921, 9 Cir., 270 F. 214. Compare Cobbledick v. United States, 1940, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783; Alexander v. United States, 1906, 201 U.S. 117, 26 S.Ct. 356, 50 L.Ed. 686.”
In commenting upon the common law pertaining to interlocutory orders in a criminal prosecution, the court said in the Rosenwasser case:
“ * * * [Ajppeals from interlocutory orders are exceptional in character and are wholly dependent upon statute * * *.” 145 F.2d at 1018.
Bill of Exceptions Is an Exception to the Common-Law Rule
In State v. Ginther, supra, the defendant was charged with the theft of a cow — with receiving the animal knowing it to have been stolen — but no value of the property was alleged. Trial was had and the defendant found guilty, whereupon a motion in arrest of judgment was made and sustained. The State appealed and we held that this court had no jurisdiction since there was no statutory provision for the appeal. In dismissing the appeal, we said:
*651“It seems generally held under the common law as administered in this country that the State may not bring a writ of error or take an appeal or have exceptions in a criminal case, unless the right thereto has been expressly granted by statute * * * ” (emphasis added), 77 P.2d at 803,
and while noting that the courts of some states permit such review in limited circumstances — either by case rule or statute — we held that we would adhere to the common law in Wyoming.
We noted in Ginther that Wyoming has a statutory exception to this common-law rule which appears as our bill-of-exceptions statutes according to which the State’s attorney may take “any opinion or decision of the court” to this court for review. We then went on to hold and cite with approval cases which hold that, where an appellate right is granted and is based upon specific statutes, such statutes are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged by construction. It is said in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1659, supra, wherein the states’ right of appeal in criminal cases is discussed, that the common-law rule is as this court identified it in Ginther, supra. The encyclopedia then goes on to say that
“ * * * it is generally held that, being' in derogation of the common law, they [statutes granting appellate rights] should be strictly construed, and that the authority conferred thereby should not be enlarged by construction. [Citations.]” 7
In State v. Weathers, 13 Okl.Cr. 92, 162 P. 239 (1917), cited in Ginther for the proposition that appellate criminal appeals statutes which are in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, the Oklahoma statute expressly allowed the State to appeal in a criminal case from an order arresting judgment, quashing an information or indictment, and questions reserved by the State. It was held that the prosecution had no right to appeal from a trial-court order granting a person convicted of a crime a new trial. The court said:
“ * * * In many jurisdictions the state has no right of appeal at all, and its right to appeal, where the right is granted, is based upon specific statutes, which statutes are not to be enlarged by construction.” 162 P. at 240.
See also State v. Arnold, 144 Ind. 651, 42 N.E. 1095 (1895), cited in Ginther, where, in referring to a statute similar to that considered in State v. Weathers, supra, it was said:
“These statutes, it is urged, deny the right of the State to appeal in other instances than those enumerated, and this we have no doubt is correct, as shown by the cases cited to that proposition. State v. Bartlett, 9 Ind. 569; State v. Hamilton, 62 Ind. 409; State v. Hallowell, 91 Ind. 376; State v. Evansville, etc., R.R. Co., 107 Ind. 581 [8 N.E. 619].”
This court then held in State v. Ginther:
“Our view of the law accordingly is that the prosecution in a criminal case in this state is given by statute no method of review of adverse rulings except through the medium indicated in the four above cited sections [the bill-of-exception proceeding], with the limitations there imposed.” (Emphasis added.) 77 P.2d at 807.
In State v. Benales, supra, the court granted the defendant’s motion for dismissal based upon the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, § 10, and § 7-11-208, W.S.1977. The State undertook an appeal to this court, proceeding as in a civil case under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, and, in a per-curiam opinion, we dismissed the appeal as we observed that the State had not complied with the bill-of-exceptions statute, anchoring our holding *652upon the State v. Ginther rule quoted above.
In State v. Heberling, supra, 553 P.2d at 1043, on September 3, 1976, we revisited and reaffirmed these prior holdings and thus this court has historically been committed to the common-law rule which holds that, unless there is a statutory exception, the State may not appeal an adverse ruling of the district court in a criminal case. Where there is a statutory exception to this rule, the statutes which provide the exceptions, as with our bill-of-exception statutes, §§ 7-12-101 through 7-12-105, supra, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly adhered to. State v. Ginther, supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwall, supra.
Bill of Exceptions
The Exclusive Source of This Court’s Jurisdiction
Since it is not possessed of a common-law right of appeal, the State has no right to appeal a district court’s adverse ruling or judgment in a criminal prosecution without strictly adhering to the bill of exceptions provisions of the statute (§§ 7-12-101 through 7-12-105, supra). This being so, this court, except by bills of exceptions, has no jurisdiction to review any such rulings or judgments. State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra. In Gibson, Chief Justice Potter, writing for the court, said:
“ * * * It only upon a compliance with the provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the district court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions." (Emphasis added.) 85 P. at 979.
In Gibson, the Attorney General argued that an exception to the ruling of the court should be sufficient to preserve the issue for this court’s consideration. This court rejected the contention, saying:
“ * * * But it is obvious, we think, that the bill in a case like this not only serves to preserve in the record matters which otherwise would not be in the record, but it is the basis of the jurisdiction of this court. It is not perceived that we would have authority to decide any question arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case, without a bill of exceptions containing the same, taken and filed as prescribed by the statute.” (Emphasis added.) 85 P. at 979.
Having said this, the court struck the bill since it was not sealed as provided by what is now our § 7-12-102, W.S.1977, 1983 Cum.Supp.
Reference to the Majority Opinion and City of Laramie v. Mengel, Supra, and Certiorari
Without even giving the bill-of-exceptions statutes (§§ 7-12-101 through 7-12-105) or the case law which holds that this court has no jurisdiction to “review any ruling of the district court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions” except by way of bill of exceptions (State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra) a sideways glance — that is to say, without even mentioning these statutory and historical case authorities which identify and define the very jurisdiction of this court to act in the premises, the majority in the case at bar say:
“The State of Wyoming sought review of these pretrial rulings pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari. It is our conclusion that this court does have the authority and responsibility to review such pretrial rulings by trial judges in the exercise of its discretion.” 683 P.2d at 630.
I cannot fathom the “discretion” to which the majority have reference. We do not even have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. I repeat, for emphasis, the words of Chief Justice Potter as he wrote for this court in State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra:
“ * * * It is only upon a compliance with the provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the district court adverse *653to the state in criminal prosecutions,” (emphasis added), 85 P. at 979,
and where the Chief Justice also said:
“ * * * But ⅛ is obvious, we think, that the bill in a case like this * * * is the basis of the jurisdiction of this court. It It is not perceived that we would have authority to decide any question arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case, without a bill of exceptions containing the same, taken and filed as prescribed by the statute.” (Emphasis added.) 85 P. at 979.
I agree that we need not be slavishly bound by old opinions, but if we are to overrule them we should say so and at the same time be possessed of adequate and substantial authority upon which to base our overruling decision. In this ease, however, the majority do not have or even mention case authority which would authorize the overruling of State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell. In fact, State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell is not even noticed by the majority. The reason the majority cite no authority for their position here has to be because there are no legislative rules and regulations which permit this court to implement our powers of certiorari for interlocutory appellate purposes in a criminal case.8 This is because the State does not possess a common-law right to an appeal, and, where there is an exception to the common-law rule as Wyoming has in its bill-of-exceptions statutes, the exception, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly followed and may not be enlarged by construction. State v. Ginther, supra.
The most shocking feature of this court’s majority opinion in the case at bar is its reliance upon our recent decision in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, as authority for holding that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling may be brought to our attention through a petition for a writ of certiorari.
The majority say, in this respect:
“The threshold question of the authority of this court to review these evidentiary rulings by the trial court pursuant to a writ of certiorari is settled in principle by the decision of this court in City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983).” 683 P.2d at 632.
The thing that makes the majority’s reliance upon City of Laramie v. Mengel so unbelievable is the fact that the City of Laramie case did not evolve from a petition by the State as is the case here, and the petitioner City was not — for this reason at least — jurisdictionally limited by the bill-of-exceptions provisions of our statutes from seeking certiorari.
In City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, the substantive issue was the constitutionality of § 31 — 6—105(f), W.S.1977, as adopted by the Laramie Municipal Code, which statute and code provision hold that evidence of a driver’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test could be used against him in court where the citizen stands accused of operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The municipal judges in City of Laramie v. Mengel had held, in response to motions to suppress and in limine, that the refusal to submit to the blood-alcohol test was testimonial in nature, and that the ordinance was therefore violative of the protection against self-incrimination found in the United States and State constitutions. The order granting the. motions of respondents Mengel and Johnson further prohibited the City of Laramie from permitting any of its witnesses to comment upon the refusal of either respondent to take a blood-alcohol chemical test, or to comment directly or indirectly in any manner concerning such refusal.
In an effort to obtain a definitive decision on the issue, the City of Laramie (not the State) filed a document in this court entitled “Petition for Permission to File Bill of Exceptions.” Instead of granting or denying this petition, we granted a writ of certiorari, noting that
*654§ 7-12-102 through § 7-12-105, W.S.1977, pertaining to bills of exceptions were not applicable in an instance in which the accused is not charged with an offense against the laws of the State of Wyoming and this statutory proceeding [bill of exceptions] was not available with respect to a prosecution in a municipal court for violation of an ordinance. City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916).” 671 P.2d at 343.
In its further defense, the ruling in City of Laramie v. Mengel had prospective effect only and it was in this respect consistent with the theory of bills of exceptions. Most importantly, that appeal was not proscribed by the rule that says where an appellate proceeding is legislatively in place it must be followed, State v. Ginther, supra. We therefore treated the City of Laramie’s petition for a bill of exceptions as though it were a petition for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of settling questions of constitutional magnitude for which review was otherwise unavailable. This is, of course, in the proper circumstances, one of the offices of certiorari. City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra.
In City of Laramie v. Mengel we assumed, in reliance upon language contained in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916), that this court possessed jurisdiction to review the questions raised by the City of Laramie. We said in City of Sheridan v. Cadle:
“This not being a civil case, there seems to be no provision giving the city a right of appeal to this court. We think, therefore, that the writ might be issued to determine the question of the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the appeal in which the order complained of was made.” 157 P. at 895-896
Parenthetically, I am now forced to the admission that, having studied this subject in greater depth, and especially since revisiting this court’s earlier opinion in Mau v. Stoner, supra — which holds unequivocally that, even where constitutional appellate authority exists, the exercise of rights of appeal must nevertheless be authorized by the legislature through the promulgation of statutory rules and regulations — and given the absence of any such implementing legislation in the area of certiorari, I now question the propriety of that language in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, upon which we relied in City of Laramie v. Mengel. According to Mau v. Stoner and the overwhelming weight of the general law, this court is without jurisdiction to employ its constitutional grant of appellate certiorari authority to review any questions — civil or criminal — unless and until the requisite legislation is promulgated.
However, I only give tangential reference by way of dicta to the City of Laramie v. Mengel utilization of certiorari because, regardless of whether this court was correct in granting certiorari in City of Laramie v. Mengel, that case provides no authority for the issuance of the writ in the case at bar. This is so because the legislature has expressly limited this court’s jurisdiction to review questions raised by the State in a criminal case. The bill of exceptions is the only mode of review, and this court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to hear, under the label of “certiorari,” interlocutory appeals or appeals from final orders brought by the State.
It is with the assumption of jurisdiction that I take issue with the majority opinion in the appeal at bar — not whether, assuming jurisdiction, the writ was otherwise lawfully employed, and it is in the jurisdictional context of our difference that I charge the majority with taking unwarranted liberty with our holding in City of Laramie v. Mengel when the majority opinion says:
“The threshold question of the authority of this court to review these evidentiary rulings by the trial court pursuant to a writ of certiorari is settled * * * in City of Laramie v. Mengel * * *.” 683 P.2d at 632.
This is just not so. In City of Laramie we assumed we had jurisdiction to employ cer-tiorari under City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, and, in any event, we were not involved with a State of Wyoming criminal *655appeal and the consequential proscriptions of the bill-of-exceptions statutes. In the case at bar, we simply do not have jurisdiction — the State having no inherent right of appeal and the bill of exceptions not having been utilized, State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra.
The majority in the appeal at bar call attention to the observations that this court made in City of Laramie v. Mengel having to do with what we said about the utilization of the writ of certiorari in Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954). The majority say:
“ * * * We did note in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, that review pursuant to the statutes providing for a bill of exceptions was not available to the city. In that opinion we quoted language from Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954), in which the court observed in substance that the writ of cer-tiorari subserves a good purpose in instances in which an appeal (or a bill of exceptions) is not plain, speedy and adequate. With respect to rulings which suppress important evidence to be offered by the State in a criminal prosecution the inadequacy of the bill of exceptions after an acquittal is patent.” 683 P.2d at 632.
By this statement the majority are saying in effect that in City of Laramie v. Mengel we relied on Call v. Town of Afton (where the State was not a petitioner for certiorari) for the proposition that certiora-ri serves a good purpose in instances in which “an appeal (or a bill of exceptions) is not plain, speedy and adequate.” From this observation about a circumstance in which certiorari may be utilized, the majority reason:
Even though the State has no common-law right of appeal and even though the bill of exceptions is available and is the only statutory remedy the State has — and even though this court has held that the bill of exceptions is the jurisdiction-furnishing vehicle in these circumstances — we find that a bill of exceptions would be inadequate after acquittal and we will therefore simply disregard the bill-of-exceptions jurisdictional requirement as previously announced by this court and, without statutory implementing sanction, employ certiorari in its stead.
When the majority observe:
“With respect to rulings which suppress important evidence to be offered by the State in a criminal prosecution, the inadequacy of the bill of exceptions after an acquittal is patent” (emphasis added), 683 P.2d at 632,
it is constructing its own fantacized “inadequacy” out of an assumption that the law provides the State with the right to appeal adverse criminal rulings in addition to the remedy provided by the bill of exceptions. This is just not the case. In fact, .it amounts to judicial sophistry. The State has no right of appeal except that which is given by statute and, if so provided as it is in Wyoming’s criminal code, the statute must be followed with particularity, State v. Ginther, supra. Thus, the majority make a fatally unwarranted and unauthorized assumption in order to reach its fatally faulty conclusion with respect to the utilization of the writ of certiorari in the case at hand.
CONCLUSION
In summary, I call attention to these following propositions:
The Constitution of the State of Wyoming gives this court the power to issue writs of certiorari in the exercise of its appellate power (Art. 5, § 3), but this authority is restricted by such rules and regulations as “may be prescribed by law” (Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18). It is the legislature that has the authority to limit and define the appellate process (Mau v. Stoner, supra). The writ of certiorari being in aid of this court’s appellate jurisdiction (Art. 5, § 3), statutory authority must exist to invoke the court’s certiorari authority (109 A.L.R. at 795, supra) since the State has no common-law right of appeal from adverse trial court decisions in a criminal prosecution (State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, *656supra; Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1096, supra; 4 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 268, pp. 762-763; 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659, supra). In absence of statute, the State has no common-law right to an interlocutory appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal prosecution (United States v. Rosenwasser, supra).
In Wyoming, the legislature has made an exception to the common-law rule of nonap-pealability of the State’s adverse criminal rulings through the bill-of-exceptions statutes (State v. Ginther, supra). Since the bill-of-exceptions statute is in derogation of the common law, it must be strictly construed and its authority cannot be enlarged by construction.9
This court has held that, based upon these above propositions, the prosecution in Wyoming has “no method of review of adverse rulings except through [the bill-of-exceptions procedure]” (State v. Ginther, supra), and, finally, we have said that it is only upon compliance with the bill-of-exceptions provisions that this court has “jurisdiction to review any ruling of the district court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions” (State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra).
I take issue with the majority’s utilization of City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, as an excuse to ignore and circumvent these jurisdictional prohibitions against the issuing of a writ of certiorari in the case at bar. I say this, because in City of Laramie v. Mengel we granted the writ upon the authority of City of Sheridan v. Cadle, noting that, since the State was not the petitioner, the bill-of-exceptions statutes were not available to bring the issues here. We said that the bill-of-exceptions statutes
“ * * * were not applicable in an instance in which the accused is not charged with an offense against the laws of the State of Wyoming and that this statutory proceeding [bill of exceptions] was not available with respect to a prosecution in a municipal court for violation of an ordinance,” citing City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra,
and went on — no matter how carelessly — to exercise our certiorari appellate authority. But at least it can be said that our procedure was authorized by Wyoming Supreme Court precedent and pursued the same underlying philosophy as that contained in the bill-of-exceptions statutes.
For the reasons given, I would hold that the majority commit grievous error in granting the writ of certiorari in this appeal because this court has, by this method, no jurisdiction to review a suppression ruling of the district court adverse to the State of Wyoming.
I would hold that the petition for a writ of certiorari was improvidently granted.
. Ah_for the good, old days!
. State v. Heberling, supra; State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961); State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938); State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906).
. State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra n. 2, discussed infra.
. City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, 671 P.2d at 345, holds that the grant or denial of certiorari is discretionary with this court.
. Section 7-12-105, W.S.1977, provides:
"The judgment of the court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state.”
. See State v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543, 547-548 (1982), for a reiteration of the general rules.
. We recently expressed the derogation-of-common-Iaw rule for Wyoming when we said in State v. Stovall, supra n. 6, 648 P.2d at 547-548:
" * * * A statute designed to change the common law must be strictly construed. Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967). It must speak in clear and unequivocal terms, for the presumption is that no change is intended unless the statute is explicit.”
. State v. Ginther, supra; State v. Arnold, supra; State v. Weathers, supra; 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659, supra; and see State v. Stovall, supra n. 6, for reaffirmation of the rule pertaining to the strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common-law concept.