Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:In my judgment this difficult case has been decided, both here and below, on a most inadequate record.
I find little basis for the hearing judge’s and the majority’s confidence that the father is “able and willing to provide a satisfactory home for Timothy.” He did not provide a satisfactory home for Timothy and his mother, nor for his first wife and child (whom he permitted to be adopted). While it is to be hoped that his present marriage will prove to be happy, whether that is likely cannot be determined from the record. When the hearing was held (January 3, 1974), he had been married less than five months. His wife’s testimony was very brief and she did not describe the marriage; she did say she would “love to have” Timothy and had discussed the possibility with her husband. A neighbor and friend said the home was “exactly like mine, they keep it neat [and clean],” but most of her testimony concerned the father’s past relationship with Timothy and this was also so of the testimony of the father’s sister (who did not refer at all to the present marriage or home). Against this evidence is the testimony of Timothy’s greatgrandmother, grandmother, grandfather, and a friend of Timothy’s mother, and *249while hardly disinterested, some of this testimony is most disquieting as regards the father’s character.*
It appears to me that both the hearing judge, who decided the case from the bench, and this court have in effect accepted the father’s testimony at face value. In a case such as this some independent inquiry should be made. The best procedure would be for the hearing judge to appoint counsel for Timothy. Cf. In Re: Adoption of R. I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A. 2d 601 (1973); Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, 228 Pa. Superior Ct. 371, 324 A. 2d 562 (1974). At least there should be an impartial witness who has examined the respective homes; frequently a hearing judge will accomplish this through the good offices of a social service agency. There should also be some at least relatively impartial testimony regarding character, as for example by the father’s and stepfather’s respective ministers and civic and business associates; nor would *250it be out of place to require both of them and also the father’s wife to be examined by a psychologist or psychiatrist.*
Although great consideration is due a natural parent’s interest in having his child, a presumption must never interfere with determining what is in fact in the child’s best interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Grillo v. Shuster, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 229, 312 A. 2d 58 (1973). Thus the tender years presumption is “merely the vehicle through which decision . . . may be reached where factual considerations do not otherwise dictate a different result.” Commonwealth ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 109, 296 A. 2d 625, 627 (1972). There are many cases in which determination of the child’s best interests has led to an award of custody to someone other than a parent. See cases cited in Stapleton v. Dauphin County Child Care Service, supra at n.7.
In the present case I believe there has been too much reliance on presumption and too little reliance on evidence. I do not mean to be unforgiving about the father’s past unsuccessful marriages. Normally both parties to a divorce are at fault; and in any event, the father is entitled to overcome his past. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 448 Pa. 437, 292 A. 2d 380 (1972) (custody awarded mother who admitted having affairs with other men). Thus, I do not say the award of custody is wrong; I simply cannot tell. In some cases this uncertainty would dictate affirmance, but not here, where our responsibility is to exercise review “of the broadest type.” Commonwealth ex rel. Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, supra at 443, 292 A. 2d at 383. Upon such review, what appears is that *251the hearing judge has ordered. Timothy taken from care criticized by no witness and praised by every witness who saw it,* and has placed him in a situation that may prove most unfortunate.
I would remand for further hearing.
Cercone, J., joins in this opinion.For example: From the greatgrandmother’s testimony: “Q. Did he ever indicate he was going to burn her hands? A. Did he. Did he. Sit and laugh. Q. Just answer the question, that’s all. A. He took her hands and held them over the hot fire that the man that lived next door then came over and saved her and then she phoned, and cried, grandma please come and get me. Please come and get me. I couldn’t go. I had no way to get down. Holding her beautiful hands over flames to burn them.” If offered for the truth, this is hearsay; also, the greatgrandmother admitted she hated the father. There was, however, no rebuttal. From the grandmother’s testimony: “There were time [sic] Debra called me and cried to me over the phone that she had no food in the home.” From the grandfather’s: “. . . she always called up crying. . . . I seen it many times, she’d come up to the house hungry.” “The thing that upset me most was her crying all the time that Joe had beaten her up, coming up home teUing me they had no food.” The friend (she said she had been a friend of both the father and stepfather) said the “cupboards were frequently bare” and that she would give the mother supper and also her son’s outgrown clothing for Timothy. There was no rebuttal to any of this testimony.
Apart from the testimony by the greatgrandmother and other relatives, alluded to above, other parts of the record suggest the need for such inquiry. Under cross-examination the father admitted that at one time he had been a “fairly heavy” drinker, but said he had “[cut down a] whole lot.”
Including the father’s friend and neighbor, who said on cross-examination: “Q. Did you indicate to Mr. Dash that since he has been taking care of Timothy you noticed a big change in Timmy? A. Xes. Q. He seemed to be coming along real well, doing real well? A. Xes.”