Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie

ROSE, Justice,

specially concurring.

While I agree that the decision to issue economic development project bonds for the proposed convention center should be affirmed, I cannot join the majority’s analysis in arriving at that conclusion. In my opinion, the information-gathering hearing conducted by the Wyoming Community Development Authority (WCDA) and the city council, prior to approval of the bonds, satisfied statutory and constitutional procedural requirements solely because the decision-making process involved legislative rather than adjudicatory facts.

STATUTE

Section 9-7-122(e), W.S.1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, directs the WCDA and the governing body to conduct a joint public hearing prior to the issuance of economic development project bonds:

“The authority shall not finance any economic development project unless the governing body of the municipality or county in which the economic development is located and the authority conducts [conduct] a joint public hearing.”

This statutory requirement for a hearing entitles the parties to a contested-case or trial-type hearing under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act,1 if adjudicative facts are at issue. Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26 (1969). Notwithstanding this well-established rule of law, the majority hold that the WCDA and city council need not determine adjudicative facts in a trial-type proceeding because federal statutes and treasury regulations do not require trial-type proceedings. These federal enactments, however, do not establish the type of hearing required under Wyoming law.

The majority’s reliance on In re Application for Certificate of Need by HCA Health Services of Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 689 P.2d 108 (1984), is misplaced. In that case, specific federal statutes and regulations required states to conduct full evi-dentiary hearings prior to issuing certificates of need for proposed health care facilities. We recognized that the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the United States Constitution prevented Wyoming from authorizing less procedural protection, and interpreted our statutes accordingly.

The federal tax laws and regulations, cited as controlling by the majority, 718 P.2d at 874-875 allow local governmental units flexibility in setting a form of hearing that is appropriate for the particular tax-exempt bonds and that satisfies local concerns. Nothing prevents states from requiring formal, trial-type procedures, and, indeed, Treasury Regulation 5f.l03 — 2(g)(2) (1983), 718 P.2d at 874-875, commends the use of state administrative hearing rules as a means of assuring compliance with federal requirements.

The Wyoming Community Development Authority Act, §§ 9-7-101 through 9-7-121, W.S.1977, Cum.Supp.1985, at issue in the present case, directs the WCDA and the governing body to conduct a public hearing and to make five specific factual findings prior to the issuance of bonds. If, as the majority suggest, these required factual findings involve adjudicative facts, then the act contemplates their determination in an adjudicative or trial-type hearing. Since legislative rather than adjudicative facts determine the propriety of an economic development bond issue, however, no trial-type hearing is required. Lund v. *878Schrader, Wyo., 492 P.2d 202 (1971); Scarlett v. Town Council, supra.

Legislative facts generally relate to policy-making by a tribunal, whereas adjudicative facts typically concern the specific actions and intent of the parties:

“Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.” 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 2d § 12:3, p. 413 (1978).

We have relied on this distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts to determine administrative procedural requirements in the past. Holdings’ Little America v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County, Wyo., 670 P.2d 699 (1983); Lund v. Schrader, supra; Scarlett v. Town Council, supra.

In the case at bar, the principal issue before the WCDA and the city council was whether the proposed economic development project would “result in an unfair competitive disadvantage for existing business in the municipality, county or state.” Section 9-7-122(d)(v). Resolution of this question requires a determination of the general business climate in the community, including such factors as the services currently provided, the extent to which existing facilities are used, the anticipated demand for the proposed facilities, the degree of duplication of services, and the clientele served by the proposed and existing facilities. General information of this sort is often available from state and local chambers of commerce. Certainly it can be obtained in open public meetings where opponents and proponents of the proposal describe their respective situations and submit pertinent data. Cross-examination challenging the details of opposing positions would be of minimal value in illuminating the overall business picture. I would hold, therefore, that § 9-7-122 contemplates an information-gathering hearing rather than a trial-type hearing to determine whether a proposal qualifies for economic development project financing.

DUE PROCESS

Petitioners contend that § 9-7-122(d)(v)2 creates a property right in existing businesses in that portion of the market which is secure from loss due to the unfair competitive disadvantage caused by an economic development project. Therefore, petitioners urge, they are entitled to individualized, adversarial hearings to protect against a wrongful deprivation of this property interest.

I am not prepared to join the majority in holding that individuals have no protected property interest in the continuation of their business positions, free from government-created, unfair competitive disadvantages. I note in this regard the well-established principle that the state cannot exclude a person from his chosen occupation in a manner that contravenes due-process requirements. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254, (1963); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of the State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 64 A.L.R.2d 288 (1957).

At any rate, this court need not determine whether § 9-7-122(d)(v) creates a constitutionally protected property interest in petitioners, because the due process clause, like the statutory requirement for a hearing, does not mandate a trial-type hearing for the resolution of legislative facts. The United States Supreme Court laid the foun*879dations for this rule in two well-known decisions involving tax assessment, Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 28 S.Ct. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103 (1908); and Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372 (1915). See Davis, supra, § 12:2, pp. 409-412.

In Londoner v. City and County of Denver, supra, landowners with no opportunity for a hearing were taxed for the cost of paving a street abutting their property. The Supreme Court held that due process of law required that the affected taxpayers have an opportunity to be heard:

“ * * * Many requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in proceedings of this nature. But even here a hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal.” 210 U.S. at 386, 28 S.Ct. at 714.

In Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, supra, a property owner sought to enjoin state officials from increasing the taxable valuation of all property in Denver by 40 percent. The taxpayer argued that it had been given no opportunity for a hearing and, therefore, had been deprived of its property without due process of law. The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice Holmes refused to require a hearing to decide the general factual questions involved:

“ * * * (jeneraj statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule.” 239 U.S. at 445, 36 S.Ct. at 142.

The dispute in the case at bar asks general factual questions concerning the competitive impact of the proposed project on the existing business community. The information-gathering hearing afforded to all interested persons by the city council and WCDA was an appropriate forum for resolving these questions and satisfied due-process requirements.

I would have affirmed the issuance of the economic development project bonds in this case on the foregoing grounds.

. A contested case is a proceeding

" * * * in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." Section 16 — 3—101(b)(ii), W.S. 1977.

. Section 9-7-122(d)(v), Cum.Supp.1985, provides:

“The authority shall not finance any economic development project unless the governing body and the authority determine that the economic development project would:
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"(v) Not result in an unfair competitive disadvantage for existing business in the municipality, county or state."