State v. Albright

BISTLINE, Justice,

dissenting.

In its rush to judgment the majority ignores recently announced law which is directly on point. In Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986), this Court determined the scope of the state’s constitutional duty of disclosing and preserving evidence material either to guilt or punishment, stating:

The due process protection found in art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, mandates, as a condition of fundamental fairness in the conducting of a criminal trial, that the prosecution must disclose to a defendant, upon appropriate request, evidence material either to guilt or to punishment. This rule is true “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87 [83 S.Ct. at 1197].
With respect to cases involving lost or destroyed evidence, a criminal defendant also is not without state due process protection. Whether a due process violation will be found to have occurred under art. 1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, will be dependent upon the type of balancing test ... discussed above. Paradis, supra, 110 Idaho at 540, 716 P.2d at 1312 (footnote omitted).

The balancing test mentioned has been developed by several courts and is based upon United States Supreme Court decisions relative to the issue before us. Id. at pp. 538-539, 716 P.2d at pp. 1310-1311.1 The test has three parts, each of which must be considered in deciding whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated by the loss or destruction of allegedly exculpatory evidence:

(1) whether the evidence was material to the question of guilt or the degree of punishment;
(2) whether the defendant was prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the evidence; and
(3) whether the government was acting in good faith when it destroyed or lost the evidence.

Id. at p. 539, 716 P.2d at p. 1311.

The majority’s reliance upon California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), is misplaced. First, as Justice Huntley has accurately noted, the facts of Trombetta appreciably differ from those found here. Second, and to my mind even more important, Trombetta involved only federal constitutional requirements. In its concluding paragraph, per a footnote, the Trombetta Court reminded that: “State courts and legislatures, of course, remain free to adopt more rigorous safeguards governing the admissibility of scientific evidence than those imposed by the Federal constitution.” Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2535 n. 12 (citations omitted). Yet, today’s majority ignores Paradis and follows Trombetta. More sound to my mind would be the practice of beginning any constitutional review with regard for our own constitution, and only then review federal constitutional law. To ignore both our own constitution plus a recently announced decision directly in point inexcusably serves to breed confusion and uncertainty. The proper resolution of this case at the very least, should be a remand to the district court for further consideration in light of Paradis.

. Those cases are: United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969); and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).