dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s decision to uphold a $24,520 attorney fee award that is twice the amount counsel customarily would have charged for the services provided. In my view, the court’s opinion ignores the plain language *976of AS 23.30.145, mischaracterizes our case law, and permits the appearance of windfall fees to go virtually unquestioned.
When claimant Bignell applied to the superior court for attorney’s fees for appellate proceedings he urged the court to apply a multiplication factor of at least two in computing the fee award. Bignell calculated the fee his counsel would have charged, for work done on an hourly fee basis, as $12,260 and urged the court to at least double the award. The trial court awarded $24,520, and my colleagues now uphold the award as proper. I cannot agree, for the reasons stated below.
Attorney’s fees in workers’ compensation cases are governed by statute. AS 23.30.-145(c)1 grants the court authority to award fees for work performed in an appellate proceeding. Because subsection (c) does not set out a precise formula for calculating appellate level fees, we have held that a court should look to the factors listed in subsection (a) dealing with the calculation of attorney’s fees for proceedings before the Board. In Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979), we stated that the “Superior Court’s fee award for the appeal should provide for realistic compensation, taking into account the same factors that the Workmen’s Compensation Board considers when it grants attorney’s fees for non-controverted claims_” Id. at 366. We then quoted from AS 23.30.-145(a), which provides in part:
In determining the amount of fees the board shall take into consideration the nature, length and complexity of the services performed, transportation charges, and the benefits resulting from the services to the compensation beneficiaries.
The plain language of the statute in no way suggests that a multiplier should be applied to double an award of attorney’s fees, nor is it appropriate for this court to infer such an intent. If the legislature had wanted to authorize double attorney’s fees, it could have done so in plain language.
Our prior holdings also do not establish authority for a double award, contrary to the majority’s assertion. As we explained in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Bonner, 680 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1984):
We have previously taken the position that attorney’s fees on an appeal in a worker’s compensation case should be a reasonable fee, i.e., a full fee for the reasonable time and expense of litigating the case on appeal adjusted, if necessary, to reflect the statutory attorney’s fee award from the Board. See Wien Air Alaska v. Arant, 592 P.2d 352 (Alaska 1979).
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
In this case, a “full fee for the reasonable time and expense of litigating” is exactly what Bignell’s counsel would have received if a multiplier had not been applied. The $12,260 actual fee that Bignell’s counsel would have charged, calculated by multiplying his hourly rate by the number of hours spent, would meet the Bonner “full fee” requirement. The trial court’s award of twice this amount was far in excess of a reasonable fully compensatory fee.2
The majority contends that the award is justified by the complexity and novelty of Bignell’s case, and the benefit which resulted to the claimant. Even if a multiplier were statutorily authorized, the majority mischaracterizes this case as meriting a double fee award. While the benefit that Bignell received was substantial, his case was neither novel nor particularly complex. The key facts were undisputed, and the central legal question — whether temporary disability benefits are payable during vocational rehabilitation even though an injured *977worker’s medical condition has stabilized— did not present an especially complex issue. Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have considered whether medical stabilization marks the end of temporary disability.3 While most have decided the question differently than we did in Bignell’s case,4 the issue obviously cannot be deemed novel.
I also disagree with the majority’s contention that a multiplier is justified because of the contingent nature of fee awards in workers’ compensation cases. Since payment of a fee is contingent upon Board or court approval, see AS 23.30.145, the majority suggests that the public policy goal of insuring that competent counsel are available to represent injured workers will be thwarted if claimants’ counsel receive no more than an hourly fee when they win and nothing at all when they lose. This reasoning is flawed because we have held that AS 23.30.145(c) authorizes fee awards to counsel for losing claimants on appeal as well as successful claimants. M-B Contracting Co. v. Davis, 399 P.2d 433, 436 (Alaska 1965).
Although losing claimants are rarely awarded fees, the majority’s solution is inappropriate. It is patently unfair to require Bignell’s employer, or its insurance company, to pay a double fee award in order to compensate for cases where counsel for losing claimants receive no fees. A far better approach would be to encourage trial courts to exercise their discretion and award fees routinely to worthy losing claimants.
In sum, I would reverse the court’s double fee award because it contravenes the plain language of AS 23.30.145 and our prior holdings, and offends notions of fundamental fairness.
. See supra note 6 in majority opinion.
. The trial court stated that it was convinced that counsel spent substantially more time on the appeal than the 147 hours estimated in counsel’s affidavit. The record does not support this conclusion. While counsel’s 147-hour estimate did not include time spent preparing various pleadings, most of the pleadings were brief, pro forma motions, affidavits and proposed orders which would require only a few hours for an experienced attorney to prepare.
. See, e.g., Home Insurance Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 23 Ariz.App. 90, 530 P.2d 1123, 1125-27 (1975); see also 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 57.12, at 10-9 (1983).
. See Bignell v. Wise Mechanical Contractors, 651 P.2d 1163, 1169 (Alaska 1982) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein at 1169 n. 1. But cf. Cenvill Communities, Inc. v. Brown, 409 So.2d 1147, 1148-49 (Fla.App.1982) (statute requires date of maximum medical improvement to be determined after rehabilitation training program completed).