specially concurring and dissenting.
I am in accord with the disposition of these cases in the majority opinion save for the question of attorney fees on appeal. Paragraph 14 of this contract, which also is quoted in the majority opinion, provides:
“14. In the event that any party or individual institutes an action at law to enforce any agreement hereunder, the prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing party.”
This is a contractual right to attorney’s fees within the rule promulgated in Bowers *867Welding & Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, Wyo., 699 P.2d 299 (1985); and Kvenild v. Taylor, Wyo., 594 P.2d 972 (1979). The plaintiffs are entitled to enforce this provision of their contract like any other provision.
If the obligation is not honored by the defendants then the plaintiffs should be permitted to enforce it in the district court and to establish the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs for which they are entitled to be compensated. That is an issue of fact. If the right is controverted, it is peculiarly appropriate for that issue to be disposed of in a fact-finding court. I can discern no reason why the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs provided for in the contract would not include those on appeal as well as those relating to the trial of the action. I do not believe that this court, even with the support suggested by Justice Raper, Retired, in his concurring and dissenting opinion should involve itself in the resolution of this issue of fact. This case is distinguishable from those relied upon in the majority opinion, and the issue in this case should be resolved in the trial court.