(concurring)—ER 609(a)(1), requiring a determination of whether the probative value of admitting evidence of conviction of a crime outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, places an extraordinarily heavy intellectual burden upon the trial judge in a case tried to the court without a jury and what may very well be an impossible burden in a jury trial when the witness is the defendant charged with a crime, as in this case. Both "probative value" and "prejudicial effect" cannot be found as facts, each containing a number of assignable probabilities. Therefore, the determination of what weight should be given to each must be made on the basis of judgment or, with a jury, opinion. A trial judge cannot gauge with any degree of accuracy the probative value each juror will give the evidence of the conviction and to what degree each juror will be prejudiced thereby. Upon appellate review, the court cannot gauge with any degree of accuracy whether the trial court, in attempting the balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect, properly exercised its discretion.
In short, I agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Brachtenbach in State v. Burton, 101 Wn.2d 1, 12-24, 676 P.2d 975 (1984) eliminating impeachment by proof of prior convictions altogether, but as ER 609 is the law, I will state *589that in my opinion the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case.