dissenting.
The offense of Homicide By Vehicle While Driving Under The Influence is defined by statute as follows:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person as the direct result of a violation of Section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance and who is convicted of violating section 3731 is guilty of a felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause of death and the sentencing court shall order the person to serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than three years.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735(a). Based upon the record in this case, the essential elements of the charge of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
There is no question that the appellant, Ronald C. Len-hart, was properly convicted of violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731 relating to driving under the influence of alcohol. The evidence established that appellant’s blood alcohol exceeded 0.20% at the time of the accident and at that level he was incapable of safe driving. See Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 504 Pa. 244, 470 A.2d 1339 (1983). In Mikulan, we said: “It ‘is now virtually universally accepted that a person with a [blood alcohol percent] of 0.10 should not be driving.’ ” Id., 504 Pa. at 249, 470 A.2d at 1341 (citation omitted). The trial court, in convicting the appellant of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, found that the unintentionally caused death of the victim William Bateman was the direct result of appellant’s violation of § 3731 — driving under the influence of alcohol. The lower court concluded that from the position of the two vehicles after the accident, the appellant’s car had crossed the *196double yellow centerline and collided with the victim’s oncoming vehicle.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the verdict winner, and accept as true all direct and circumstantial evidence which, if believed, would support a finding that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1382 (1981). “Further, while it is clear that a criminal conviction may not be based upon mere speculation or conjecture, evidence may still be found sufficient even though wholly circumstantial.” Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 389 A.2d 101, 103, 104 (1978).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, it was established that the appellant was operating his vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of more than 0.20% in violation of § 3731; that appellant’s automobile, travelling south, crossed over the centerline of the roadway into the northbound lane and struck the victim’s oncoming vehicle; and that the victim died as a result of injuries he suffered in the collision. I would hold that the evidence, albeit circumstantial, supports appellant’s conviction of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol and affirm the order of the Superior Court.1
I dissent.
. The fact that the trial court sustained demurrers to the charges of homicide by Vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732; reckless driving, 75 Pa.C. S.A. § 3714; and driving on the wrong side of the roadway, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301 does not preclude appellant’s conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731 and homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735. The trial judge explained that the sustaining of the demurrers did not constitute a judicial finding that the appellant’s vehicle did not cross the centerline of the highway, but rather was a recognition that not all instances of crossing over the centerline amount to a violation of § 3301. Further, even if we assume that the verdict of guilty on the charge of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence is inconsistent with the sustaining of a demurrer to the charge of driving on the wrong side of the road, this inconsistancy alone is not grounds *197for reversing the conviction. "It has long been the rule in Pennsylvania .and in the federal courts that consistency in a verdict in a criminal case is not necessary.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 444 Pa. 405, 282 A.2d 375 (1971) (citations omitted).