specially concurring:
We granted certiorari to review both the regulatory taking and eminent domain rulings in The Mill v. State of Colorado, Department of Health, 868 P.2d 1099 (Colo.App.1993).14 I agree with the majority that the court of appeals erred in finding a regulatory taking of The Mill’s property. I also agree that the enhanced value statute, section 24-56 — 117(l)(c), 10B C.R.S. (1988), is dispositive in this case in determining whether the decontaminated value of a property should be considered for purposes of eminent domain pursuant to the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7942 (1993 Supp.). I concur in the majority opinion and write separately on the applicability of the enhanced value rule in this case.
I
The 61-aere parcel of land (property) at issue in this case consists of a 25-acre mill yard and a 36-acre tailings pile. Pursuant to an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) license, the property was operated as a uranium processing mill and for storage of uranium mill tailings from the late 1950s until 1962. In 1968, the AEC delegated regulatory authority of the radioactive materials and the AEC license to the State of Colorado, which terminated the license for the property in issue that adjoins the Gunnison Airport.
The Mill purchased the property in 1973. At that time, the Colorado Department of. Health (CDH) had imposed no restrictions on the use of the property. Radioactive contamination of the mill yard was found in 1976. In 1978, Congress enacted UMTRCA to decontaminate twenty-two inactive uranium mills to protect the public from the health hazards associated with the radioactivity of uranium mills. After radioactive contamination of the property was confirmed in 1980 and 1982, The Mill leased the property to O.C. Coal Company in 1983. The Mill notified CDH of the lease agreement, and CDH responded with a letter advising The Mill and O.C. Coal of safety precautions that were recommended because of the radioactive contamination of the property.
O.C. Coal terminated the lease in 1984. The Mill contends that the CDH letters setting forth safety requirements caused O.C. Coal to terminate the lease and brought an action against CDH in 1986, claiming a regulatory taking. While the regulatory takings case was on appeal, CDH initiated a condemnation proceeding in accordance with UMTR-CA and the applicable Colorado statute. § 25 — 11—303(1)(d), 11A C.R.S. (1989 & 1994 Supp.). In the condemnation action under UMTRCA, the parties stipulated that the market value of the property in its contaminated state was zero, and the trial court vested title to the property in CDH. The *1009Mill appealed both the regulatory taking and the condemnation decisions to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals consolidated the regulatory takings case with the eminent domain case. In the consolidated appeal, the court of appeals held that a regulatory taking had occurred and set aside the stipulation of the parties that the fair market value of the property in its contaminated state was zero. On remand, the court of appeals directed that fair market value be determined based on the decontaminated value of the property, and ordered a new determination of just compensation.
II
In Department of Health v. Hecla Mining Co., 781 P.2d 122, 125 (Colo.App.1989), the court of appeals stated: “We do not find support in the federal law for [the] assertion that the purpose of [UMTRCA] is to meet an obligation to remedy government-initiated contamination.”15 The legislative history of UMTRCA reflects a congressional intent not to overburden either the federal or state governments with the costs of clean-ups.16 Rather than protecting the investment of the property owner, Congress’ concern was to minimize the costs of the program in cleaning up radioactive uranium sites.17
Hecla set out the key elements of the legislative history and stated:
The legislative history shows that the Radiation Control Act was enacted due to concern over the health threat posed by unstable and uncontrolled inactive uranium mill tailings and not to meet any legal obligation on the part of the federal government to remedy the hazardous situations at such sites. Concern over costs of the program prompted Congress to provide for state acquisition of mill sites, particularly if decontamination would result in windfall profits to an owner who retained ' the site after decontamination.
Hecla, 781 P.2d at 124. The court of appeals in Hecla held that in a condemnation proceeding, property must be valued in its present condition, without regard to the governmental purpose supporting the necessity for condemnation or the radioactive contamination of the property. Accord, Williams v. City and County of Denver, 147 Colo. 195, 363 P.2d 171 (1961); § 24-56-117(l)(c).
In a condemnation proceeding, the property taken is valued at its fair actual cash market value at the time of trial or when the property is taken. § 38-1-114, 16A C.R.S. *1010(1982 & 1994 Supp.); see Mulford v. Farmers’ Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 62 Colo. 167, 161 P. 301 (1916). Market value is the price a property will bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires but is not obligated to sell, and is bought by one who desires, but is under no necessity to buy the property. Dep’t of Highways v. Schulojf 167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402 (1968). The value of the land taken is based on present conditions and not on the future development of the property. Id.
When Congress enacted UMTRCA, it directed that acquisitions be accomplished pursuant to state law. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1480(11), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 37 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7464. When the Colorado General Assembly agreed to the financial commitments of UMTRCA and authorized the CDH to participate in its implementation, it specifically directed that such acquisitions be conducted pursuant to the eminent domain laws of Colorado. § 25-11 — 303(l)(d). In particular, the General Assembly directed that the enhanced value criteria in section 24-56-117(l)(c), be followed when condemning property under UMTRCA. Section 24 — 56—117(l)(c) provides in relevant pai’t: “Any decrease or increase in the fair market value of real property prior to the date of valuation caused by the public improvement for which such property is acquired ... shall be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property.” Section 24-56-117(l)(c) is the statutory codification of the rule against enhanced value. See Williams, 147 Colo, at 199-200, 363 P.2d at 173-74. The court of appeals dismissed section 24-56-117 as “general policy” that must yield to what the court stated was the “ends” of UMTRCA (protecting the owner’s investment). The Mill, 868 P.2d at 1106.
The UMTRCA is not an exception to the enhanced value rule, but rather incorporates the rule into its framework. In Hecla, the court of appeals held that evidence of the decontaminated value of the land, “because it fails to reflect the actual condition of the property at the time of the taking, is necessarily speculative or prospective and thus inadmissible.” Hecla, 781 P.2d at 126. The court of appeals in the present case declared that Hecla was dispositive of value determination of fair market value and of the issues raised at the immediate possession hearing, but held that the enhanced value rule in Williams was inapplicable and that Hecla would not be followed as inconsistent with the scheme established by UMTRCA. The court of appeals misinterpreted UMTRCA, and erred in not following Hecla.18
The enhanced value statute is dispositive of the condemnation issue. The contaminated value of the land was zero. The Mill, in acquiring the property, knew of the property’s prior use as a uranium processing mill, which contaminated both the building and the soil. The Mill was effectively limited in the use it could make of its land because of radioactive contamination. Such a limitation on use is not compensable, however, because the only value of The Mill’s property would be as the result of improvements effected by a clean-up that would restore the land to its former condition. The property was contaminated when it was acquired by The Mill. Because the cost of decontaminating the property exceeds the value of the property after the clean-up, the value of the property is zero, and the rule against enhanced value is applicable.
Ill
The cost of decontaminating The Mill’s property is borne by the state and federal governments. A consideration of the property’s decontaminated state for purposes of calculating fair market value would grant The Mill more than it acquired when it purchased the property in 1973, and would grant the landowner “windfall profits,” profits which Congress intended to avoid in enacting UMTRCA.
Because an application of the rule against enhanced value is in accordance with congressional intent and the intent of the Gener*1011al Assembly, the court of appeals erred in ordering a determination of the property’s decontaminated value and in not following Hecla. The court of appeals also erred in setting aside the parties’ stipulation that the property had no value in its present condition.
. We previously reviewed inverse condemnation and regulatory taking issues in State of Colorado, Department of Health v. The Mill, 809 P.2d 434 (Colo.1991) and remanded to the district court for further consideration of promissory es-toppel and regulatory taking claims asserted by The Mill.
. The court of appeals in Hecla subsequently stated:
The [UMTRCA] ... expressly set forth, as the purpose for the legislation, the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare from the potential and significant radiation health hazards of uranium mill tailings.... This is an undisputable public purpose....
Id. (citations omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (stating that the purpose of the UMTRCA is "to stabilize and control ... tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner and to minimize or eliminate radiation health hazards to the public...
. The UMTRCA divides the costs of decontamination between the federal government (90%) and state government (10%). 42 U.S.C. § 7917(a). In contrast, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1993 Supp.), imposes liability upon "the owner and operator of a ... facility," or "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.... ” §§ 9607(a)(l)-(2).
The Mill is also subject to federal legislation that imposes liability on mill owners for noncompliance with radon emission standards. 40 C.F.R. § 61.222(b) (1993). The cost of decontamination of The Mill property has been estimated at $40 million.
.Such a concern eliminates the disparate appearance of the two decontamination options provided in UMTRCA. A contaminated site may be cleaned up either (1) through an agreement with the owner, 42 U.S.C. § 7913(a), or (2) by purchase or condemnation when the Secretary of Energy, with the concurrence of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, determines that decontamination would lead to "windfall profits” for the owner. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7914(a) and (e)(2).
The two options are intended to reduce the costs of the program to the public by preventing the receipt of "windfall profits” to landowners. Allowing owners such as The Mill to recover the uncontaminated value of their land, after purchasing the property in a contaminated condition, would provide the owners a windfall and would increase the cost of the program, contrary to congressional intent.
. Judge Smith authored the opinion of the court in Hecla and the court of appeals opinion in this case, but the other members of the panel were not the same. The court of appeals panel in this case erred in applying a different interpretation of the UMTRCA than a different panel employed in Hecla.