concurring.
I agree that the superior court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress, and that therefore his conviction should be affirmed. However, in reaching that cor-clusion I would apply the rule of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), and hold that Trooper Brandlen’s initial search of the automobile’s trunk was lawful.1 See Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1168-69 (Alaska 1973) (Fitzgerald, J., concurring).
. In Chambers v. Maroney, under facts remarkably similar to those in this case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the automobile “could have been searched on the spot,” saying:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428. In this case I believe there was ample cause to arrest the occupants of the car and clear probable cause to believe that the automobile contained articles that the police were entitled to seize.