Board of Assessors of Lynn v. Shop-Lease Co., Inc.

Reardon, J.

(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In my view, having considered the stipulation of the parties, the court should have dismissed the appeal out of hand.

The basis for the holding of the majority is that the board erroneously applied the capitalization of earnings method in valuing Shop-Lease’s property. Specifically, it is held that the tax factor employed should have been reduced to reflect the fact that property in Lynn is assessed at well under full and fair cash value. This derives from the stipulation of the parties that in the relevant period “substantially all properties . . . were . . . assessed at 30 percent of the fair cash value of such properties.” This stipulation, which provides the factual keystone of the majority’s opinion, means that the parties have stipulated that the assessors have acted in violation of G. L. c. 59, § 38,1 requiring assessors to make a *575“fair cash valuation” of all property subject to taxation. They have stipulated that the assessors have falsely certified to the correctness of valuation lists, G. L. c. 59, § 52,2 and have violated their oaths of office, G. L. c. 41, § 29.3 As the majority note, this court has repeatedly stressed the duty of assessors to tax property at its full and fair cash value.4 See Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 343 Mass. 223, 230-232 (1961); Leto v. Assessors of Wilmington, 348 Mass. 144, 146 (1964); Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366, 372 (1965). On this record I believe it is improper for this court to grant the assessors the relief they request. Notwithstanding its criticism of the assessment practices, in its decision the court effectively ratifies the lawless conduct of the assessors and even rewards it by requiring the board to make that illegality part of its valuation calculations.

*576The court is not at the mercy of the parties’ stipulations when those stipulations are offensive to law. Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 319 Mass. 568, 574-575 (1946). Commonwealth v. Clarke, 350 Mass. 721, 722 (1966). It is not bound to adjudicate any matter which the parties bring before it by way of agreed facts. When, as in this case, they present a situation rife with illegality, the same considerations of public policy which cause a court to refuse to decide right's under an illegal contract should cause it to withhold the exercise of its powers.5 “The plaintiff comes as a participant in a violation of law by the making of an illegal contract. The court will give him no relief from the consequences of his participation in an unlawful act.” Downey v. Charles S. Gove Co. 201 Mass. 251, 252 (1909). The same principle should apply with even greater vigor here where the complaining party has perpetrated a blatant illegality in violation of a public trust. It is no part of this court’s duty to assist the assessors in obtaining the optimal benefit from their unlawful method of taxation.

It is true that in Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366 (1965), the court held that the proper remedy for a taxpayer whose property had been disproportionately assessed in relation to other property was an abatement which would effectively reduce his assessment to the proportion of other assessments even when this would result in valuing all property at less than full cash value. Id. at 377. In those circumstances, however, the compelling need to provide a remedy for the taxpayer who was the victim of discrimination outweighed the harm resulting from the departure from the statutorily required full cash assessment. Id. at 376. It was more just in that situation to provide the remedy and to abide the illegality than to remit the taxpayer to alternative means which might have attacked illegal procedures but would probably have negated prompt individual relief.

*577Here the court faces no such “ ‘dilemma.’ ” Id. at 372. The party seeking relief from this court is not a taxpayer suffering under an illegal system but rather the assessors who are the authors of the illegality. Adding insult to injury, the assessors insist that the board should have fully assimilated this illegal method of assessment into its valuation. In these circumstances the assessors have no good cause to bemoan any unjust treatment.

The majority correctly point out that failure to reverse the board would create a proportionate overassessment on other taxpayers of Lynn relative to Shop-Lease. But this discrimination is a consequence of the failure of the Lynn assessors to perform their statutory duty. G. L. c. 59, § 52; c. 41, § 29. Fair distribution of the tax burden would be a natural consequence of the full cash valuation required by law. The assessors in effect are asking this court to take a thoroughly illegal system and to adjudicate proportionality within its unlawful context. To do so is to pervert the functions of the court. The result is also prejudicial to the efforts of those assessors in cities and towns of the Commonwealth where an effort is made to comply with the law. See, e.g., G. L. c. 58, §§ 9-10C, 18C. The statement of the majority that flagrant failure by assessors to comply with their constitutional and statutory duty to assess all property at its full and fair cash value will produce an unsympathetic reception in this court impels me to observe that such conduct should lead us to afford them here no reception at all. This court should apply its powers in support of equity on the request of assessors only when there is a showing that they have complied with the statutes which govern their activities.

If the assessors are truly concerned with equity among the taxpayers of Lynn, they have a simple remedy at hand: that is to obey the law. I would not give them the relief they have sought.

“The assessors of each city and town shall at the time appointed therefor make a fair cash valuation of all the estate, real and personal, subject to taxation therein, and, in cities, the assessors may, in any year, divide the city into convenient assessment districts.”

“The assessors, or other persons authorized to assess taxes, shall, at the end of said valuation list, subscribe the following statement:

“We, the assessors (or other persons so authorized, as the case may be,) of , do severally state, that the foregoing list is a full and true list of the names of all persons known to us, who are liable to taxation in , (here insert the name of the city or town,) during the present year, and that the real and personal estate contained in said list, and assessed upon each person in said list, is a full and accurate assessment upon all the property of each person, liable to taxation, at its full and fair cash value, according to our best knowledge and belief. This statement is made under the penalties of perjury.
“Failure to subscribe the foregoing statement shall not invalidate a tax otherwise legally assessed; but whoever assesses taxes in a town without having subscribed the same shall be punished by a fine of ten dollars.”

“Any person chosen to assess taxes or to determine or to assist in determining the value of property for the purpose of taxation shall, before entering upon the performance of his duties, take the following oath:

“I, having been chosen to assess taxes and estimate the value of property for the purpose of taxation for the town (or city) of for the year (or years) ensuing, do swear that I will truly and impartially, according to my best skill and judgment, assess and apportion all such taxes as I may during that time assess; that I will neither overvalue nor undervalue any property subject to taxation, and that I will faithfully perform all the duties of said office.
“If he neglects to take such oath before entering upon the performance of his duties, he shall forfeit not more than fifty dollars.”

The stipulation in this case is in contrast with the situation outlined in Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 366 (1965), in which the court noted, at 371: “Indeed, it is unlikely that a public board would formally adopt, by a vote set forth in its official records, a wholly illegal practice, such as a policy of assessing all land at less than 100% of full fair cash value.” The assessors have shown no such becoming modesty here. Not only do they stipulate as to their illegal practice but urge it upon the court as the very basis of their claims.

“The rule of .law is of universal operation, that none shall, by the aid of a court of justice, obtain the fruits of an unlawful bargain.” Russell v. DeGrand, 15 Mass. 35,39(1818).