dissenting. This action in the district court is authorized by K.S.A. 12-712 and the scope and nature of the review is limited thereby. Under the statute the district court is given the authority to review the action of a municipality in a zoning matter. Any person having an interest in property affected may have the reasonableness of any ordinance or regulation determined in such an action. If the ordinance or regulation by the municipality is found to be unreasonable the ordinance or regulation may be set aside. The statute does not authorize a district court to substitute its judgment for that of the municipality. The court is not authorized to enter the business of zoning. The court merely determines if the ordinance or regulation is reasonable. The Kansas cases which support these statements were recognized by the Court of Appeals and applied. These cases are set forth in the majority opinion and recognized as the law.
However, after paying lip service to these cases the majority disregards the principles cited and adopts a new approach to judicial review in zoning actions. A novel bifurcation of the scope and nature of review under K.S.A. 12-712 is initiated. The opinion of the court states that when a city adopts “a comprehensive plan for development of a city” it acts in a legislative capacity. (Syl. ¶ 1.) In such a case review by the courts under the statute is limited as recognized in our previous case law. On the other hand, when a city is called on to rezone “a particular tract” the action of the municipality becomes “more quasi-judicial than legislative.” (Syl. ¶ 2.)
The request for rezoning in the present case relates to a particular tract, so under this new law judicially declared by the majority the refusal to rezone this tract becomes more quasi-judicial than legislative, whatever that means.
Now let us consider the procedure followed by the district court in this case, which procedure is approved by the majority as being within the proper scope of review provided by K.S.A. 12-712. The district court heard the evidence and made over thirty findings of fact. It then concluded that four factors pre*602eluded it from finding the city had acted unreasonably in denying the requested zoning change. In other words, the court found the action of the municipality in refusing to rezone the property was reasonable.
Under our prior case law this should complete the review contemplated by K.S.A. 12-712 and the refusal to rezone should have been approved by the district court. In the present case the district court retained jurisdiction of the case and gave the plaintiff-landowner an opportunity to take care of the four changes in planning which the court required. These “proposed changes” were to be agreed to by the landowner and then the new plan was to be resubmitted to the city for a final decision by that body. These four planning changes were:
“1. Access on 87th . . . that could influence backup traffic into the intersection [of 87th and Metcalf];
“2. A greater setback from the north side to make the entrance more attractive;
“3. Upgrading of the landscaping; and
“4. High aesthetics in architecture to blend in with the surrounding neighborhood with emphasis on small signs.”
It should be noted that these were all matters bearing upon plans for a proposed shopping center. This action by the court presupposes the property should no longer be zoned C-O (office building) and should be rezoned CP-1 (planned retail). At this stage of the proceedings the district court entered into the business of zoning.
Apparently, two of the four suggested changes in planning the shopping center were rejected by the plaintiff-landowner. The plan with two changes was then presented to the city council. The application for rezoning was again denied by the city. Thereupon the district court resumed jurisdiction over the rezoning application in court and held another hearing. Additional evidence was introduced, and the court then ordered the zoning change.
The majority approves this procedure, the effect of which is to give the district courts of this state complete and final control of the rezoning process. Hereafter, when a rezoning action by a municipality is considered “more quasi-judicial than legislative” the district court in reviewing the action taken by the municipality not only will hear evidence and make findings but also will order planning changes and control the nature of the facility to be constructed.
Such authority is beyond that contemplated and granted by the *603legislature. It violates the separation of powers doctrine encompassed by the constitution. I would affirm the Court of Appeals and reverse the trial court.