dissenting, with whom McCLINTOCK, Justice, joins.
I would have reversed the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The right to effective assistance of counsel is, for all criminal defendants, basic and constitutionally mandated.1 Given the facts of this case, the denial of this defendant’s request for substituted counsel, coupled with a denial of a continuance, was a denial of his right.
The majority opinion requires a defendant to make a “factual showing of good cause” in order that he be entitled to an appointment of substitute counsel. It then concludes that not only was there no showing of incompetence of counsel or a conflict of interest, but the defendant’s representation of a lack of trust and confidence as between attorney and counsel, coupled with counsel’s agreement that such trust and confidence are lacking, is not sufficient to fulfill the good-cause requirement. On the contrary, it is my judgment that the relationship of mutual confidence between a lawyer and his client is essential to a fulfillment of the lawyer’s professional responsibility of furnishing effective assistance of counsel and that it cannot exist in circumstances such as these where both client and counsel agree that the requisite confidence and trust are absent.
I find the law to be that where a defendant shows good cause why mutual confidence and trust between him and his attorney no longer exist, the court should substitute counsel. Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 437 Pa. 262, 263 A.2d 351, 353-354 (1970). In this case, Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was confronted with a situation where the defendant’s counsel insisted the defendant plead guilty to first-degree murder, while it was defendant’s wish that he be permitted to go to trial. Counsel, on the morning of the trial, moved for a continuance because of this difference which had culminated in a lack of confidence and trust between the attorney and client. The motion asked that the matter be continued until other counsel could be employed and given adequate time to prepare the defense. The court denied the motion and the client pled guilty one-and-one-half hours later.
Justice Roberts held that the plea could not stand because it was not freely given since the defendant had been placed in a position where he had no choice but to enter such a plea. The court said:
“It is true that a defendant, whether represented by retained or appointed counsel, cannot continually request new counsel when disagreements arise. But ‘[sjince a relationship of mutual confidence between lawyer and client is important to the lawyer’s fulfillment of his professional functions, where good cause is shown by the defendant why that confidence does not exist the court should substitute counsel.’ ABA Minimum Standards, Providing Defense Services 51 (1967). In the instant case ‘good cause’ was certainly shown .
“Since the court’s failure to grant the motions for continuance and withdrawal effectively deprived appellant of any meaningful choice when he entered his guilty plea, appellant must be given a chance to plead over. The judgment of sentence of the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.”
Here, the defendant showed to the trial court that he had previously informed counsel that he did not want his representation. The attorney, in turn, responded that he did not want to represent the defendant. The defendant related that his attorney’s only concern was to effect a plea to a lesser offense, while the defendant asserted his innocence and wished to go to trial with other counsel. The record further reveals that the defendant had previously dismissed *1077this appointed counsel, charging him with incompetence. The defendant’s attorney had attempted to withdraw, citing an inability “to achieve the rapport, trust and confidence of said Irvin necessary to the vigorous defense to which he is constitutionally entitled.” Surely, it can be understood by all why an appointed counsel would entertain a lack of trust and confidence with his client when the client had previously charged him with incompetence. I hasten to add that there is no showing that the attorney was in any way incompetent. However, once the public charge of incompetence is made by a client against his lawyer, in these circumstances, the question of the lawyer’s actual competence is irrelevant to the issue of the existence of mutual confidence between lawyer and client. Competence is not the issue. Trust is the -issue. Good cause for substitution is, indeed, shown when an attorney and his client agree that they have irreconcilable differences, resulting in a lack of rapport, trust and confidence. This is particularly true in a situation, like this case, where the defendant has not continually requested new counsel whenever disagreements arise. Compare, Miller v. State, Wyo., 560 P.2d 739 (1977).
The majority attempts to buttress its position on the substitution of counsel, by concluding that the defendant made a “knowing and intelligent waiver of the assistance of counsel.” This position might be tenable if we could ignore the circumstances leading up to the defendant’s decision to act as his own attorney. I cannot escape the conclusion that the defendant was given no real freedom of choice to decide whether he wished to defend himself. It was like the options that were made available to the defendant in Commonwealth v. Velasquez, supra. There, the defendant’s choice was to continue with a lawyer who wanted him to plead guilty against his will or be represented in trial in circumstances where the attorney-client confidence had been destroyed. The plea evolving from these conditions was held faulty because it was not freely given.
In the case at hand the defendant could either accept the representation of a lawyer in whom he had no confidence and who admittedly did not feel he could furnish the defense to which the defendant was constitutionally entitled — or—the defendant could go it alone unprepared. This was no choice at all!!
To make matters worse, the majority concludes there was no abuse of discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a continuance so that he could prepare his own defense. Underlying the majority’s conclusion is its impression that the defendant was “playing a cat and mouse game with the court.” This belief presumably is premised on the majority’s inability to find a justification for a substitution of counsel. In addition, the majority points to the record and finds an absence of any “particular need for additional time.” It then indulges the same kind of a fault-finding search which I have denounced in both Ash v. State, Wyo., 555 P.2d 221; and Adger v. State, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1056 (handed down Sept. 11,1978), on the ground that the issue is fair trial — not whose fault is it that the defendant didn’t have one. But, even if I were to adopt the fault-finding approach (which I do only to make this following point), there was no lack of diligence on the part of the defendant in this case. Soon after the setting of defendant’s new trial, his appointed counsel moved to withdraw from the case. I am unable to place any blame on the defendant for the fact that this motion was not formally heard until the day of trial. Although the defendant was informally advised that the court would not allow his appointed counsel to withdraw, I find no evidence in the record to support the charge that the defendant was seeking to manipulate or subvert court procedures. The fact remains that the defendant became his own attorney on the day of trial and, therefore, had no opportunity to adequately prepare his defense.2 *1078There had been no previous requests for a delay. Under these circumstances, the denial of a continuance amounted to a deprivation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. See, People v. Williams, 386 Mich. 565, 194 N.W.2d 337 (1972).
With regard to the evidence of a collateral offense, I must also differ with the majority’s analysis. The majority concludes that the fact that the defendant may have stolen the gun used in the armed robbery was admissible to prove the defendant’s identity. While I probably would not have found the introduction of such evidence prejudicial, I am unable to agree that it, in any way, assists in identifying the defendant. The manner in which the defendant allegedly obtained the gun is totally unrelated to question of identity.
. The duty in a capital case to assign counsel “is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527, n. 1. Gideon v. Wainwnght, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, without discussion of the term “effective,” extends the constitutional right of counsel to any felony.
. Even where certiorari has been denied by the United States Supreme Court, where lack of time for a lawyer to prepare his client’s defense has been urged, none of the recently denied *1078petitions for certiorari involve situations in which an attorney had less than a day in which to prepare. See, e. g., United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.) (one month), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860, 98 S.Ct. 186, 54 L.Ed.2d 133 (1977); United States v. Rastelli, 551 F.2d 902 (2d Cir.) (18 days), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 115, 98 S.Ct. 115, 54 L.Ed.2d 91 (1977); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1977) (4 days), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 889, 54 L.Ed.2d 795 (1978); United States v. Brugger, 549 F.2d (7th Cir.) (more than two weeks), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977); United States v. Faulkner, 538 F.2d 724 (6th Cir.) (although attorney was retained immediately prior to trial he had more than two days before the first witness was called), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023, 97 S.Ct. 640, 50 L.Ed.2d 624 (1976).