(to reverse and remand). I agree with the reasoning of my Brother T. G. Kavanagh that the original guilty plea of April 7th was in fact properly "accepted”.
But, regardless of whether MCLA 768.35; MSA 28.1058 is or is not mandatory, as my Sister Mary S. Coleman holds, its provisions are not satisfied in the instant case. The statute provides that a guilty plea shall be vacated when the trial judge "shall have reason to doubt the truth” of such plea. (Emphasis added.) No valid reason is shown in the transcript of the proceedings of May 8, 1969.
The only additional data presented to the trial judge was defendant’s statement that, on the same facts, he no longer felt that he was "really” guilty. Since "the truth” of the plea depends upon whether or not the defendant did in fact commit certain acts constituting a crime, that defendant feels what he did was or was not a crime is not relevant. Just as the defendant saying he was guilty without relating the facts necessary to constitute a crime does not satisfy finding the truth of a plea, so a defendant’s saying he does not really *404feel guilty after relating the commission of acts that do constitute a crime does not disestablish the truth of the plea, if the defendant still wants to plead guilty. I would like to make it very clear, unlike my Brother Kavanagh’s opinion, that defendants do not have the right to insist on acceptance of guilty pleas under MCLA 768.35. In those cases where the tried judge is presented with objective facts which would legitimately cause him to doubt the truth of a plea of guilty, MCLA 768.35 commands him not to accept the plea. The dispositive consideration is whether or not the facts as found by the judge indicate that defendant was guilty. It is the trial judge, not the defendant, who is to make the determination of whether there are sufficient facts and allegations under law to justify a plea of guilty. People v Taylor, 387 Mich 209, 224 (1972). The facts upon which the trial judge acted in vacating defendant’s guilty plea were no less compelling of guilt than those facts elicited at the original hearing. Indeed, aside from defendant’s expressed reversal of his feelings of culpability, the facts are identical. Thus the trial judge, having on the record no "reason to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty”, improperly vacated that plea.
I would therefore vote to reverse. Defendant should be remanded to recorder’s court for sentencing on the original plea of guilty, now reinstated, to robbery unarmed.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.T. G. Kavanagh, J. (separate opinion). This case and the case of People v McMiller reported 389 Mich 425, were submitted together so that we might consider the matter of setting aside a plea *405of guilty and retrial on a higher offense arising out of the same transaction.
In this case the plea was vacated sua sponte by the judge after he said he would accept it but before he had imposed sentence.
In McMiller the plea was overturned on appeal after sentence.
Defendant Robert William Wolff was arrested on November 16, 1968 and charged with aiding and abetting an armed robbery.1 On April 7, 1969 he offered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of robbery unarmed.2
After ascertaining defendant’s understanding of the charge and voluntariness of his plea, the following colloquy took place:
"The Court: What did you do that makes you think that you are guilty?
"The Defendant: I drove the participants and let them out of the car.
"The Court: Are you saying that a robbery occurred on September 8 at 2912 Cochrane, a robbery of Adelbert Circle, and you drove the get-away car for that robbery?
"The Defendant: Not the get-away car. I drove them to the scene.
"The Court: What else did you do?
"The Defendant: I left.
"The Court: Did you know that they were going to commit a robbery?
"The Defendant: Yes, sir.
"The Court: You knew it?
"The Defendant: Yes, sir.
"The Court: Did they have a gun?
"The Defendant: There was a gun there, I believe.
"The Court: What did you do, discuss it with someone else — was it one or two that you drove there?
*406"The Defendant: I drove three men there besides myself.
"The Court: Did you have a discussion about this robbery before you drove them over there?
"The Defendant: No. They asked me to drive them there. It is right in my neighborhood.
"The Court: So you drove them over there?
"The Defendant: They are all from the same neighborhood.
"The Court: But you had a discussion about the robbery before you drove them?
"The Defendant: They had a discussion in the car after I had stopped there.
"The Court: And before you drove them you knew there was going to be a robbery?
"The Defendant: Yes, sir. I knew there was going to be a robbery.
"The Court: All right. I will accept the plea of guilty and refer the defendant to the Probation Department for pre-sentence investigation, and set May 7 for date of sentence; 9:00 a.m. in the morning. Bond continued.”
In his interview with the presentence investigator from the probation department the defendant made the following statement:
"On the day this crime was committed I had taken off from work and went over to pick up Edwin Uphan and Ray Martin. I had known both of these fellows before. We then picked up one other fellow and while sitting in the car talking near Butternut and Cochran the fellows began to talk about robbing a store. I got angry and asked them to get out of my car. I then drove away and later that day I heard that this confectionery store was robbed. After that I left the state. I pleaded guilty to Robbern [sic] Not Armed because I did not feel my lawyer would fight the Robbery Armed case for me.”
On May 8, 1969, defendant appeared before the trial court for sentencing. The court questioned *407the defendant about his statements to the court on April 7th and then said:
"The Court: * * *
You indicate from what you tell the probation officer, taking in connection with what you said there at the time of the plea, that you don’t have any guilt in this matter at all.
"The Defendant: Not really.
"The Court: I don’t know why you wasted the Court’s time and pled guilty.
"The Defendant: I was not trying to waste the Court’s time.
"The Court: What were you doing?
"The Defendant: In a way I felt I had some guilt because I knew they were going to pull oíf a crime. But as far as out and out extent of armed robbery, no.
"The Court: I cannot accept his plea. * * *
"Counsel [for defendant]: Thank you your Honor. If you question Mr. Upham [another defendant] you will find that they did meet after that and divided the proceeds of the robbery.
"The Court: I know that, but he does not admit that. He says he did not get any of the proceeds.
"The Defendant: I was in the house when they divided the proceeds.
"The Court: You were in the car also?
"The Defendant: I was in the car at the start, yes, sir, but after, nor during or after.
"The Court: You didn’t take any of the money either, you were just present?
"The Defendant: Yes, sir, that is right.
"The Court: And you indicate in your statement to the court that you were present but you did not receive any of the money?
"The Defendant: Yes, sir.
"The Court: Well, presence is not enough unless the jury finds that there was something else you did. Maybe driving the car was enough, but that is a fact for either *408a judge without a jury or a jury, but I am not going to accept his plea.”
In order to decide the ultimate questions raised by this case it is necessary first to decide several subsidiary questions:
1. Was the guilty plea in this case in fact accepted?
At the April 7th arraignment the court concluded:
"All right. I will accept the plea of guilty and refer the. defendant to the Probation Department for presentence investigation, and set May 7 for date of sentence * * * .”
We are not persuaded by the people’s argument the judge had not accepted the plea at the April 7th arraignment because at the May 8th proceeding he said: "I cannot accept his plea” and "I am not going to accept his plea.”
The argument that a plea is not "finally” accepted until sentence is passed is based on a concept that is at odds with decisions of this Court which have held that sentence is the judgment imposed on a prior conviction and the conviction has viability entirely apart from the validity of the sentence. People v Adams, 95 Mich 541, 542-543 (1893); People v Burridge, 99 Mich 343 (1894).
2. Was the plea properly accepted?
This question can be answered only by deciding whether there was adequate compliance with the statute3 and court rule.4
The judge questioned the defendant at length about his understanding of the charge and of his rights at trial and the voluntariness of his plea.
*409The defendant acknowledged that he had driven the robbers to the scene of the crime and that he knew they were going to commit a robbery. This established an adequate factual basis for acceptance of the plea.
We conclude that before the judge, said that he would accept the plea he had adequately performed all the duties imposed on him by the statute and court rule. The plea was properly accepted.
3. May a plea that is properly accepted be set aside?
The court may set aside a properly accepted plea on the motion of the accused before or after sentence is imposed. This is not an unqualified right however. Even before sentencing, the failure of the accused to present a "persuasive reason” for withdrawing his plea may justify the court in refusing to allow him to withdraw it. People v Zaleski, 375 Mich 71 (1965).
What concerns us however in this case is whether the judge may set aside a properly accepted plea against the wishes of the accused.
Because, no express objection to the court’s action here is found in the transcript, it is suggested that the accused acquiesced in it. We do not think that is a legitimate conclusion from a fair reading of the proceedings on May 8th.
The statement by defense counsel: "If you question Mr. Upham [another defendant] you will find that they did meet after that and divided the proceeds of the robbery”; and the defendant’s statement: "I was in the house when they divided the proceeds”, made after the court had said it could not accept the plea, are consonant only with the conclusion that the judge’s action was against the defendant’s wishes.
*410This situation is comparable to that which pertained in People v Shirk, 383 Mich 180, 193 (1970) where Justice T. M. Kavanagh said:
"To require defense counsel to mouth a collocation of words which could be formally labeled an objection * * * would exalt form over substance.”
We are satisfied that the judge’s action here was over the defendant’s sufficiently evidenced objection, and the propriety of it can be determined only by considering the letter and spirit of MCLA 768.35 and GCR 1963, 785.3.
4. What is the effect of the provision in the statute: ”[W]henever said judge shall have reason to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty it shall be his duty to vacate the same”?
Our statute is a reenactment of and in all material respects identical to 1875 PA 99.
Shortly after its original enactment, Justice Campbell discussed the statute in Edwards v The People, 39 Mich 760, 762-763 (1878) wherein he said:
"It is contrary to public policy to have any one imprisoned who is not clearly guilty of the precise crime charged against him, and it is equally contrary to policy and justice to punish any one without some regard to the circumstances of the case. By confining this statute to informations and not extending it to indictments, it is easy to see that the Legislature thought there was danger that prosecuting attorneys, either to save themselves trouble, to save money to the county, or to serve some other improper purpose, would procure prisoners to plead guilty by assurances they have no power to make of influence in lowering the sentence, or by bringing some other unjust influence to bear on them. It is to be presumed they had evidence before them of serious abuses under the information *411system which in their judgment required checking by stringent measures.
"Every one familiar with the course of criminal justice knows that those officers exercise very extensive and dangerous powers, that in the hands of an arbitrary or corrupt man are capable of great abuse. And unless the general impression is wrong, great abuses have been practiced by this very device of inveigling prisoners into confessions of guilt which could not be lawfully made out against them, and deceiving them concerning the precise character of the charges which they are led to confess. And it has also happened, as is generally believed, that by receiving a plea of guilty from a person whose offense is not aggravated, worse criminals who have used him for their purposes remain unpunished, because the facts which would convict them have not been brought out.
“This statute not only requires the judge to examine carefully into the facts of the case, which can require no less than a search into the depositions if they have been returned or similar evidence if they have not been taken, but also compels him to examine the prisoner himself concerning the circumstances which induced him to plead guilty.”
From the discussion so soon after the passage of the act it is obvious that the Court from the beginning has regarded the statute as expressive and implementive of a public policy to protect the accused from making an unwary or coerced plea.
The promise of a lower sentence or other unjust influence — the inveigling of prisoners to confess when their guilt could not lawfully be proved— deceiving prisoners about the precise character of the charges — using the plea of one to absolve more serious offenders — these are the evils of the court concluded the Legislature was seeking to correct in enacting the statute.
The improper substitution of the non-adversary *412procedure for the adversary trial was what was sought to be forestalled by the statute.
Thus the "truth of the plea” comprehended the validity of the basis for the charge and the circumstances prompting the accused’s choice of eschewing trial.
More recent cases have underscored the necessity for determining a factual basis for the plea. See People v Barrows, 358 Mich 267 (1959) and People v Shell, 23 Mich App 593 (1970).
Doubt about the guilt of the accused whether entertained by the judge or the accused himself should not be considered in assaying the defendant’s choice of electing this non-adversary procedure for determining it. The statutory stricture on the judge to satisfy himself of the "truth of the plea” goes to the circumstances of the plea, the state of mind of the defendant. Has the defendant been promised leniency or coerced into pleading guilty? Was this a knowing, understanding — true —plea? Does he know what the charge is? Does he understand the incidents of the adversary procedure for establishing guilt?
The obligation imposed on the judge to establish that the plea is a true plea also requires that he establish a factual basis for convicting the defendant of the charge to which the plea is offered or to some greater crime.
In People v Bartlett, 17 Mich App 205, 208-209, 211 (1969) Judge (now Justice) Levin said:
"Doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, even if entertained by the accused person himself, does not necessarily preclude a trial judge from accepting a plea of guilty. If the trial judge, after the direct questioning of the defendant required by the court rule and Barrows, ascertains that there is a factual basis for the plea, that the plea is a truthful, honest plea of guilty to an offense *413of which the accused person might well be convicted upon trial, then the truth of the plea has been reasonably ascertained.
"A defendant who desires to plead guilty to a reduced charge but who entertains doubt as to his guilt should not be required to stultify himself to obtain the benefit of the opportunity to plead to the lesser charge. A rule of law which would require a person desiring to offer a plea of guilty to admit the inevitability of his conviction upon trial would require an accused person who thinks he has a defense but might well be convicted to either state to the court that which he does not conscientiously believe or possibly forego the very real benefit of 'copping out’ to an offense carrying a shorter sentence than that of which he might well be convicted * * * .”
Many situations come readily to mind in which a defendant may protest his innocence altogether and still offer to plead guilty intelligently, deliberately and freely.
A man accused of murder might well offer a plea to manslaughter if he were convinced a jury might not believe his claim of self defense or accident as opposed to the witnesses who would give testimony supporting malice and deliberation. Cfr. North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25; 91 S Ct 160; 27 L Ed 2d 162 (1970).
A three-time loser protesting innocence might well prefer to plead to attempted breaking and entering instead of run the risk that a jury might believe the Vicar’s direct evidence of his armed robbery over defendant’s ex-cell mates’ support of his claimed alibi.
In this very case defendant’s willingness to plead to unarmed robbery was well advised as evidenced by the result — even giving full credit to his "exculpatory” statement to the presentence investigator.
So too with many situations wherein the charge *414involves specific intent and the evidence against the defendant is convincing. Many defendants faced with serious charges, particularly those who have criminal records, or who are found in incriminating circumstances or who may be aware that that alleged victims of the crime will testify against them, may wish to plead guilty to a lesser offense rather than face a possible heavy sentence on conviction of a higher charge, despite their honest belief in their innocence.
We are unable to find any authority for holding that it was intended by the statute that a judge must vacate an accepted plea if the defendant expresses doubt about his guilt. Three cases were suggested as requiring that result: People v Street, 288 Mich 406 (1939); People v Banning, 329 Mich 1 (1950); and People v Morrison, 348 Mich 88 (1957).
In Street the Court said at p 408:
"If the judge has reason to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty, it becomes his duty, sua sponte to vacate it and direct a plea of not guilty to be entered and order a trial of the issue thus formed.”
But that case involved a guilty plea that was withdrawn on the defendant’s motion and subsequent improper comment on it at trial.
. In Banning, this Court held that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing permission to withdraw under the circumstances of that case.
In Morrison the Court held that as a matter of law the defendant’s recitation of what he did did not amount to an admission of guilt to the crime charged, and negated his plea of guilty and under the circumstances it became the duty of the trial court to refuse to accept it.
The defendant’s appeal in that case from the *415denial of his motion for a "new trial” after sentencing asserted that he had not actually plead guilty to the offense set forth in the information. The Attorney General filed a brief in which he asserted that the defendant’s statement of the facts negated his plea of guilty and it thereupon became the duty of the trial judge to vacate such plea. Morrison is no authority for the proposition that a judge must, against the wishes of the defendant, vacate a properly accepted plea — a plea to an offense of which the accused might well be convicted upon a trial.
In summary then, no reason appears to require a judge to set aside a plea against the wishes of a defendant offering it because he expresses doubts about his guilt.
On the contrary, reason would seem to say that a judge would encourage truthful answers to questions about the defendant’s participation in the crime and the circumstances prompting the plea by assuring the defendant that truthful answers— even that he thinks he is innocent — would not necessarily require rejection of his plea. We believe this is a better way to avoid canned answers to canned questions.
Here, where the admitted facts support an inculpatory inference, the defendant’s assertion that such is not a correct inference does not preclude the judge from determining that the defendant freely, understandingly and knowingly offers the plea.
In this case we are satisfied that the judge properly accepted the plea of guilty to the charge of unarmed robbery; that he was not obliged to vacate it and indeed that it was error to set it aside.
We have treated the question of double jeopardy *416and retrial in McMiller so we do not address ourselves to it here.
The conviction herein on the charge of robbery armed is reversed, the order vacating the plea of guilty to the charge of robbery unarmed is set aside, the plea of guilty thereto reinstated and the defendant remanded to recorder’s court for resentencing for that offense.
MCLA 750.529; MSA 28.797.
MCLA 750.530; MSA 28.798.
MCLA 768.35; MSA 28.1058.
GCR 1963, 785.3(2).