dissenting: There is an old adage that hard cases make bad law, and this is one of them. In an effort to see that justice is done, the court has, by an unwarranted' interpretation of K. S. A. 44-512a, impliedly amended the statute by imposing the burden upon the claimant or his attorney to advise the employer and its insurance carrier of the amount of unpaid medical expenses which were incorporated in a compensation award and which they were directed to pay.
In the many cases where this court has construed and applied K. S. A. 44-512a, it held that the statute is remedial and supplements existing remedies provided in the act and applies to a different state of facts than those embraced in the original act of 1927; that the employer has the choice of protecting his vested rights by merely complying with the terms and requirements of the award by which he is bound until it is set aside, modified, paid or redeemed, or permit the employee to invoke the remedy of 44-512a for the collection of all future installments; that it is the employer, not the claimant or his attorney, who has the burden to determine *558what is due and payable where an award has been made ordering the employer and its insurance carrier to make payments of compensation; that the failure to pay any part of the compensation awarded when due and payable within the time prescribed by the statute and after demand, makes the entire amount of the award immediately due and payable and provides a cause of action to the employee to recover the entire amount of compensation awarded in like manner as the collection of a debt, and the remedies of execution, attachment, garnishment or any other remedial procedure provided by the laws of this state are available for enforcement of the judgment. A few of our many cases establishing this law are Ellis v. Kroger Grocery Co., 159 Kan. 213, 152 P. 2d 860; Miller v. Massman Construction Co., 171 Kan. 713, 237 P. 2d 373; Babcock v. Dose, 179 Kan. 298, 293 P. 2d 1007; Owen v. Ready Made Buildings, Inc., 180 Kan. 286, 303 P. 2d 168; Owen v. Ready Made Buildings, Inc., 181 Kan. 659, 313 P. 2d 267, and Teague v. George, 188 Kan. 809, 365 P. 2d 1087.
The court’s opinion appears to recognize the foregoing legal principles since it cites Owen v. Ready Made Buildings, Inc., 181 Kan. 659, 313 P. 2d 267, and Miller v. Massman Construction Co., supra, holding that the failure to pay any part of the compensation awarded when due and payable, including medical expenses, within the time prescribed by the statute after service of demand, makes the entire compensation immediately due and payable, and that the statute places the burden upon the respondent and its insurance carrier to determine what is due and payable when an award has been made ordering them to make payments. However; the court’s opinion purports to distinguish those cases from the instant case by stating, “In each of these cases the distinguishing characteristic is the fact that the respondent knew the actual amount of compensation awarded, and that sums were due and payable under the award within the prescribed period from the demand.” The conclusion is based on an unsound premise and is not warranted by either of those cases.
The Owen case, supra, involved, as does the instant case, medical expenses awarded a doctor in the claimant’s award of compensation, which was unpaid. The employer and its insurance carrier, realizing that the medical expenses ordered to be paid by the award had not been fully paid within fourteen days, contacted the doctor and attempted to ascertain the balance owing. Contrast the instant case: The respondent and its insurance carrier paid all *559items of the award including Dr. Marsh and Dr. Zweifel’s medical expenses, but made no attempt to ascertain the amount due and owing Dr. Coffey, also ordered paid by the district court’s judgment. The Owen case held that failure to pay within two weeks after demand had been served, any part of the compensation awarded when due, or any installment thereof including medical expenses, makes the entire amount of compensation awarded immediately due and payable, and authorizes the employee to maintain an action for recovery of the entire amount of compensation awarded.
In the Miller case, supra, it was said that the employer and the insurance carrier, not the claimant-employee, have the burden of avoiding effects following a demand made in accordance with the terms of K. S. A. 44-512a.
In my opinion, it is completely immaterial to a decision in this case whether claimant’s attorney paid Dr. Coffey for his services prior to the commencement of proceedings to secure the claimant a workmen’s compensation award. Likewise, my dissent is not based on the fact that claimant’s attorney paid Dr. Coffey and was therefore entitled to enforce a claim for such item against the respondent and its insurance carrier by subrogation. In my opinion, claimant’s attorney had no such right. He is not an “other person entitled” to be paid compensation as that term is used in K. S. A. 44-512a.
The cold facts of this record are that the respondent and its insurance carrier were dissatisfied with the examiner’s award of compensation, which included an item of Dr. Coffey’s medical expense, and they invoked their recourse of an appeal to the district court. Upon consideration of the law and the facts, the district court made its findings and conclusions and rendered a judgment against them, ordering payment of compensation to the claimant and payment of medical expenses for services to the claimant by Drs. Marsh and Zweifel, and Dr. Coffey up to $100. The respondent and its insurance carrier did not perfect an appeal to the Supreme Court, but permitted the award to become a final judgment. (Teague v. George, supra, 812, 813.) They regularly paid the claimant compensation as ordered, and also paid Drs. Marsh and Zweifel in accordance with the award. However, with respect to that part of the award directing payment of Dr. Coffey’s services up to $100, they sat back in self-satisfaction that they had no duty to ascertain the amount due him, or whether it had been paid. After service of the demand to pay “the entire amount of compensation awarded,” which was served more than 30 days after the district court’s award *560of compensation became final, they persisted in their attitude and still did nothing about ascertaining the amount they owed Dr. Coffey under the award.
The imperative duty of the respondent and its insurance carrier was to pay the judgment rendered, which they concede they did not do. It was not until the trial of the 44-512a case that it was ascertained claimant’s counsel had paid Dr. Coffey some two years previous. That payment did not satisfy the judgment against them, nor relieve them of their obligation to pay compensation in accordance with the award. It appears they were derelict in two respects: First, in not ascertining at the hearing before the compensation examiner and in the district court on appeal, the amount of medical services, if any, which were due and payable to Dr. Coffey, and second, in failing to ascertain, after judgment was rendered against them, the amount of Dr. Coffey’s medical services and what part, if any, was due and payable. As was held in the Miller case, supra, it is the employer and the insurance carrier, not the claimant or his attorney, who have the burden of paying compensation awarded and of avoiding effects following a demand to pay compensation “due and payable” under the award.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.