OPINION
ROBB, Judge.Case Summary and Issue
Following a bench trial, Janella Matthew appeals her conviction of battery, a Class A misdemeanor.1 Matthew raises the issue of whether sufficient evidence supports her conviction. Concluding sufficient evidence exists, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 27, 2007, Matthew, her boyfriend, and three of her children, including twelve-year-old J.M. and seven-year-old B.M., were playing cards on Matthew’s *697front porch. B.M. threw popcorn at J.M., who responded by hitting B.M. in the face. Matthew then tried to hit J.M., but missed. J.M. called Matthew a “fucking bitch,” transcript at 29, ran inside and shut herself in the bathroom. Matthew eventually got into the bathroom and hit J.M. on her arm and legs with a closed fist. J.M. testified that these blows hurt.
J.M. then pushed Matthew out of the way and ran upstairs to her bedroom. The bedroom did not have a lock, so J.M. “put [her] body against the door and pushed it shut,” but Matthew pushed open the door and again began hitting J.M. Id. at 14. Matthew hit J.M. about ten times with her hand and also struck her with a belt. J.M had covered herself with a blanket, and at one point, Matthew agreed that she “tried to take the blanket off of [J.M.] so that [she] could get a better shot at her with the belt.” Id. at 86. J.M. testified that these blows also hurt. During this altercation, J.M. kicked Matthew, hit her with her arms, “eall[ed] her names and told her to get off of [J.M.].” Id. at 32.
J.M. then went to Kathy Robinson’s house. J.M. was friends with Robinson’s children. J.M. told Robinson that she and Matthew had been in a fight. Robinson noticed a bruise on J.M.’s arm, welts on her legs, and a scratch on her back. Robinson then called the police.
On May 30, 2007, the State charged Matthew with battery, a Class D felony. On November 19, 2007, the trial court held a bench trial and found Matthew guilty. Matthew now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we will not reweigh evidence or judge witnesses’ credibility. Grim v. State, 797 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). We will consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We will affirm a conviction if the lower court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence of probative value. Id.
Our supreme court has recently summarized our standard of review when assessing claims of insufficient evidence.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind.2007) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The trial court found Matthew guilty of battery as a Class D felony. “A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery.” Ind.Code § 35-42-2-l(a). The subsection under which the State charged Matthew states that the offense is “a Class D felony if it results in bodily injury to ... a person less than fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a person at least eighteen *698(18) years of age.” Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(B).
A. Matthew’s Age
First, Matthew argues that insufficient evidence exists to support a finding that she was at least eighteen years old at the time of the offense.
When a person’s age is an element of the offense, the State must prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. Staton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ind.2006). The State must present “more than a mere scintilla of evidence,” and must introduce evidence of “substantial and probative value.” Bowens v. State, 578 N.E.2d 377, 379 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). The State need not introduce evidence of a person’s exact age at the time of the misconduct. See Warren v. State, 701 N.E.2d 902, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (“Time is not of the essence in sex crimes against children.”), trans. denied; Crabtree v. State, 547 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (affirming conviction where State did not introduce evidence of the victim’s date of birth, but introduced testimony indicating that the victim was fifteen years old at the time of the misconduct), trans. denied. The State may prove a defendant’s age entirely through circumstantial evidence. Staton, 853 N.E.2d at 474.
Trial testimony indicates that J.M. was twelve years old and that Matthew has an older son who was living with his father at the time of the incident. This evidence is sufficient to support the inference that Matthew was at least eighteen years old at the time of the incident. See Altmeyer v. State, 519 N.E.2d 138, 141 (Ind.1988) (concluding that the defendant’s testimony that he was married and had an eleven-year-old son was sufficient to establish that the defendant was at over sixteen years old); Marshall v. State, 643 N.E.2d 957, 963 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (concluding that evidence that the defendant was a deputy marshal, married, and had two children at least six years old was sufficient to prove that the defendant was over sixteen), trans. denied. Although the State did not introduce any documentation showing that Matthew was at least eighteen, the trial court was permitted to “apply its common sense to this record,” Staton, 853 N.E.2d at 475, and infer that Matthew was at least eighteen.
B. Reasonable Corporal Punishment
A parent has a right to use “reasonable or moderate physical force to control behavior.” Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind.2008). However, “the potential for child abuse cannot be taken lightly,” and “the State has a powerful interest in preventing and deterring the mistreatment of children.” Id. In balancing these principles, our supreme court has adopted the following standard: “A parent is privileged to apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his [or her] child as he [or she] reasonably believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education.” Id. at 182 (quoting Restatement of the Law (Second) Torts, § 147(1) (1965)). In determining whether the force or confinement is reasonable, the following factors should be considered:
(a) whether the actor is a parent;
(b) the age, sex, and physical and mental condition of the child;
(c) the nature of his offense and his apparent motive;
(d) the influence of his example upon other children of the same family or group;
(e) whether the force or confinement is reasonably necessary and appropriate to compel obedience to a proper command;
(f) whether it is disproportionate to the offense, unnecessarily degrading, or *699likely to cause serious or permanent harm.
Id. (quoting Restatement, supra, § 150). When a defendant raises the defense of parental privilege, “the State must prove that either: (1) the force the parent used was unreasonable or (2) the parent’s belief that such force was necessary to control her child and prevent misconduct was unreasonable.” Id. As with all sufficiency reviews, we will defer to the trial court’s judgment if “sufficient evidence of probative value [exists] to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.” Id. at 183.
Although we recognize that Matthew’s actions did not cause J.M. permanent physical damage, and that Matthew had verbally warned J.M. regarding her behavior earlier in the day, see id. (recognizing that the parent had “used progressive forms of discipline”), we are unable to conclude that the trial court’s decision is not supported by sufficient evidence. Matthew struck J.M. repeatedly with a closed fist2 in the downstairs bathroom, and then, after J.M. managed to escape to her room, Matthew forced her way into the room and continued hitting J.M. The trial court specifically stated that it found Matthew’s following J.M. to her bedroom to continue hitting her to have “crossed from reasonable to unreasonable.” Tr. at 98. We also note that after J.M. covered herself with a blanket, Matthew admittedly attempted to remove a blanket in order to have more direct access for hitting J.M. Although we recognize the difficulty caused by rebellious children, we also recognize that at the appellate level, we are to look to the evidence supporting the verdict, and will not reweigh the evidence. We conclude that under these circumstances, sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court’s finding that Matthew’s hitting J.M repeatedly with a closed fist and a belt — both in the bathroom, and then, after J.M. escaped, in the bedroom— was not reasonable.
Conclusion
We conclude sufficient evidence exists to support Matthew’s conviction. We remand to allow the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to indicate that it entered judgment as a Class A misdemeanor instead of as a Class D felony.
Affirmed and remanded.
RILEY, J. concurs. BAKER, C.J. dissents with opinion.. Matthew argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court exercised its authority under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b) to enter judgment of conviction of battery as a Class A misdemeanor. However, the abstract of judgment indicates that Matthew was convicted of battery as a Class D felony. We remand with instructions that the trial court correct the abstract of judgment.
. We do not wish to imply that a bright-line rule exists regarding the use of a closed fist.