(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I believe In re Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn.1983), is on point and controlling. As in the instant case, the female cohabitor in Eriksen wished only to preserve and protect her own property. Also, like in Eriksen, this cohab-itor invested in the cabin both by providing labor and cash. She is not claiming to be owed monies because of sexual favors.
The supreme court has interpreted the statutes to apply only when the “sole consideration for a contract between contracting parties is their ‘contemplation of sexual relations * * ⅜ out of wedlock.’ ” Id. at 674. *747The majority in this case characterizes this interpretation as not giving effect to the legislative intent or plain language of the statute, but until the legislature or the supreme court alters this interpretation, it is the law and we must follow it. See Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 487 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn.1992) (stare decisis applied in interpreting Minnesota Labor Relations Act); State v. Hofmann, 549 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Minn.App.1996) (controlling precedent applied in defining “building” for purposes of burglary statute), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996). Further, under the majority’s interpretation of the statutes, the female eohabitor in this case would, in effect, be punished for entering into the agreement to purchase the cabin; equitable remedies such as constructive trust, unjust enrichment or quantum meruit would be unavailable to her but available to parties who make similar agreements but do not have an incidental sexual relationship.