concurring;
While I join in the result offered by the majority, I -write separately to express my own reasons for granting appellant’s petition for a legal name change from “Brian Harris” to “Lisa Harris.” The majority determined that appellant has a right to a name change because appellant made a permanent and invariable commitment to live his life as a woman. However, I am convinced that this determination is not necessary in order to avail appellant of his right to change his name.
In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 544 Pa. 339, 676 A.2d 234 (1996), our supreme court set forth the legislative history of Pennsylvania’s Judicial Change of Name statute, 54 Pa.C.S. § 701, as follows:
The primary purpose of the Judicial Change of Name Statute ... is to prohibit fraud by those trying to avoid financial obligations. This intent is reflected in the penalty provision of the statute, which applies only to ‘person[s] violating the provision of this chapter for the purpose of avoiding payment of taxes or other debts.’
Goodman, supra, 676 A.2d at 236; See 54 Pa.C.S. §§ 701, 705. Further, the supreme court stated that the Judicial Change of Name statute is entirely procedural in nature and provides methods by which an individual may change his name on a permanent basis. Goodman, supra.
This court must determine whether a petitioner has complied with the statutory requirements and to ensure that the person has no fraudulent intentions in changing his name. This is where the inquiry ends. Herein, appellant filed an unopposed petition for change of name in accordance with the statutory requirements of 54 Pa.C.S.A § 701 et seq. There is no evidence to suggest that appellant was attempting to change his name to avoid any financial obligation. In light of the statutory language and the legislature’s intent, I believe that appellant’s petition should be granted without probing into appellant’s sex or his desire to express himself in the manner of his choosing.
In reaching this conclusion, I find the reasoning in In re Eck, 245 N.J.Super. 220, 584 A.2d 859 (1991), very persuasive. A change of name statute “is to be construed consistently with and not in derogation of the common law.” Eck, supra. At common law, an individual is free at any time to adopt and use any name, if such name is used consistently, nonfraudulently and exclusively. In the Matter of Montenegro, 365 Pa.Super. 98, 528 A.2d 1381 (1987); 54 Pa.C.S.A § 701(b). “Absent fraud or other improper purpose a person has a right to a name change whether he or she has undergone or intends to undergo a sex change ... or simply wants to change from a traditional “male” first name to one traditionally “female”[.]” Eck, supra.
Moreover, if parents have an absolute right to choose to name their male child an obvious “female” name at birth, it is illogical that an adult does not have the same right to change his name in the future if he so desires, whatever the name shall be, provided that the person does not seek the change for fraudulent purposes.