specially concurring:
I concur with the majority that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed. I agree with the majority that the defendant’s status as a coach is sufficient, without more, to put him in a position of “trust” under the statute. However, I concur only because the victim in this case discovered that the defendant was a coach during the period of their assignations; any sexual relations they had after her discovery renders the defendant guilty under the statute. See 720 ILCS 5/12— 13(a)(4) (West 2004).
In its overly broad interpretation of the statute, the majority believes that as long as “the defendant himself knew that he occupied a position of trust in relation to all the students of that school district, including M.C.R.,” his liability under the statute is complete. 384 Ill. App. 3d at 686-87. By finding that the defendant held a position of trust in relation to “all the students of that school district,” the majority has virtually negated the requirement that the offender’s position of trust be “in relation to the victim.” 720 ILCS 5/12 — 13(a)(4) (West 2004). In this situation, where defendant’s status as a coach is the sole evidence of a “trust” relationship, the victim’s knowledge or, at least, awareness of defendant’s position is critical.
Though the majority sets out a proper ethical response to the defendant, it does not state the appropriate legal definition required for a criminal sexual assault. In enacting section 12 — 13(a)(4), the legislature sought to “prevent sex offenses by those whom a child would tend to obey *** as well as those in whom the child has placed his trust.” People v. Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d 389, 396 (1996). It is this trust that makes the child particularly vulnerable and it is the betrayal of the trust that makes the offense unusually devastating. Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 396. Thus, if the status of the defendant is the sole indicator of “trust,” then the relationship must be known to the victim. Otherwise, “trust” is a meaningless word, signifying both everything and nothing. Here, no other indicia of “trust, authority or supervision” is alleged, only defendant’s status as a coach. Under these circumstances, there can be no criminal liability unless that status is perceived by the victim.
In People v. Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d 58, 689 N.E.2d 335 (1997), the court said that although Reynolds was a congressman when he and the victim met, “[t]he language of the statute does not suggest that the position of trust *** may result from the role of the offender alone, but that it must exist ‘in relation to the victim.’ [Citation.]” Reynolds, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 66, 689 N.E.2d at 469. The majority would have us believe that trust in relation to the “victim” is the legal equivalent of trust in relation to every student in the school district. One might ask if the defendant is also in a trust relationship to the adjoining school district. How far does criminal liability extend under the statute if no one knows he is a coach?
While I agree with the majority that defendant’s coaching position puts him in a position of trust, I believe that the victim’s awareness of the defendant’s status is an integral part of the defendant’s criminal liability. See Secor, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 396. In this case, since the victim acquired knowledge of the defendant’s position during their relationship, and the sexual relationship continued after that, the defendant violated the statute.