concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s decision that the April 25,1997, order resolved all pending issues in this case and was a final order within the clear meaning of K.S.A. 60-2103(a). Once the judgment was entered, a 30-day period existed within which to appeal. When an appeal was not filed within that 30-day period, the judgment became final.
While American Trust Administrators, Inc. (ATA), may not have agreed with that portion of the trial court’s April 25, 1997, ruling that ERISA did not preempt state regulation of ATA’s stop-loss insurance policy, the basic relief ATA had sought was obtained, and it appeared to have no valid reason to appeal and it did not do so. At that point, the case was over, finished, completed, final, and both parties were bound by the result that had been reached.
This result is consistent with our longstanding rule that “the right to appeal is entirely statutory and not a right vested in the United States or Kansas Constitutions. Kansas appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only if the appeal is taken within the *492time limitations and the manner prescribed in the applicable statutes.” Little Balkans Foundation, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Comm’n, 247 Kan. 180, 188, 795 P.2d 368 (1990); accord Tobin Constr. Co. v. Kemp, 239 Kan. 430, 437, 721 P.2d 278 (1986).
When the 1997 Kansas Legislature added subsection (b) to K.S.A 40-2201 (L. 1997, ch. 190, § 24) and this provision became effective July 1, 1997, an entirely new issue came into existence between ATA and the Commissioner.
ATA timely requested an administrative hearing before the Kansas Insurance Department, and in its docketing statement filed in this appeal, when responding to the question of whether there are proceedings in any other court or administrative agency, state or federal, which might affect this case or the court having jurisdiction, properly answered “yes” and identified the following administrative proceedings:
“Before the Kansas Insurance Department
In re Protective Life Insurance Company and American Trust Administrators, Inc.
Docket No. 2336-F.”
The Court of Appeals issued a show cause order as to why the appeal in the case before us should not be dismissed for the failure to timely appeal from the April 27, 1997 order. After a response by ATA, this appeal was retained with the issue ordered to be addressed in briefs and arguments on appeal. The jurisdictional issue that was not raised by the Court of Appeals or properly considered, in my view, was the pending administrative proceeding relating to the 1997 legislative amendments.
ATA attempted to bypass and not allow the required administrative proceeding to proceed to hearing and determination by filing the December 17, 1997, motion for an order to appear and show cause why the Commissioner should not be held to be in contempt for her refusal to abide by the April 25, 1997, order.
This filing was improper, without jurisdiction, and an attempt to violate our longstanding rule requiring parties to exhaust all of their available administrative remedies before turning to the courts for redress. See K.S.A. 77-612; Ryan, The New Kansas Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review Acts, 54 J.K.B.A. 53, 64 (1985).
*493The trial court, by failing to dismiss ATA’s request to involve the court’s contempt powers, appears to have interpreted the 1997 amendment as granting the Commissioner authority to regulate stop-loss insurance. And, while the majority herein says that we do not decide that issue, our affirmance of the January 29, 1998, and March 2, 1998, trial court orders appears to uphold that decision. This clearly bypasses administrative proceedings and violates our longstanding rule requiring exhaustion of administrative proceedings.
I do not question that Smith v. Clothier, 113 Kan. 47, 54-55, 213 Pac. 1071 (1923), and Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, Inc., 176 Kan. 101, 111, 269 P.2d 435 (1954), do hold that one may appeal from a judgment of not guilty in a civil contempt proceeding. But, these decisions are entirely different factually and should not be the basis for justifying this appeal where jurisdiction over the case is lost, new facts in the nature of the legislative action came into existence, and a failure to exhaust administrative proceedings is shown.
I would hold that ATA’s appeal should be dismissed as being without jurisdiction as to any of the issues it attempts to raise.
McFarland, C.J., and Lockett, J., join in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.