I dissent.
For the reasons stated in Justice Werdegar’s concurring and dissenting opinion in this case, and previously expressed in her dissenting opinion in People v. Wiley (1995) 9 Cal.4th 580, 595-605 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541], which I joined, defendant has a right to a jury trial on the issue of whether his prior convictions were for serious felonies. Thus, in precluding the jury from determining that issue, the trial court here erred. Unlike Justice Werdegar, however, I do not consider the error to be harmless. As I explained in my dissenting opinion in People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 282-286 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.)), “[t]he denial of jury trial is a structural error that can never be harmless, no matter how strong the evidence of guilt.” (Id. at p. 286.)
Mosk, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 29, 1999.