I dissent.
I disagree with the concurring opinion that the warrantless search in this matter was justifiable under the exception for exigent circumstances or because, as the lead opinion concludes, the police were exercising a “community caretating function.”
I firmly reject the suggestion that we should create a broad new exception to the Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches, permitting police officers to enter a residence, even when there is no immediate threat to its occupants, merely as part of their “community caretaking functions.” Such an exception threatens to swallow the rule that absent a showing of true necessity, the constitutionally guaranteed right to security and privacy in one’s home must prevail. I strongly disagree with the assumption that the warrantless search of a residence, under nonexigent circumstances, can be justified on the paternalistic premise that “We’re from the government and we’re here to help you.”
I
On December 25, 1996, at approximately 3:30 in the afternoon, Richmond police officers responded to a secondhand report by a neighbor that the door to defendant’s residence had been left open all day, no one was home, and the house was a “shambles.” When they arrived, the officers saw that the door was ajar, open approximately two feet. There was no evidence of forced entry; an expensive-looking television and stereo situated near the front door did not appear to have been disturbed. Nor was there any indication that anyone was inside; there was no response to their knocks or their announcement that they were from the Richmond Police Department. They entered, guns drawn, to perform a “security check.” One of the officers reported “a real mess inside.”1
During their walk through the house, the officers noticed what appeared to be cocaine and paraphernalia for making crack cocaine in the kitchen, and a *483large amount of cash in a bedroom drawer. They secured the house and returned with a warrant; their search yielded additional cash and drugs.
Defendant, charged with multiple drug-related offenses, moved to suppress the evidence. The superior court granted the motion on the ground that that there was insufficient evidence to support a belief that exigent circumstances were present at the time of entry.
The superior court explained: “[T]he [Constitution is very clear about how it protects people’s home[s]. . . . [T]he law states that exigent circumstances means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence, [f] The testimony which has been presented to me would indicate that these officers were aware that a door had been open all day. That the person[s] who were the occupants of the premises had not been there, and that the place was in shambles. . . . HO . . . [f] I don’t feel on the facts of this case, there was sufficient information [that] would justify the officer[s] to believe that an exigent circumstance was taking place at that point. Right then and there or shortly before that a crime had been committed or somebody would be inside that premises who would need their assistance, [f] It’s one of those situations, I think, where it’s not uncommon where people leave their doors open.”
The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that, under the circumstances, “the officers reasonably suspected that an exigency existed requiring their immediate warrantless entry.” We granted review; I would agree with the trial judge.
II
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unwarranted governmental intrusion. It provides that the people are entitled “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The right is protected against state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Security against the government’s warrantless search of a private residence is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. The United States Supreme Court has held that “ ‘the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ” *484(Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585 [100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379-1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639].) “At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505, 511 [81 S.Ct. 679, 683, 5 L.Ed.2d 734, 97 A.L.R.2d 1277].)
As we have similarly emphasized: “The courts have implicitly recognized that man requires some sanctuary in which his freedom to escape the intrusions of society is all but absolute. Such places have been held inviolate from warrantless search except in emergencies of overriding magnitude, such as pursuit of a fleeing felon [citation] or the necessity of action for the preservation of life or property . . . .” (People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 882 [109 Cal.Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208], fn. omitted.) “Homes . . . clearly fall within this category of maximum protection.” (Id. at p. 882, fn. 8.)
Entry into a residence by a police officer is “per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances.’ ” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 474-475 [91 S.Ct. 2022, 2042, 29 L.Ed.2d 564].) Such exceptions are “ ‘few in number and carefully delineated,’ [citation] and . . .the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 [104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097-2098, 80 L.Ed.2d 732].)
In People v. Duncan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 91, 97 [227 Cal.Rptr. 654, 720 P.2d 2], which also involved warrantless entry into a home, we explained the exception to the Fourth Amendment for searches under exigent circumstances. “We have defined ‘exigent circumstances’ to include ‘an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property . . . .’ [Citation.] The action must be ‘prompted by the motive of preserving life or property and [must] reasonably appear[] to the actor to be necessary for that purpose.’ [Citation.]
“Thus the exigent circumstances test involves a two-step inquiry: first, factual questions as to what the officer knew or believed and what action he took in response; second, a legal question whether that action was reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.] On appeal, a reviewing court must affirm the trial court’s determinations of the factual questions if they are supported by substantial evidence, but must take the ultimate responsibility for deciding the legal question according to its independent judgment. [Citation.] ‘As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct is *485dependent upon the existence of facts available to him at the moment of the search or seizure which would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. [Citation.] And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given not to his unparticularized suspicions or “hunches,” but to the reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience; in other words, he must be able to point to specific and articulable facts from which he concluded that his action was necessary.’ ” (People v. Duncan, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 97-98.)
In Duncan, a police officer responded to an initial report of a possible burglary in progress at a residence. He found an open window at the back of the house, under which was a box containing a television and other items. We determined that the officer reasonably concluded that the perpetrators might still be in the residence, and that a warrantless entry was thus permitted. (People v. Duncan, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 98-99.) Similarly, in Tamborino v. Superior Court (1986) 41 Cal.3d 919, 923 [226 Cal.Rptr. 868, 719 P.2d 242], we held that a warrantless entry was justified when an officer searched a residence after receiving a report of a robbery and observed the defendant wounded and bleeding inside the apartment. We concluded that these facts “reasonably could have led the officer to decide that an immediate, brief search of the apartment was warranted to determine whether additional persons were present at the crime scene.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 755 [117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1] [warrantless entry was justified based on the report of a recent shooting, bloodstains on the fence and porch, and what appeared to be bloodstains on the floor inside the house]; People v. Roberts (1956) 47 Cal.2d 374, 378 [303 P.2d 721] [warrantless entry was justified when officers received no response when they knocked on the defendant’s door and heard several moans that sounded as if a person inside was in distress].)2
By contrast, we have held that a warrantless entry is not permitted when there was no probable cause to believe a crime had occurred or was occurring inside a residence, and officers had no reason to believe a victim or perpetrator was within. Thus, in People v. Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 282, 287 [101 Cal.Rptr. 893, 496 P.2d 1261], we held that a warrantless entry was not justified after a six-year-old girl, found by a neighbor crying outside her apartment, told officers that her mother was not home and no one answered *486the door when the officers knocked. We observed: “The solicitude of the police for the girl’s safety and welfare was of course commendable. But the police must also be concerned with the interest of her parent in the security and privacy of her home, an interest expressly protected by constitutional command. (U.S Const., 4th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.)” (7 Cal.3d, at pp. 285-286.) As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held: “The fact that a police officer is performing a community caretaking function . . . cannot itself justify a warrantless search of a private residence. . . . [f] . . . The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures does not extend only to those who are suspected of criminal behavior.” (U.S. v. Erickson (9th Cir. 1993) 991 F.2d 529, 531-532.)
Applying the two-step inquiry we prescribed in People v. Duncan, supra, 42 Cal.3d 91, to this matter, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Beginning with the factual questions, I conclude that we are bound by the findings of the superior court, which were clearly supported by substantial evidence. In sum, it found that the officers knew that the door had been open all day, the occupants were not home, and the place was a mess; they did not enter to protect persons or property from any imminent threat. “It’s one of those situations . . . where it’s not uncommon where people leave their doors open.”3
Turning to the legal question, contrary to the concurring opinion, I conclude that the evidence was properly suppressed. The People failed to carry their burden of proving that the warrantless entry was justified. The officers responded to a report of door left open all day and a messy house; there was no sign that anything had been stolen or that anyone was home. *487The circumstances did not warrant a reasonable belief that entry was necessary to preserve life or property. To the extent that the officers believed they were called upon to perform a community caretaking function, it would have sufficed to shut the door.
in
The lead opinion agrees that the People did not meet their burden of establishing exigent circumstances warranting the officer’s actions: “The officers . . . had no knowledge of any facts that would lead a reasonable person in their position to believe entry was immediately necessary to aid life or limb.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 473.) But, rejecting our numerous precedents in point, it reaches out to adopt a new exception to the warrant requirement when the police are acting in a “community caretaking function,” that is, when their purpose is to protect persons or property rather than to investigate a crime.
Under the lead opinion’s newly created exception, entry is permissible, and incriminating evidence can be seized, when police officers enter a home merely to “ ‘find out what is going on’ ” (lead, opn., ante, at p. 479)—even though there is no imminent danger to person or property. The test—whether “a prudent and reasonable officer [has] perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions” (id. at p. 477)—is broad and untethered. Thus, it would appear to apply, as it were, ipso facto whenever the door to a residence is left open: “ ‘[W]hen doors are open, we will hope that [officers] will take steps to find out what is going on . . . .’ That is what law-abiding, tax-paying citizens desire and expect of their local constabulary.” (Id. at p. 479.)
Is it? “[E]ven the most law-abiding citizen has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority. . . .” (Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 530-531 [87 S.Ct. 1727, 1732, 18 L.Ed.2d 930].) Up to now the law has unequivocally provided Fourth Amendment protections against all searches by police officers, regardless of their subjective intentions. Unlike the author of the lead opinion, I am not persuaded that “ ‘the assistance role of law enforcement ... in this society will go downhill’ ” (lead opn., ante, at p. 480) unless we adopt their newly devised “community caretaking” exception.
The lead opinion has obscured the “ ‘firm line at the entrance to the house’ that the Fourth Amendment has drawn.” (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 *488Cal.4th 373, 386 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 850, 949 P.2d 947], quoting Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 590 [100 S.Ct. at p. 1382].) Does the lead opinion’s new exception also permit entry when a door is merely unlocked? When a neighbor reports that no one is home, or the occupants simply choose not to answer a knock at the door? When something “might be” wrong? The potential for abuse is obvious.
Accordingly, I dissent.
One officer testified that as he stood at the front door, he noticed that the inside of the residence was messy and “looked like someone had gone through the house”; his two *483contemporaneous reports, however, did not include any such observation. A second officer testified that he did not notice a mess before entering. The superior court implicitly found that the officers did not observe the condition of the house as they stood outside the door.
Contrary to the lead opinion’s implication, People v. Hill, supra, 12 Cal.3d 731, and People v. Roberts, supra, 47 Cal.2d 374, involved findings of exigent circumstances, not that the warrantless entry into a residence was—or could be—justified merely by the fact that police officers were “ ‘performing a community service or community value.’ ” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 478.) Here, by contrast, the officers “entered only to conduct a security check.” (Ibid.)
The People point to testimony by the officers that they were concerned “for possibly the life and property on the inside of the house, welfare of the people inside,” that the open door was “unusual” in an urban setting, and that 95 percent of their “open door" calls are determined to be burglaries. These statements, no more than “hunches,” were entitled to little weight. (People v. Duncan, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 98.) The officers did not state that they entered the house on the belief that someone was inside; rather, they explained that they did so to conduct a “security check.” The superior court apparently did not conclude from the testimony that the officers actually entered the house in order to forestall any imminent danger to persons or property. “ ‘ “A proceeding under [Penal Code] section 1538.5 to suppress evidence is one in which a full hearing is held on the issues before the superior court sitting as a finder of fact.” [Citation.]’ ... In such a proceeding the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court. On appeal all presumptions favor the exercise of that power, and the trial court’s findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160 [107 Cal.Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621], italics added by Lawler.) Neither the lead opinion nor the concurring opinion properly defers to the trial court’s findings.