One of the fundamental powers reserved to the people of this state is the power to enact legislation by initiative. This court has recognized the importance of that power: “[T]he initiative power must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process. [Citation.] Indeed it is our solemn duty to jealously guard the precious initiative power, and to resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of its exercise. . . . [A]ll presumptions favor the validity of initiative measures and mere doubts as to validity are insufficient; such measures must be upheld unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears.” (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 501 [286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309], italics in original.)
At the November 1998 General Election, the voters of California exercised their initiative power and enacted into law Proposition 5. The initiative offers Indian tribes a model agreement, or compact, regulating the conditions of gambling on Indian lands. Federal law requires either such a compact, or authorization by the Secretary of the Interior, before tribes may conduct gambling.
Today, the majority rejects the will of the people by invalidating the model compact of Proposition 5. It concludes that the compact authorizes forms of gambling the state Constitution prohibits and therefore exceeds the people’s power to legislate. Specifically, section 19, subdivision (e) (section 19(e)) of article TV of the California Constitution forbids legislation “authorizing]” casinos of the type operating in New Jersey and Nevada. According to the majority, two of the forms of gambling regulated by the model compact—gaming terminals and card games operated under a “players’ pool prize system”—are banking games rather than lotteries, and are therefore forms of casino gambling prohibited under section 19(e). In the majority’s view, the model compact authorizes these forms of casino gambling and therefore violates section 19(e). I disagree.
First, because federal law has preempted the field of Indian gambling regulation, it is federal law, not state law, that authorizes Indian gambling. *617Federal law encourages tribes and states to enter into compacts addressing gambling on Indian land. By entering into a compact with a tribe, a state may influence the conditions under which Indian gambling is conducted and the regulations to which the gambling is subject, but a state lacks the power to either forbid or authorize Indian gambling. Thus, contrary to the majority, the model compact of Proposition 5 does not authorize Indian gambling and thus does not violate section 19(e) of article IV of the California Constitution.
Second, federal law authorizes a tribe to offer any form of gaming otherwise permitted by the state in which the tribe is located. California law permits lotteries but prohibits banking games. The gaming terminals and card games regulated by Proposition 5’s model compact are lotteries rather than banking games because they operate under a players’ pool prize system. Therefore, federal law authorizes California tribes to offer these games.
I
The Primacy of Federal Authority Over Indian Gambling
As the aboriginal possessors of America, Indian tribes have a unique and sovereign relationship with both the federal government and the states within which they are located. Tribal sovereignty and the federal power over Indian relations greatly limit the power of states to regulate Indian tribes and activities on tribal lands without congressional authorization. “ ‘Indian relations [are] the exclusive province of federal law.’ ” (Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 60 [116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252].) From the earliest days of our nation, states have lacked any general sovereign power over Indian tribes and tribal lands. As Chief Justice John Marshall said in a case rejecting the State of Georgia’s attempt to apply its criminal laws within Cherokee tribal lands: “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.” (Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 [8 L.Ed. 483, 501].)
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, there are two independent but related barriers to a state’s attempt to assert its power over activities on Indian lands. (White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980) 448 U.S. *618136, 142-145 [100 S.Ct. 2578, 2582-2585, 65 L.Ed.2d 665].) One is the sovereign status of Indian tribes; the other is the federal Constitution’s grant of power to Congress over Indian affairs. (Ibid.)
These barriers are not entirely fixed, however; Congress may also delegate to the states some of its power over Indian affairs by authorizing the application of state law to Indian affairs. For example, in title 18 United States Code section 1162, enacted in 1953, Congress granted to certain states (including California) jurisdiction over criminal offenses in “Indian country,” and it extended state criminal law to Indian country. Subsequently, California asserted that this grant of criminal jurisdiction authorized it to apply state gambling laws to Indian country.
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202 [107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244], the United States Supreme Court rejected California’s argument that in enacting title 18 United States Code section 1162 Congress had intended to extend all state gambling laws to Indian country. Rather, the high court held that under section 1162 only those state laws that entirely prohibited a particular form of gambling (“criminal/ prohibitory” laws) could be applied to Indian country, and not those state laws that only restricted but did not prohibit a form of gambling (“civil/ regulatory” laws). (480 U.S. at p. 209 [107 S.Ct. at p. 1088].)
In the wake of that decision, Congress in 1988 enacted a detailed statutory scheme, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), to regulate gambling on tribal lands. (Pub.L. No. 100-497 (Oct. 17, 1988) § 23, 102 Stat. 2467, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.) In the structure and scope of IGRA, which comprehensively addresses all forms of gambling on Indian lands, Congress made clear its intent that IGRA preempt the field of regulation of Indian gambling. Congress also made clear this intent to preclude state jurisdiction over Indian gambling in the statute’s legislative history: “[IGRA] is intended to expressly preempt the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands.” (Sen.Rep. No. 100-446, 2d Sess., p. 6 (1988) reprinted at 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 3076.) “[U]nless a tribe affirmatively elects to have State laws and State jurisdiction extend to tribal lands, the Congress will not unilaterally impose or allow State jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of Indian gaming activities.” (Id., 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at p. 3075, italics added.)
IGRA divides all forms of gambling into three classes. The forms of gambling regulated by Proposition 5 and at issue here are so-called “class III *619gaining activities.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703.) Section 2710(d)(1) of title 25 of the United States Code (hereafter section 2710(d)(1)), as a matter of federal law, conditionally authorizes tribes to engage in class III gaming activities that the state permits someone else to engage in. IGRA establishes three conditions for authorization: “Class m gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are— RQ (A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution” adopted by the tribe and approved by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission, “(B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity, and ft[] (C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . that is in effect.” (Ibid.) The second condition for authorization (condition (B)) is essentially the distinction that California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, supra, 480 U.S. 202, drew between gambling activities a state absolutely prohibits, and those it regulates or restricts but does not prohibit. In the words of IGRA: “Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.” (25 U.S.C. § 2701(5), italics added.)
Section 2710(d) further provides a detailed mechanism by which a tribe may negotiate and enter into a tribal-state gambling compact, and by which the Secretary of the Interior may authorize tribal gambling in the absence of a tribal-state gambling compact if a state refuses to enter into such a compact. Nothing in those provisions suggests that a state may use the process of negotiating and entering into compacts to prohibit a tribe from engaging in class III gaming activities that the state permits someone else to engage in.
IGRA also removed the power of states, recognized in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, supra, 480 U.S. 202, to apply to Indian lands those state laws absolutely prohibiting a particular form of gambling. Instead, IGRA included a new federal criminal statute, codified at 18 United States Code section 1166, criminalizing gambling in “Indian country” that is not authorized by IGRA. The federal statute adopts “for purposes of Federal law” state gambling laws, but the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute these offenses. (Ibid.)
Thus, if a state authorizes class III gaming activities by anyone, federal law authorizes a tribe to engage in those same activities once the tribe adopts an Indian gambling ordinance approved by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission and enters into a compact with the state. If the *620state fails or refuses to reach an agreement with the tribe, the Secretary of the Interior may authorize tribal gambling.
Several crucial points emerge from this review of IGRA. First, authorization or prohibition of Indian gambling is exclusively a matter of paramount federal law. Where Indian gambling is authorized, it is authorized by operation of federal law. Where Indian gambling is prohibited, it is prohibited by operation of federal law. Although a state’s gambling law may shape the contours of the federal authorization, a state may not directly prohibit Indian gambling as such. A state may not criminalize or prosecute any tribal gambling activities, even for forms of gambling that the state prohibits to everyone. Only the federal government may prosecute gambling that IGRA does not authorize. Nor can a state on its own authorize Indians to engage in gambling, even gambling that it permits everyone else to engage in. For example, even if slot machines were legal everywhere else in California, IGRA would still prohibit their use on a reservation absent an approved tribal ordinance and a tribal-state compact. Even the power of a state to shape the contours of federal authorization is extremely limited. Once a state permits even a single entity (including the state itself) to engage in a class HI gaming activity, federal law authorizes all tribes within the state to engage in that form of gambling (once they adopt an approved tribal ordinance and either enter into a compact or, if the state refuses to enter into a compact, receive authorization from the Secretary of the Interior).
H
Does the Model Compact of Proposition 5 Violate the California Constitution?
Do the California Constitution’s prohibitions of legislative authorization of gambling bar the state from entering into the model tribal-state compact in accordance with IGRA, as the majority concludes? The answer is no. Three state constitutional provisions found in section 19 of article IV of the California Constitution are pertinent. Subdivision (a) of article IV, section 19 provides: “The Legislature has no power to authorize lotteries and shall prohibit the sale of lottery tickets in the State.” Subdivision (d) of article IV, section 19 qualifies the lottery ban by authorizing a state lottery: “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), there is authorized the establishment of a California State Lottery.” Subdivision (e) of article IV, section 19 provides: “The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.”
By entering into a tribal-state compact the state does not “authorize” lotteries or other forms of gambling. A state may only authorize, or prohibit, *621acts that are within the limits of its sovereignty. For the reasons stated above, it is utterly beyond the sovereign power of California to authorize or prohibit gambling on Indian lands within the state. California can no more authorize gambling on Indian lands than it can authorize gambling in another state. Section 19 of article IV of the California Constitution removes from the Legislature any power that the Legislature would otherwise have to authorize or prohibit lotteries or gambling casinos. For Indian gambling, however, the Legislature would not otherwise have the power to authorize or prohibit lotteries or gambling casinos because federal law completely preempts the field of Indian gambling and it is federal law, not state law, that authorizes or prohibits Indian gambling. Although the state may facilitate Indian gambling by negotiating and entering into a compact, doing so does not authorize Indian gambling in the sense of granting permission for an act the state otherwise has the power to prohibit. Nor does a state’s failure to enter into a compact have the effect of prohibiting Indian gambling, for in the absence of a compact IGRA directs the Secretary of the Interior to establish procedures governing tribal gambling. The Legislature or, in this case, the voters, cannot sensibly be described as “authorizing” something they lack the power to prohibit.
To be sure, as the majority notes, the model compact purports to “authorize” tribes to engage in certain forms of class III gaming. (Gov. Code, § 98004, Tribal-State Gaming Compact, § 4.1.) Whether a tribe is authorized to engage in class III gaming, however, is a question of federal, not state, law. Whatever the compact may say, it cannot authorize a tribe to engage in class HI gaming. For example, if the state otherwise completely prohibits a form of class III gaming, a compact purporting to authorize a tribe to engage in that form of gambling would be ineffectual, for condition (B) of section 2710(d)(1) would prohibit the tribe as a matter of federal law from offering that form of gambling.1
The parallel case of an interstate compact regulating gambling in another state also illustrates why a tribal-state gambling compact does not unconstitutionally authorize gambling. To further California’s interests, the Legislature has entered into a compact with the neighboring State of Nevada, the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, regulating the number and size of gaming facilities located in Nevada within the Lake Tahoe Basin. (Gov. Code, § 66801, Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, art. VI, §§ (d), (f).) That *622compact has never been considered to be an act by the Legislature authorizing casinos within the meaning of the term “authorize” as used in section 19 of article IV of the California Constitution.
Indeed, if any act of the State of California may be properly characterized as authorizing Indian gambling, it is the enactment of the constitutional provisions and statutes creating the California state lottery and horse race wagering. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subds. (b), (d).) These statutes authorizing forms of class III gambling trigger by force of federal law the collateral consequence of authorizing Indian tribes to engage in the same forms of gambling. But these statutes are constitutionally permitted; therefore, if they are the act of authorization of tribal gambling there is nothing unconstitutional about the authorization.
Accordingly, I conclude that the act of entering into a tribal compact pursuant to IGRA is not the authorization of gambling within the meaning of section 19 of article IV of the California Constitution, for under IGRA a state lacks the power either to authorize or prohibit a tribe from engaging in gambling. The next question is whether the forms of gambling addressed by Proposition 5’s model compact are authorized by IGRA as a matter of federal law.
Ill
Does IGRA Authorize the Forms of Indian Gambling Regulated by Proposition 5’s Model Compact?
Because I conclude that the California Constitution does not bar the model compact of Proposition 5,1 also reach the question of whether, as petitioners contend, the model compact conflicts with IGRA by allowing forms of gambling that IGRA does not authorize. In applying IGRA here, the initial question is whether two forms of class III gaming activities included in the model compact of Proposition 5—gaming terminals under a players’ pool prize system and card games under a players’ pool prize system—are forms of gambling otherwise permitted in California and therefore meet IGRA’s second condition for authorization of class III gaming activities: “Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are • • • [HI • ■ • [HI (B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity[.]” (§ 2710(d)(1).) In considering this question, it is important to recognize that, while state law defines the forms of gambling activities the state permits, the question of whether a form of tribal gambling falls within a category of gambling activities permitted by the state is ultimately a question of federal law.
*623The question whether gaining terminals under a players’ pool prize system and card games under a players’ pool prize system meet IGRA’s above-quoted second condition for authorization of class III gaming activities can in turn be broken down into two subordinate questions. First, what forms of class III gaming does California permit, even if only to a single person or entity? The answer is lotteries and horse race wagering. Thus, any California Indian tribe may offer these forms of gambling, and federal law obligates the state to negotiate a tribal-state compact addressing these forms of gambling. Second, are the gaming terminals and card games under a players’ pool prize system described in Proposition 5’s model compact either lotteries or horse race wagering? For the reasons I shall explain hereafter, I conclude that gaming terminals and card games under a players’ pool prize system are essentially lotteries and thus within the scope of gambling activities that California “permits . . . for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.” (§ 2710(d)(1).)
To determine whether gaming terminals and card games under a players’ pool prize system are lotteries, it is necessary to examine the difference between a lottery and a banking game. In Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery (1996) 13 Cal.4th 475 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651], this court discussed this difference extensively. Although the state law definition of the term “lottery” is not ultimately controlling for purposes of federal law, the principles for distinguishing a lottery from a banking game discussed in that case are helpful here.
Our court said a lottery requires a prize offered by the operator, distributed on the basis of chance, to players who have paid consideration for the opportunity to win. (Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery, supra, 13 Cal.4th 475, 484.) We explained: “[A] ' “purse, prize, or premium is ordinarily some valuable thing offered by a person for the doing of something by others, into the strife for which he does not enter. He has not a chance of gaining the thing offered; and, if he abide by his offer, that he must lose it, and give it over to some of those contending for it, is reasonably certain.” ’ . . . ‘[a] lottery operator does not “wager” or hazard his property against that of others. Whether the property offered by the lottery operator will be distributed is not the issue, as it is in gaming; in a lottery, the only issue is to whom will the property be distributed—and the lottery operator, earning his revenue as a portion of the ticket sales, is not himself a contender for the prize.’ ” (Id. at pp. 485-486, italics omitted.)
“[T]he scheme in [People v.] Postma [(1945) 69 Cal.App.2d Supp. 814, 818 [160 P.2d 221]] was not a lottery because the operators offered no prize *624for disposal or distribution to others. Instead, they bet individually against each participant on the outcome of a race. In each bet, the operators had a chance to win the other bettor’s stake and retain their own. In each bet, by the same token, the operators risked losing their stake. Unlike a lottery operator, who has offered a prize for reasonably certain disposal and has no interest in the outcome of the chance device by which the winner or winners are chosen, the operators in Postma had an interest in the outcome of each bet. It was possible, at least theoretically, that the operators might win all the bets in a given race or, as the court noted, that they might lose all the bets, ‘all bets being on the winning horse.’ ” (Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery, supra, 13 Cal.4th 475, 487.)
“These two categories of gambling [banking games and lotteries] are nonetheless exclusive of one another, and can be surely distinguished, not by the manner of play, but by the nature of the betting itself. (See, e.g., In re Lowrie [(1919)] 43 Cal.App. 564, 566-567 [185 P. 421] [complaint, alleging petitioner ran game in which the other participants bet against him on the outcome of a roll of dice, charged operation of a banking game, not a lottery, since petitioner allegedly kept a fund against which the other participants bet].) In a lottery the operator does not bet against any of the participants, but merely offers up a prize for distribution to one or more of them. The operator, in other words, has no interest in the outcome of the chance event that determines the winner or winners—the ‘game’ or ‘draw’—because neither the fact the prize will be disposed of, nor the value of the prize to be distributed, depends upon which, or how many, of the lottery entrants might win it. In a banking game, in contrast, the operator does compete with the other participants: ‘he is the one against the many.’ (People v. Ambrose [(1953)] 122 Cal.App.2d [Supp. 966,] 970.) The operator thus has a direct interest in the outcome of the game, because the amount of money the operator will have to pay out depends upon whether each of the individual bets is won or lost.
“One corollary of the distinction drawn above is that the operator of a banked game may or may not, depending on the outcome of the game, be obliged to pay out more than the amounts wagered on a particular game. Moreover, an extraordinary run of bad luck on the part of the house may unpredictably deplete its funds. A bank, in theory, can be ‘broken.’ A lottery can never be broken in this sense. True, if a lottery operator offers a fixed prize—a particular automobile or piece of real property, for example—the ticket receipts may be insufficient to cover the cost. But the operator’s success or failure in such a lottery depends only on how many entries are attracted, not on which participant, or how many participants, win the prize. *625The outcome of the game or draw, in other words, does not determine whether the lottery operator makes or loses money on that game or draw.” (Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery, supra, 13 Cal.4th 475, 487-488, italics in original.)
To summarize, a banking game requires that the operator (banker) wager its property against the property of the players. The banker gets to keep as its own the wagers of the losers, and it pays out of its own account the amounts due the winners. The banker hazards the gain and the loss, it wagers against the other players and like them its fortunes are at risk during play. The banker’s gain or loss depends on whether the players win or lose; it profits when they lose and loses when they win. The banker has an interest in the outcome of each individual player’s wagers because the bank gets to keep whatever a player loses. The banker is the one against the many, competing against the players.
The gaming terminals and class III card games that are the subject of Proposition 5 traditionally are operated as banking games. Under the model compact of Proposition 5, however, prizes for gaming terminals and class III card games are awarded instead under a players’ pool prize system. The tribe’s revenue comes from fees charged to all players rather than from retaining the wagers of losing players. The model compact describes the players’ pool prize system as follows; “ ‘Players’ pool prize system’ means one or more segregated pools of funds that have been collected from player wagers, that are irrevocably dedicated to the prospective award of prizes in authorized gaming activities, and in which the house neither has [acquired] nor can acquire any interest. The Tribe may set and collect a fee from players on a per play, per amount wagered, or time-period basis, and may seed the player pools in the form of loans or promotional expenses, provided that seeding is not used to pay prizes previously won.” (Gov. Code, § 98004, Tribal-State Gaming Compact, § 2.16; accord, Gov. Code, § 98006, subd. (a).)
A players’ pool prize system has none of the characteristics of a banking game. Under that system, the players share in the pool according to their success at the game, the players can win no more than the amount wagered by all players, and the players cannot win anything from the game operator. The game operator’s share is independent of the success or failure of the players and is not increased if any or all players lose and is not decreased if any or all players win. The players’ pool prize system makes the gaming terminals and card games at issue here lotteries because “[t]he outcome of the game or draw . . . does not determine whether the lottery operator makes or loses money on that game or draw.” (Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery, supra, 13 Cal.4th 475, 488.)
*626The majority reaches a different conclusion.2 It concludes that the gaming terminals and card games to be operated by Indian tribes under a players’ pool prize system are banking games and not lotteries. It bases this conclusion on the following asserted distinctions between the players’ pool prize system and lotteries: A players’ pool prize system operator retains an interest in the outcome of play; the players’ pool prize system operator bets against the players, keeping all losing wagers and paying out on all winning wagers; and the payouts on any given round of play under a players’ pool prize system are variable. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 607-609.) The first two assertions are incorrect, while the third is equally true of both traditional lotteries and the players’ pool prize system.
First, a players’ pool prize system operator does not retain an interest in the outcome of play. A game operator under a players’ pool prize system has no more interest in the outcome of the game than any other lottery operator. Its income from a given round of play (in the form of player fees) is fixed and does not rise or fall depending on the success or failure of the players. The decision to make a future loan to the prize pool to seed future games is not “compelled,” contrary to the majority (maj. opn., ante, at p. 608), and it does not give the operator any interest in the outcome of already completed games, just as a lottery operator’s decision to offer a bigger prize in a future lottery does not give it any interest in the outcome of lotteries already completed. Nor does the fact that a high payout in a past game has delayed or prevented the repayment of a past loan to the prize pool by the operator give the operator an interest in the outcome of play, just as a lottery does not become a banking game simply because the operator might lose money if its revenues from operating the lottery are less than the cost of the prizes it offers.
Second, the players’ pool prize system operator does not retain an interest in the outcome of play. As previously explained, neither the tribe nor anyone else acts as a “banker” who bets against the players and stands to profit or lose depending on the outcome of the gambling.
Third, the payouts on any given round of play under a players’ pool prize system are no more variable than those of a lottery. Despite the majority’s protestations to the contrary, the possibility that in a players’ pool prize *627system the wagers collected in a given round of play may not all be awarded as prizes in that round of play does not distinguish that system from a lottery. In one'common form of lottery, number-matching games like the Super Lotto of the California State Lottery, it is possible that no one will come up with the matching numbers to win the prize in a given round of play; in that case, the prize rolls over to the next round of play. Likewise, in a players’ pool prize system, any amounts not won in one round of play become available as prizes in later rounds. The game operator does not acquire those amounts for its own account. Nor, contrary to the majority, can the pool itself sensibly be characterized as a bank simply because it collects wagers and pays winners, for those functions necessarily occur in every form of gambling.
Accordingly, gaming terminals and card games under a players’ pool prize system are not banking games but lotteries. Because California permits lotteries, IGRA therefore, as matter of federal law, authorizes Indian tribes to offer gaming terminals and card games under a players’ pool prize system. In turn, Proposition 5’s model compact complies with IGRA by regulating these forms of authorized gambling, and it does not violate the California Constitution because it does not itself authorize the gambling.3
Conclusion
The rise of Indian gambling in the past two decades has stirred deep passions and heated political debate. The voters of California sought to resolve the status of Indian gambling in our state by enacting the model Tribal-State Gaming Compact of Proposition 5. Because the model compact complies both with our state Constitution and with the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, I would uphold the will of the voters and deny the petition for a writ of mandate.
Likewise, another portion of Proposition 5, Government Code section 98006, purports to “authorize” tribal gaming terminals and card games using a players’ pool prize system. It, too, is misleading to the extent it claims to authorize gambling on tribal lands over which California lacks jurisdiction.
Although the majority and I both analyze whether games operated under a players’ pool prize system are lotteries or banking games, our respective purposes in doing so are quite different. As explained at the outset of my opinion, I resolve this question to decide whether such games are authorized by IGRA as a matter of federal law; the majority decides this question to determine whether such games are prohibited by the casino gambling prohibition of section 19(e) of article IV of the California Constitution.
I see no merit to petitioners’ other arguments against Proposition 5. Like compacts enacted by the Legislature, it is a proper legislative act, establishing a policy applicable to all within its scope, and does not infringe on the prerogatives of the executive. (See American Federation of Labor v. Eu (1984) 36 Cal.3d 687 [206 Cal.Rptr. 89, 686 P.2d 609].) Nor does it violate equal protection for the state, in response to the federal mandate of IGRA, to enact a compact recognizing the federal authorization of gambling on Indian lands. (Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation (1979) 439 U.S. 463 [99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740].)