(dissenting). Because I find that the trial court committed constitutional error, I respect*461fully dissent. I agree with the unanimous Court of Appeals panel, which held that the undisclosed information was not only favorable to the defense, it was also material in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the information been disclosed.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 433-434; 115 S Ct 1555; 131 L Ed 2d 490 (1995), “favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 682; 105 S Ct 3375; 87 L Ed 2d 481 (1985)] (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).”
A determination of materiality does not require that the defendant demonstrate “by a preponderance” that the disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in his acquittal. Rather, the defendant must merely show that there is a “reasonable probability” of a different result, “and the adjective is important.” Kyles, supra at 434.
The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A “reasonable probability” of a different result is accordingly shown when the government’s evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Bagley, 473 US 678.
The second aspect of [] materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is not a sufficiency of the evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpa*462tory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict. The possibility of an acquittal on a criminal charge does not imply an insufficient evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a [] violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. [Id. at 434.]
The majority concludes that even though the trial court did not have the benefit of the Kyles decision, it nevertheless made the correct determination because the circuit court determined that the information “would not have changed the outcome of the trial.” Ante at 452. This is precisely the incorrect standard that the United States Supreme Court sought to correct in Kyles. The difference being that the defendant must only demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that the outcome may have been different. The defendant does not have to demonstrate, as the circuit court and majority state, that the outcome “would have been” different, only that there is a reasonable probability of such a result. In fact, the majority in Kyles specifically condemned the dissent for “assuming] that Kyles must lose because there would still have been adequate evidence to convict even if the favorable evidence has been disclosed.” Id. at 435, n 8.
The majority states that despite the “helpful” nature of the documents to the defense, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. (Ante at 460.) I disagree. The Supreme Court’s holding in Kyles states that the defendant need not prove that the result would have been different, only that there is a reasonable probability of such a result. *463If a document is “helpful” to the defense, is there not at least a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different? I believe so, especially where, as here, the document contained statements favorable to the defense yet not admitted at trial.
An analysis of the facts shows that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. In direct conflict with the social worker’s statement that the younger boy “was very up front in some ways[,]” her notes stated that he would “report adults to various authorities, threatening to charge them with various forms of abuse, if he was not granted his every wish . . . .” Furthermore, her reports indicated the boy’s need to be manipulative and in control, despite testifying that she would not use the word “deceptive” to characterize him. Clearly, the notes portray the boy in a different, if not contradictory, light than what her testimony indicated. In Kyles, the Court recognized that suppressed statements of eyewitnesses, riddled with inconsistencies, would have resulted in a weaker case for the prosecution and a stronger one for the defense, and they would have substantially reduced or destroyed the value of the testimony of the prosecution’s two best witnesses. The same can be said of this case.
As to the older boy, his teachers had compiled reports stating that not only was he an “accomplished liar,” but that he told lies “even when confronted with direct evidence of wrongdoing and will insist loudly that he didn’t do anything.” The majority finds conclusive the fact that during their testimony, the older boy’s teachers “agreed that all the students at the facility had emotional problems, and many of them lied.” Ante at 457 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the *464majority finds that because the jury knew the older boy had a “troubled background,” the evidence contained in the documents could not be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict. I disagree. I fail to see how the jury’s knowledge that the older boy had a “troubled background” would justify withholding such material information. Even a layperson would know that the older boy had a troubled background, as both the older boy and the younger boy were at a home for children with severe behavior problems. Ante at 451. Furthermore, knowing that “many” boys at the home lied is not the same as knowing that this particular boy had lied “even when confronted with direct evidence of wrongdoing and [would] insist loudly that he didn’t do anything.”
In United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 112-113; 96 S Ct 2392; 49 L Ed 2d 342 (1976), the Court stated:
The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis added.]
Clearly, this is a case in which the verdict was already of questionable validity. Over a year had gone, by before anyone even questioned the young boy *465about the incident. The only material witnesses were the two boys. The additional evidence showed that the very victim that claimed abuse by the defendant, was also one who claimed abuse by other people just to get his own way. Even though the trial judge stated he would search the omitted evidence for evidence of “false accusations against anyone,” ante at 452, he did not deem this type of false accusation about abuse to be material in this abuse case. I find this to be error.
In sum, I fail to see how disclosing this information to the jury would not create a reasonable probability that the outcome would be different. This is especially so, where the “two boys were the main witnesses for the prosecution.”
[T]he question is not whether the State would have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that the jury’s verdict would have been the same. Confidence that it would have been cannot survive a recap of the suppressed evidence and its significance for the prosecution. [Id. at 453.]
The majority states that the suppressed information is not material because the younger boy admitted he told lies and made false accusations, and the jury knew of the older boy’s “troubled background.” This type of harmless-error analysis is inappropriate where, as here, the suppressed information is material to the case. The United States Supreme Court indicated in Kyles that once a reviewing court has found a constitutional error, there is no need for further harmless-error review. The information suppressed by the government is clearly material (and favorable) to the defense. There is no doubt in my mind that there is at least a reasonable probability that the jury’s outcome would have been different if it *466had known that the older boy vigorously insists that he hasn’t lied when in fact he has, and the younger boy likes to fabricate stories of abuse if he is not given his every wish. After all, these two accomplished liars, and the one social worker who relied on what the boys told him, were the only material witnesses to the prosecution’s case. This, coupled with the fact that the deposition testimony of the social worker from the other school contradicted her notes, demonstrates that there was a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different.
On the basis of the above facts and relevant constitutional review, I find that the circuit court committed error requiring reversal in holding that the suppressed information was not material to defendant’s case. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.