Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien :I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by the majority. The only error alleged by appellant which I find meritorious involves the charge of the trial court *29on voluntary manslaughter. The disputed charge is quoted in the opinion of the majority, and in my view was clearly prejudicial. As the majority points out, a conviction for voluntary manslaughter may be entirely consistent with a direct intent to kill. In its charge the trial court apparently confused specific intent, an absolute essential of voluntary manslaughter, with malice, the absence of which distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from murder. The court did correctly advise the jury that it should examine the surrounding circumstances to determine whether, if the appellant had committed an intentional act in shooting the decedent, he had done so with the particular hardness of heart, or cruelty, or recklessness of consequences which constitutes malice or whether, on the other hand, his mental state was one of passionate emotion due to anger, rage, or terror, which rendered his mind incapable of cool reflection.
However, by emphasizing to the jury that if they “bear in mind” that manslaughter is never attended by direct intent to kill, the court made it difficult for a jury to find a verdict of manslaughter if it also found that appellant intended decedent’s death.
I agree with the majority that Rule 1119(b), Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not change the law enunciated by us relative to general and specific exceptions to charge. I part company with the majority, however, in its determination that the error in charge did not constitute basic and fundamental error.
Since I believe that the charge contained fundamental error, 1 would not allow the verdict to stand and I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand the case for a new trial.
Mr. Justice Eagen joins in this dissenting opinion.