concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority holds that the trial court erred in not providing the jury with computational verdict forms as required by section 13-21-111.5, 5 C.R.S. (1997). I agree with this conclusion. The majority also holds that this error was harmless because an allocation of liability by percentage can be easily derived from the sum of the individual damage awards. I disagree. In my view, this failure to comply with an explicit statutory provision is not harmless. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.
Section 13-21-111.5 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) In an action brought as a result of ... an injury to person ..., no defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that represented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable to such defendant....
(2) The jury shall return a special verdict ... determining the percentage of negligence or fault attributable to each of the parties ... and determining the total amount of damages sustained by each claimant. The entry of judgment shall be made by the court based on the special findings, and no general verdict shall be returned by the jury.
When the jury in this case failed to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each of the defendants, it rendered a general verdict expressly prohibited by section 13-21-111.5(2). Although the majority concludes in its harmless error analysis that percentages of fault may be easily derived from the jury’s damage award, I agree with our court of appeals that “we cannot assume that the amounts awarded by the jury against the separate defendants are for separate injuries or that they are the equivalent of an apportionment based on fault.” Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220, 1230-31 (Colo.App.1996). Furthermore, I believe that a clear violation of a legislative mandate which casts doubt on the integrity of the proceedings is not harmless. See Avery v. Wadlington, 186 Colo. 158, 161, 526 P.2d 295, 297 (1974).1 For these reasons, I would affirm the court of appeals. Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.
. In Avery, we explained that
the legislature, when it enacted the comparative negligence statute, intended to establish a system in negligence cases which divides the responsibility for a fair and good result between the jury and the judge. Such a system enhances the chance of a pure verdict on material facts alone. It mandates in precise language that the jury is the finder of facts and as such simply answers questions posed to it in the special verdict form.
Avery, 186 at 161, 526 P.2d at 297.