dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the reason that Walden was correctly charged with the crime that he committed.
The majority reliance upon the cases of Coates v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 357, 229 N.E.2d 640; Lawrence v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 161, 235 N.E.2d 198; Green v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 481, 282 N.E.2d 548; Elmore v. State (1978), 176 Ind.App. 306, 375 N.E.2d 660; and, Nash v. State (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 807, is not merited under the facts of this case. Broadly stated, the foregoing cases address the question of how to properly charge a defendant under several theft or possession of stolen property sections of the criminal law.
Generally speaking, criminal conduct which occurs wholly beyond the borders of this state cannot be prosecuted in Indiana. Green v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 596, 115 N.E.2d 211. See also, IND. CODE 35-41-1-1.
It is reasonable to assume Walden did steal the car from the Cooks; however, that theft occurred in Florida and cannot be prosecuted in Indiana. On the other hand, the evidence did show that Walden received or retained stolen property in Indiana. The distinction of the thief being a possessor of stolen goods is of no consequence under these facts.
The State of Indiana properly charged Walden with receiving or retaining stolen property for the reason that I.C. 85-48-4-2(b) applies to the facts.
I would not reverse for the reasons stated in the majority opinion.