specially concurring.
¶ 1 I concur in the Court’s opinion and write only to comment on my reasons for joining the majority of the Court, as now constituted, in receding from the reliability hearing prescribed in the original opinion in this matter. Dodd v. State, 1999 OK CR 29, rehearing granted vacating and withdrawing opinion, 70 OBJ 2952 (Oct. 6,1999).
¶ 2 The original opinion established a procedure for and mandated that before a jailhouse informant could be called to testify, the court would make a determination, under prescribed criteria, as to the reliability of the proffered witness and whether such witness should be allowed to testify.
¶ 3 Arguments are made that such procedure will allow the trial court to perform gatekeeping functions, as in he use of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2798, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), in ensuring reluctance and reliability of novel scientific expert testimony; or Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3148, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), in determining the trustworthiness of testimony of a minor child; or Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), in allowing the trial court to make a threshold determination of the admissibility of a confession. Compelling reasons prompted each of the provisions for these threshold determinations, which do not extend to the use of a jailhouse informant as a witness, and adequate protection is afforded by the discovery procedure and the use of cautionary jury instructions as mandated in the majority opinion.
¶ 4 Many witnesses, in addition to jailhouse informants, may have a motive to lie. That is not a sufficient reason to remove the trier of fact from making a determination of the credibility of such witness.