¶ 1 This case is here on a writ of certiora-ri to the Utah Court of Appeals. At issue is the effect of the six-year limitations period in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988)1 of the *208Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”) that governs claims for permanent total disability, and Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 that provides for continuing jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. An administrative law judge dismissed petitioner J. David Vigos’ request for permanent total disability benefits because the request was filed more than six years after the industrial accident that initially gave rise to Vigos’ workers’ compensation claim. The Industrial Commission denied Vigos’ motion for review, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We reverse and remand.
I.
¶ 2 On October 13, 1988, Vigos fell and injured his head and back while working for Mountainland Builders, Inc., a construction company. Mountainland filed a timely report of injury with the Workers’ Compensation Fund of Utah (the “Fund”) and the Commission. Vigos’ physician also filed a timely physician’s initial report of work injury with the Fund and the Commission. Vi-gos did not, however, file an application for hearing with the Commission in 1988.
¶ 3 The Fund voluntarily paid Vigos temporary total disability benefits from October 14, 1988, to May 8, 1989, as well as medical expenses through July 1989. A clinical psychologist, David G. Ericksen, Ph.D., evaluated Vigos in early 1989 and reported that in light of his injuries he should pursue a slow-paced, structured line of work and increase his responsibility and workload as appropriate. He implied that Vigos could eventually return to “his full level of previous functioning.” Vigos was told he could return to work without restrictions on May 8,1989. He was not told he could receive, and he did not receive, an impairment rating, and he had no indication from physicians of permanent disability.
¶ 4 Eventually, Vigos attempted to rehabilitate himself by continuing to work. From 1989 to 1994, he worked at various jobs but was unable to hold any of them. In 1994, he realized that his 1988 accident had caused him a permanent disability. On January 25, 1994, Vigos applied to the Social Security Administration for disability benefits. His request was denied twice but was finally granted on June 23, 1995. On October 25, 1994 (during Vigos’ request for reconsideration before the Social Security Administration), he sought payment for additional medical treatment from the Fund. It denied his request November 3, 1994, under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(1) (1994),2 because more than three years had passed after his last medical treatment.
¶ 5 On July 11,1995, almost six years and nine months after his accident, Vigos filed an “Application for Hearing — Form 001” with the Commission requesting medical expenses, temporary and permanent total disability benefits, and travel expenses. The Fund answered that Vigos’ claim was filed more than six years after his accident and was barred by section 35-1-99(3), the Act’s statute of limitations. The administrative law judge dismissed Vigos’ claim under section 35-1-99(3). The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order. The Court of Appeals held that under Avis v. Industrial Commission, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct.App.1992), section 35-1-99(3) was a statute of limitations, not an unconstitutional statute of repose, which barred Vigos’ claim. See id. at 587-88. This Court granted a writ of certiorari.
II.
¶ 6 Vigos asserts several arguments in support of his position. First, he claims *209section 35-1-99(3) violates the Due Process and Open Courts provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article I, sections 7 and 11, and cases following our decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). The statute is unconstitutional, Vigos argues, because it cuts off his right to assert a claim before the claim arises. Second, Vigos argues that he met the six-year limitations requirements of section 35-1-99(3) because his initial claim for benefits was deemed filed within the six-year limitations period. Third, Vigos argues that the Commission acquired jurisdiction over his basic claim entitling him to benefits and that the Commission had continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate his claim for permanent total disability benefits even though it was made after the six-year limitations period. Fourth, Vigos contends that because the Commission had jurisdiction over his claim and because the Fund paid him benefits during 1988 and 1989, the Commission had continuing jurisdiction to award him permanent total disability benefits pursuant to section 35-1-78.3
¶ 7 We review a Court of Appeals decision on certiorari for correctness, giving its interpretation of law no deference. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wall, 978 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah 1999).
¶ 8 It is fundamental that constitutional issues should be avoided if the case can be properly decided on non-constitutional grounds. See World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1994); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 82 (Utah 1982); Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980). For that reason, we first address whether Vigos satisfied the statute of limitations and whether the Commission had continuing jurisdiction to enter an award for permanent total disability benefits.
¶ 9 Because Vigos was injured in October 1988, the applicable workers’ compensation statutory scheme for his claims is Utah Code Ann. title 35, chapter 1, as amended in 1988. Section 35-1-99 confers jurisdiction on the Commission over particular workers’ claims. See Mannes-Vale, Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah 1986). Section 35-1-99 requires an injured worker to (1) give notice of an industrial accident to the employer, and (2) make a claim for compensation by filing an “application for hearing” with the Commission. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(1) to (3). See generally 7 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 78.10 (1998). Under the first requirement, a worker must notify his employer of an industrial accident within 180 calendar days of the accident or the claim is barred. Notice to the employer is presumed if the employer files an accident report or if the employer or its insurance company pays disability or medical benefits. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(1).
¶ 10 Under the second requirement, an injured worker must make a claim for compensation within six years from an industrial accident.
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the industrial commission within six years after the date of the accident.
Id. § 35-1-99(3). If a worker satisfies this limitations period, the Commission acquires jurisdiction, and the Commission will have continuing jurisdiction over the worker’s case under section 35-1-78, which states:
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
*210Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78; see also infra ¶¶ 27-32.
¶ 11 Mountainland and the Fund argue that Vigos did not satisfy the statute of limitations because he failed to file an “Application for Hearing — Form 001,” see Utah Admin. Code R490-1-2(F) (1988),4 with respect to his initial 1988 claims before the six-year period ran. The filing of this form, they contend, is essential to satisfying the statute of limitations. The Commission contends that “any application for hearing [not just Form 001] is sufficient,” but that the worker must actually file some application.
¶ 12 Vigos argues that the Commission acquired initial jurisdiction-under section 35-1-99(3) because Mountainland filed a timely “Employer’s Report of Injury” with both the Fund and the Commission. Vigos’ physician filed a timely “Physician’s Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease” with the Fund and the Commission; and the Fund accepted liability for the accident and actually paid Vigos disability benefits and medical expenses. This was all done well within the six-year limitations period stated in section 35-1-99(3) and in compliance with other time requirements. Vigos argues that filing an “Application for Hearing” is appropriate and necessary only when a dispute arises over entitlement to benefits. Because there was no dispute concerning Vigos’ initial entitlement to benefits and benefits were paid, the filing of an “Application for Hearing” was inappropriate and unnecessary. Therefore, Vigos contends the Commission acquired jurisdiction over his initial claim and had continuing jurisdiction of his claim for additional benefits.
¶ 13 The plain language controls the interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look beyond the plain language to legislative history or policy considerations. See Olsen v. Samuel McIntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998) (citing Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997); World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994)). We also “construe[] workers’ compensation statutes liberally in favor of finding employee coverage.” Olsen, 956 P.2d at 259 (citing Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990); Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 306-07 (Utah 1984)). Accordingly, we look first to the statutory language.
¶ 14 Section 35-1-99(3)5 states:
A claim for compensation for ... permanent total disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the industrial commission within six years after the date of the accident.
Prior to enactment of this provision in 1988, the Act had no statute of limitations for permanent total disability claims. See Mecham v. Industrial Comm’n, 692 P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1984); Buxton v. Industrial Comm’n, 587 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 1978). Section 35-1-99(3) established a six-year limitations period in which an “application for [a] hearing” for permanent total disability benefits, rather than a “claim” for compensation benefits, would have to be filed. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988), with Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(1) (Supp.1986) (“If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three years after the date of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation is wholly barred.” (emphasis added)).
¶ 15 Mountainland and the Fund contend that section 35-1-99(3) requires the filing of the “Application For Hearing — Form 001.” The filing of that form is not the only way to establish the Commission’s jurisdiction over a claim and to preserve an applicant’s right to benefits under section 35-1-99(3). Commission Rule 490-l-2(G) provides for a “Claim for Protection of Rights — Form 002.” The filing of this form also apparently satisfies section 35-1-99(3), since its purpose is to preserve an applicant’s rights under the Act when a dispute does not exist. See Utah Admin. Code R490-1-2(G). Thus, the filing of an “Application for Hearing” is not the *211only way to initiate a claim for the purpose of section 35-1-99(3).
¶ 16 The Commission argues that an applicant must actually make some application for hearing, but does not specify what applications suffice. Clearly the filing of an “Application for Hearing” or a “Claim for Protection of Rights” form would vest the Commission with jurisdiction over the claim. However, our cases have also made clear that there is no need for a formal claim or application for hearing under section 35-1-99(3) if the Commission’s jurisdiction is otherwise established.
¶ 17 In Utah State Insurance Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), an employee suffered a severe burn during employment. She did not file a formal claim for compensation with the Commission; but, as here, the necessary' employer, physician, and insurer forms were filed, and the insurer accepted liability and paid compensation benefits and medical costs. Later, the employee required further surgery. The Commission denied a request for medical benefits for the surgery on the ground that because the applicant had not initially made a formal filing, the Commission had no jurisdiction. This Court held that the Commission had jurisdiction:
Notwithstanding the fact that the [workers’ compensation] statutes require either the filing of a claim for compensation or the filing of a written notice of the accident in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission, this Court has long recognized that a claim for compensation need not bear any particular formality. In fact, “great liberality as to form and substance of an application for compensation is to be indulged.” However informal the claim may be, it need only give “notice to the parties and to the commission of the material facts on which the right asserted is to depend and against whom claim is made.”
Id. at 709 (citations omitted). Dutson and its predecessors held that the Commission has jurisdiction over a workers’ compensation claim on the basis of an informal filing — in Dutson’s case, the filing of an employer’s “First Report of Injury,” a physician’s medical report, and an employer’s notice of payment of compensation. See Dutson, 646 P.2d at 708-09. The Court further stated:
[T]he content of the several documents filed with the Commission reveal that all interested parties ... were on notice of Dutson’s claim and were duly apprised of the material, jurisdictional facts upon which the claim was based_ We therefore conclude that the form and substance of the documents filed with the Commission were adequate within the meaning, purpose and intent of the statutes, ... to confer jurisdiction upon the Commission.
Id. at 709 (emphasis added). The principle stated in Dutson and its predecessors applies equally here, despite the fact that section 35-1-99(3) refers to the filing of an “Application for Hearing” rather than a “Claim for Compensation.” All interested parties had notice of Vigos’ initial claim and knew the material and jurisdictional facts surrounding his accident. The required forms were filed, liability accepted, disability benefits paid, and medical expenses compensated well within the six-year period. In effect, both jurisdiction and liability were conceded by all concerned. Thus, the basis for the Commission to assert continuing jurisdiction over the claim for permanent total disability under section 35-1-78 was established. As in Dutson, the meaning, purpose, and intent of the Act were met.
¶ 18 Another case, Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571 (1949), also compels this result. In Apex Mining, an applicant for workers’ compensation benefits did not file a formal claim, but his employer and physician submitted their required forms and the employer presumably accepted liability and requested that the applicant appear before the Commission for examination by its medical committee to determine the extent of its liability. Later, the applicant applied for additional benefits because of continuing health problems stemming from his original accident. This Court held that the Commission had jurisdiction over the applicant’s original claims despite the fact that “no formal application for compensation was filed,” id. at 308, 209 P.2d at 572, and that the Commission therefore had continuing jurisdiction over additional claims. See id. at *212310, 209 P.2d at 573. In addition, the Court held that the Commission had initial jurisdiction because the “conduct of the [employer and insurer] is equivalent to the filing of a claim.” Id. at 312, 209 P.2d at 574 (Wolfe, J., concurring). The employer and insurer in Apex Mining had filed necessary reports, recognized liability, voluntarily paid disability compensation, and requested a Commission determination on the amount of compensation due. See id. at 309, 209 P.2d at 573.
¶ 19 In the instant ease, as stated above, Mountainland filed the appropriate reports and Mountainland and the Fund admitted liability, paid medical expenses, and paid temporary disability payments. Their actions, like the employer’s and insurer’s in Apex Mining, were sufficient for the Commission’s jurisdiction to attach, notwithstanding the fact that a formal claim for compensation was not initially filed. Their conduct satisfies the section 35-1-99(3) requirement for an “Application for Hearing.” See also Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779 (Utah 1984); cf. Peterson v. Industrial Comm’n, 29 Utah 2d 446, 511 P.2d 721 (1973) (dismissing claim when neither employer nor employee had initially filed documents with Commission).
¶20 Further, it was unnecessary under the Commission’s own administrative rules for Vigos to file an application for hearing with respect to his initial claim. Utah Administrative Code R490-1-3(B) states:
Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application for Hearing with the Commission.
Thus, only after a claim for compensation has been made and denied must a worker file the “Application for Hearing” under this rule. It cannot be the case that section 35-1-99(3) is satisfied only upon filing an “Application for Hearing” if the “Application” is not required to be filed under the Commission’s rules until after a claim has been denied. The rule is therefore flatly inconsistent with Mountain-land’s and the Fund’s contention — and with the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Howe and Justice Zimmerman — that filing an “Application for Hearing” is the only way to comply with the statute of limitations and vest the Commission with jurisdiction.6
¶21 It would be inconsistent with the Act’s purpose and the manner in which it is to be construed to hold that Vigos’ claim is barred because he did not initiate a formal Commission hearing. Mountainland and the Fund admitted liability for Vigos’ industrial accident. Because there was no dispute over compensation or medical benefits, no Commission hearing was requested or necessary. Doctors released Vigos to work, and he attempted to rehabilitate himself through further employment. The full extent of his *213injuries became apparent only after several years. The public policy of this state requires that when persons having claims attempt to use lesser means than pursuit of formal administrative adjudication or litigation, they may not be penalized by loss of benefits at some later date. Cf. Stoker v. Workers’ Comp. Fund, 889 P.2d 409, 412 (1994) (stating it would be ironic to interpret the Act as requiring a claimant to use the most aggressive and expansive form of therapy, rather than a less aggressive and invasive therapy, to claim additional benefits). To hold otherwise would result in workers bringing formal administrative proceedings for almost every accident, regardless of disputed liability, to insure that any future related problems would be covered. Vigos’ claim of permanent total disability should not now be barred because Mountainland and the Fund admitted liability and made the filing of an application for hearing unnecessary at the time of Vigos’ 1988 accident. Because they admitted liability and paid compensation and medical benefits, it was unnecessary for Vi-gos to file an initial application for hearing. Indeed, in these circumstances, it would have been entirely meaningless for Vigos to file an application for hearing under section 35-1-99(3).
¶22 Holding section 35-1-99(3) satisfied in this ease is consistent with the general policies behind statutes of limitations. Statutes of limitations are intended to prevent unfair dilatory litigation against a defendant and to require that claims be litigated while proper investigation and preservation of evidence can occur. Examples of unfair litigation include surprise or ambush claims, fictitious and fraudulent claims, and stale claims. See Horton v. Goldminer’s Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989); Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 597 P.2d 875, 876 (Utah 1979); Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322, 1323 (Utah 1979). Evidentia-ry problems include lost evidence, faded memories, and disappearing witnesses. See Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. Vigos was not attempting to ambush his employer or the Fund with a stale or fraudulent claim. Rather, after receiving initial benefits for his industrial accident and attempting to rehabilitate himself by engaging in further employment, it became apparent that his industrial injuries were far more severe than a mere temporary disability. He should not now be punished for his diligence in seeking to rehabilitate himself by being barred from claiming permanent total disability. See Stoker, 889 P.2d at 412.
¶23 Further, there is no problem with stale evidence in this matter. The benefits which Vigos now seeks relate to his initial injury, which Mountainland and the Fund investigated and documented in depth. The record includes medical diagnosis and insurance papers outlining his initial injuries.
¶24 Finally, in holding that the parties’ actions satisfy section 35-1-99(3) requirements, we uphold the purpose and intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act generally and its jurisdictional section specifically. The purpose of the Act is to provide relief from industrial accidents. See Pinter, 678 P.2d at 306-07. To that end, we construe the Act liberally and in favor of coverage if the statutes reasonably permit. See Heaton, 796 P.2d at 679. Prior cases (specifically Dutson and Apex Mining) have found jurisdiction in the Commission based on very similar fact patterns. The Commission has been held to have jurisdiction when all the appropriate parties were aware of the “material, jurisdictional facts upon which the [workers’ compensation] claim was based,” Dutson, 646 P.2d at 709, and the “purpose and intent of the [workers’ compensation jurisdictional] statutes” were fulfilled. See id.; see also 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 483(b) (1958) (“An acknowledgment or recognition of liability for compensation by the employer constitutes a waiver of the requirement for making or filing a timely claim.”); id. § 483(c) (“Payment of compensation for a period of time may constitute a waiver of the requirement of timely making or filing of a claim for compensation or estop the employer or its insurance carrier to object to the failure to make or file such claim unless the requirement is not subject to waiver or es-toppel.”).
¶ 25 In sum, Vigos satisfied the statute of limitations in section 35-1-99(3) by showing *214that required forms were filed, disability benefits paid, and medical expenses compensated before the six-year period ended.
¶ 26 Because Vigos satisfied the statute of limitations in section 35-1-99(3), the Commission had original jurisdiction. It follows that the Commission had continuing jurisdiction under section 35-1-78 to hear Vigos’ 1995 application for permanent disability arising from his 1988 accident. Section 35-1-78 states in part:
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
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(3)(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitation contained in other sections of this chapter....
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect.
¶ 27 Subsection (1) provides that the Commission’s powers and jurisdiction “shall be” continuing over “each case” properly within its jurisdiction. Section 35-1-78 imposes no time limit on the Commission’s continuing jurisdiction. Indeed, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, the authoritative treatise on workers’ compensation, notes that Utah is in “an important minority of states [that] permit reopening for changed condition at any time.” Larson’s, § 81.21 (emphasis added). That policy benefits both employers and employees. Disability benefits may be decreased in favor of an employer or increased to benefit an injured worker when circumstances warrant. See id. § 81.10. It would be unfairly discriminatory to allow a reduction of benefits under the continuing jurisdiction statute but not allow an increase in benefits to employees after the specified period has run. That, however, seems to be the position of Chief Justice Howe’s dissent. Since Vigos satisfied the statute of limitations in section 35-1-99(3), the Commission had continuing jurisdiction pursuant to section 35-1-48 over his request for additional benefits.
¶28 Chief Justice Howe’s dissent states that the Legislature, through section 35-1-78(3), intended to “limit[ ] the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission to the periods contained in the statute of limitations in 35-1-99(3).” Infra at ¶ 50. The dissent offers no citation of any kind for its assertion of what the Legislature intended. The assertion is merely lifted from the joint brief of Mountainland and the Fund that states no authority for the proposition. Moreover, common sense and the plain language of subsection (3) refute the dissent’s reading of the continuing jurisdiction provision. If read as the dissent reads that provision, continuing jurisdiction would be a complete nullity. Chief Justice Howe argues that the continuing jurisdiction provision applies only to claims that fall within the limitations period. But the Commission needs no continuing jurisdiction to act in those cases. In effect, Chief Justice Howe makes the continuing jurisdiction statute a nullity.
¶ 29 As to plain meaning, subsection (3) states two propositions: first, that section 35-1-78 cannot be interpreted as modifying workers’ compensation statutes of limitations, and second, that the Commission cannot change the workers’ compensation statutes of limitations. A statute of limitations has been defined as “an act limiting the time within which an action shall be brought.” 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 2 (1987) (emphasis added). Section 35-1-78(3), on its face, does not “modify,” and the Commission cannot “change,” the time within which a workers’ compensation claim must originally be brought. However, if a worker brings a claim within the six-year period in section 35-1-99(3), the Commission may have continuing jurisdiction beyond the six years to decide related claims. But that does not modify or change the limitations period, which pertains only to a claim for some rem*215edy for an injury from an accident.7 In other words, section 35-1-78(3) applies when a worker has done nothing to satisfy the statute of limitations before it runs; in that case, section 35-1-78(3) insures that the Commission’s continuing jurisdiction is not used to create original jurisdiction after the relevant limitations period has run. Nevertheless, subsection 35-1-78(1) gives the Commission continuing jurisdiction, even after the limitations period has run, if jurisdiction over the claim was established before- the statute ran.
¶ 30 United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co. v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 239, 430 P.2d 162 (1967) (Nielsen I), aff'd on reh’g on other grounds, 20 Utah 2d 271, 437 P.2d 199 (1968) (.Nielsen II), does not support the position of the dissents. Nielsen I denied a worker’s claims for compensation because the claims were brought after he made a lump sum settlement of previous claims with his self-insured employer. See Nielsen I, 19 Utah 2d at 240-42, 430 P.2d at 164. The Court stated that the continuing jurisdiction statute then in effect “mean[s] the commission has continuing jurisdiction only during the period of the [relevant] limitations statutes.” Id. at 242, 430 P.2d at 164. While Nielsen I may state the proposition that the Commission’s continuing jurisdiction does not extend beyond the statute of limitations period, that case is inapplicable to Vigos’ case for three reasons. First, the real reason Nielsen I barred the worker’s claims, according to Nielsen II, is that he made a lump sum settlement with his employer “in lieu of any ... [further] compensation to which he would be entitled, thus exhausting his claim[s],” not because of any limitations on continuing jurisdiction under the statute. See id. at 272, 437 P.2d at 200. Second, Nielsen II stated on rehearing that the effect of Nielsen I “is confined to its own facts,” including the fact that the parties had settled all future claims, “which ought to be regarded as of controlling importance.” Id. In this case, there is no evidence that Vigos, Mountainland, and the Fund entered into a settlement precluding Vigos’ future claims. Third, although Nielsen I stated that “the commission has continuing jurisdiction only during the period of the [relevant] limitations statutes,” that statute was critically different from the current continuing jurisdiction statute, making Nielsen I’s statement on continuing jurisdiction inapplicable to the current continuing jurisdiction statute. The statute upon which Nielsen I relied stated that “the employee shall receive [partial disability benefits], during such disability, and for a period of not to exceed, six years from the date of the injury.” Utah Code Ann. § 42-1-62 (1943) (emphasis added). The current continuing jurisdiction statute reads: “The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing.” Utáh Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1). Chief Justice Howe’s reliance in his dissent on Nielsen I is misplaced.8
¶ 31 Because Vigos satisfied the statute of limitations in section 35-1-99(3), the “powers and jurisdiction of the commission over [his] case [are] continuing,” as the language of section 35-1-78 plainly states. See Apex Mining, 116 Utah at 310-12, 209 P.2d at 573-74; Sheppick v. Albertson’s, Inc.; 922 P.2d 769, 775 & n. 2 (Utah 1996); Stoker, 889 P.2d at 412; Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266, 270 (1943).
¶ 32 In sum, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Commission did not have continuing jurisdiction to hear Vigos’ application for permanent total disability. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.
¶ 33 Reversed and remanded.
¶ 34 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM concurs in Justice STEWART’S opinion.. The Legislature relocated and renamed this statute: section 35-1-98(2) in 1990, section 35A-*2083-417(2) in 1996, and section 34A-2-417(2) in 1997. The statute was reorganized and altered somewhat in 1999. The relevant substance of section 35-1-99(3) remains unchanged, and we will refer to the 1988 codification, which governs this case.
. This section states:
Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably related to the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a period of three consecutive years.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98 (1994) (currently found at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417(l) with changes in syntax but not substance).
. The Utah Citizens’ Alliance, a coalition of individuals and organizations dedicated to public safety and accountability, filed an amicus curiae brief and a reply brief supporting Vigos. They essentially make the same arguments: that section 35-1-99(3) is unconstitutional (or that it should not preclude Vigos' action) and that the Commission has continuing jurisdiction.
. All citations to the Utah Administrative Code are to the 1987-1988 version, the version applicable to Vigos' claims.
. Section 35-1-99(3) was enacted in 1988. See H.B. 218, 47th Leg., Gen. Sess., 1988 Utah Laws 532, 538-39.
. The Commission's Employees Guide to Workers' Compensation also contradicts respondents’ position. This document, an informal and readable guide for persons having workers' compensation questions, is made available through one’s employer and on the Internet. See Employee's Guide to Workers' Compensation, available on the Internet at www.labor.state.ut.us/workcomp.htm. We note in passing that it is much more likely that an injured worker will consult this readable guide to understand his responsibilities under the Workers’ Compensation Act than the statutes in the Utah Code or the Administrative Rules, and thus it is useful in our analysis.
The Guide responds to the question "HOW DO I FILE A CLAIM FOR A WORK RELATED INJURY OR ILLNESS?” by stating: “Report the accident to your employer immediately, no matter how slight. However, A WORKER HAS UP TO 180 DAYS TO REPORT AN INJURY OR WORK RELATED ILLNESS." Id. (emphasis added). The Commission mentions reporting an injury to the employer-as the required action to make a claim, not filing an "Application for Hearing" with the Commission. See also id. at Question Eight (mentioning assisting in filing Employer’s First Report Of Injury and Physician’s Initial Report of Injury, but not “Application for Hearing”).
The Guide mentions nothing about an “Application for Hearing” until a question regarding what to do if a claim is denied:
A. First talk with the insurance carrier or self-insured employer to find out why your claim has been denied. If they lack information required to accept a claim, you can obtain the missing information and resubmit the claim. If this is unsuccessful, call the Industrial Accidents Division of the Labor Commission at 530-6800 or toll free (800)530-5090. The staff may be able to assist you with your claim or possibly file an application for a hearing.
Id. (emphasis added). Obviously, the Commission’s argument is significantly undermined by its own Employee’s Guide.
. Of course, one is not required to separately satisfy the statute of' limitations for related claims. As this Court stated in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission:
A claim for compensation under the Industrial Act is only one claim, no matter how many hearings are had or how many distinct awards are made. It is a claim by the employee for compensation for the injury he has sustained, notwithstanding the compensation may be determined from time to time resulting in many distinct awards. .
73 Utah 366, 376-77, 274 P. 139, 143 (1929) (emphasis added).
. Both Chief Justice Howe and Justice Zimmerman rely on the supposed intent of the Legislature in enacting the 1988 amendment to section 35-1-99, but neither justice cites one word of legislative history in support if his opinion.