Opinion by
Judge Manderino,This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County which overruled the decision of the Zoning Board of Adjustment of Lancaster Township denying the application of H. R. Miller Co., Inc. (Miller) to install concrete bases and equipment for a bituminous concrete plant on their present business site. The Court of Common Pleas reversed the Zoning Board and ordered the Zoning Board and its Zoning Officer to issue a permit to Miller. An appeal was taken to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to Section 402 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970 (Act of July 31, 1970, P. L. , No. 223, 17 P.S. 211.101 et seq.).
The Zoning Board of Adjustment denied Miller’s request because it concluded from the record that the requested use of the property would constitute a new and different nonconforming use than was presently on the site. The Board also concluded that if the requested use were not a new nonconforming use but only the expansion of a prior nonconforming use, the expansion would be in violation of a twenty-five per cent limitation placed on the expansion of nonconforming uses by the Township ordinance. The Board further concluded that traffic problems which would result from a grant of Miller’s request would be contrary to the public interest.
*215The lower court reviewed the record and concluded that the Board erred because the record did not support its conclusions. The lower court found that Miller’s request was for the same nonconforming use which had previously existed on the site for many years and that no expansion of the use was involved. We affirm the action of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County.
A similar issue involving this exact site was before the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas in 1962, in a zoning matter which involved a determination of the nature of the nonconforming use existing on the site. In 1962, the Court held that for over thirty years the site was in continuous use as a stone quarry business, a roadbuilding business, and a retail business for selling quarried mineral products used in making concrete, paving roads, and parking lots.
In this case the lower court came to the same conclusions previously arrived at in the earlier case concerning the site. The lower court found that the businesses which had existed on the property continued to exist, and that the site currently was used for the quarry business, the road building business and the sale of quarried mineral products.
The lower court therefore concluded that the construction of concrete bases and equipment for a bituminous concrete plant did not involve a new use since it was the continuation of a use which had existed on the property and also that no expansion of a use was involved because the exact location on the property where Miller proposed to construct the bases and equipment had been previously used in the businesses on the site.
The record is clear that Miller filed his application for a building permit to meet the demands of a new method of building roads instituted by the Pennsylva*216nia. Department of Highways. Waterbound macadam roads with a base of rolled stone formerly used in the road building business were being replaced by macadam roads which would use bituminous concrete as a base. Both the rolled stone bases and the bituminous concrete bases use, to a significant degree, the same stone. The record also shows that there exists on the site a ready mix concrete plant also utilizing the stone from the quarry business.
We agree that Miller’s proposed bituminous concrete plant was not something new and . different from the businesses already existing on the land. The site has been and is being used for the road building business, involving the construction of macadam roads and concrete roads. A modification of the operations on the site is necessary for Miller to modernize its business to meet present demands. The only change the granting of a permit will bring about is the production of a different type of road material to build a different type of road. The lower court correctly held that this would not be a new and different use, but simply the modernization of an existing nonconforming use on land already being used in Miller’s operations.
We think that the record clearly justifies the lower court’s conclusion that Miller does not plan a new use nor does Miller intend to expand an existing nonconforming use. Bather, Miller desires to continue the same nonconforming use but must make certain changes because the ingredients of its product must change as demanded by the market.
We have also examined the record and it does not support the Board’s conclusion that increased traffic would adversely affect the public interest. In fact, the record is almost void of any evidence which would support a conclusion that there would be any significant increase in the number of trucks leaving the site daily for road construction destinations.
*217Lancaster Township relies on In Re: Mignatti's Appeal, 403 Pa. 144, 168 A. 2d 567 (1961), to justify its conclusion that the bituminous concrete plant would be a use of the land new and different from any existing there. In Mignatti, however, the court decided that a bitiuninous concrete plant was not a reasonable extension of an existing nonconforming use as a quarry and stone crushing plant. In this case, the record does not sustain a conclusion that the only nonconforming use existing on the property is a quarry and stone crushing plant. There is on the property in addition uses involving the road building business and the preparation of ready mixed concrete. Miller does not plan to start a new business or engage in a new use. Miller desires to continue doing exactly what it has been doing and what a prior owner has done on the property. There has been a change in the market and the consumers now desire a change in the type of product used for exactly the same purpose, road building.
Since the court below took no additional testimony, but reviewed the appeal solely on the record made before the Zoning Board, the function of this court is to determine whether the Board abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Mulac Appeal, 418 Pa. 207, 210 A. 2d 275 (1965). We hold that the Board did err in its legal conclusions. The decision of the lower court is affirmed.