specially concurring.
I concur in the majority's opinion insofar as it reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstates the trial court’s ruling rejecting the two jury instructions ten*836dered. However, I do so from a quite different analytical perspective.
As I view the case, the question is whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the facts of this particular accident. The “rear-end collision instruction” referred to by the attorneys, the trial court, the Court of Appeals and the majority, simply reflects but one specific example of a situation in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply. Iacino v. Brown, 121 Colo. 450, 217 P.2d 266 (1950).
The trial court quite properly rejected instruction No. 1. That instruction was modeled on CJI-Civ.2d 11.12 (1980) (CJI-11.12). The instructions for the use of CJI-11.12 clearly indicate that it is to be used only when applicable and, most importantly, only in conjunction with CJI-Civ.2d 3.5 (1980) (CJI-3.5). CJI-3.5 contains a definition of the term “presumption”; at trial, plaintiffs counsel tendered instruction No. 2 because in two other jury instructions the trial court had used the term “presumption.”1 The majority opinion seems to suggest that an instruction such as tendered instruction No. 1 might be permissible in some circumstances. I believe CJI-11.12 may never be given in isolation. It amounts to an instruction for a directed verdict of negligence in the circumstances of a rear-end collision. The language of CJI-11.12 may only be used in combination with CJI-3.5—as plaintiffs did in their tendered instruction No. 2. Thus, the trial court properly rejected tendered instruction No. 1 because it contained a misstatement of law.
I also agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the tendered instruction No. 2 in the circumstances of this case. I do not, however, agree with the majority’s opinion that the reason for denial is because the automobile struck in the rear was located ten feet from the highway. I can envision a case wherein a car owner whose vehicle is parked nine feet from the highway and is struck from the rear by another vehicle might be entitled to the res ipsa loquitur concept embodied in CJI-3.5, as modified by CJI-11.12. However, the evidence in this case discloses that numerous causes other than the alleged negligence of Bettner could be viewed as having caused Boring’s injuries. Holmes v. Gamble, 655 P.2d 405 (1982); Saliman v. Silk, 118 Colo. 220, 194 P.2d 304 (1948); Iacino v. Brown, 121 Colo. 450, 217 P.2d 266 (1950). Bettner testified that just prior to the accident she had reduced her speed; had been passed by three automobiles, with results that twice slush was sprayed upon her windshield; that she was approaching the top of an incline just prior to the accident and observed a car pass her and then cut in quickly and fishtail in front of her, forcing her to apply her brakes; that she had no advance warning of the sudden appearance of an ice patch on the highway prior to the fishtailing of the passing vehicle or prior to seeing the overturned semi-trailer; that she chose to steer her car to the side of the road near an access road to avoid applying brakes on the ice on the highway; and that nevertheless her car spun when she applied the brakes, ultimately striking Boring’s vehicle. Because this evidence is sufficient to establish that the accident in question was most probably due to some cause other than the negligence of Bettner, the trial court properly concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not available and, therefore, properly rejected tendered instruction No. 2.
For those reasons, I concur in the judgment of the majority.
. One instruction informed the jury that no negligence could be presumed form the happening of an accident. Another instruction informed the jury that a person is presumed to have knowledge of hazardous conditions which a reasonably prudent person would gain upon reasonable inquiry under the existing circumstances. At trial, plaintiffs counsel argued that a "presumption” instruction—presumably plaintiffs tendered instruction No. 2—was necessary to inform the jury what that term meant in the context of the other two instructions. The record reveals that the trial court understood fully that two different instructions were offered, one a "rear-end collision" instruction, the other a "presumption” instruction; it was rejecting both instructions.