(dissenting).
I cannot agree that the provisions of Sec. 42 — la—13 (b) (3), U. C. A. 1943, bars the making of an award to the widow and dependents of the deceased employee under the facts of this case.
LeRoy D. Horrocks, the decedent employee, had on March 6, 1946, during his lifetime, filed with the commission a claim for total disability resulting from silicosis. The prevailing opinion states that under the facts presented to the commission it could well have made an award to the claimant for such disability, but because it failed to do so within the lifetime of the claimant the commission is now barred from making an award to his dependents. •
When LeRoy D. Horrocks left the employee of the plaintiff he was suffering from total disability resulting from silicosis and as of that date became entitled to compensation, and although he in due time filed his claim for such compensation, due to factors beyond his control, no award or payment was made during his lifetime. The fact that the commission failed to make an award before he died did not affect his right to the compensation. The right became vested when he became totally disabled because of silicosis and could no longer work. Although in Parker v. Industrial Commission, et al., 86 Utah 468, 50 P. 2d 278, we did not expressly overrule the case of Heiselt Construction Company v. Industrial Comm., 58 Utah 59, 197 P. *59589, 15 A. L. R. 799, we explained that case by saying that the award which was made to the personal representative after the death of the employee was for payments which would have become due had the employee lived and were not such as to which he had already become entitled, but held that the employee had a vested right as to payments to which he had already become entitled. In the instant case decedent commenced earning his disability wage when he became unable to work and the rights to those payments became vested during his lifetime. The failure of the commission to order those payments did not change those rights. The employee had done everything required of him to set the machinery of the commission in action to aid him in the collection of those payments. Under such a state of facts that which should have been done should be considered as having been done for the purposes of determining whether the conditions imposed in Sec. 42 — la —13 (b) (3) have been complied with. To hold that whether a dependent would be entitled to an award depends upon the action or inaction of the commission, even though it should have acted, would make such rights wholly dependent upon the commission rather than the law, a result which the legislature could not possibly have intended.
The prevailing opinion follows strictly the wording of Section 42 — la—13 (b) (3), U. C. A. 1943, and holds that decedent’s dependents are not entitled to an award since no compensation was paid or awarded to him during his lifetime. But in this kind of case we should look to the purpose of the provision rather than hold too strictly to its express wording. The purpose of this provision was to allow the dependents of such decedent to recover compensation where the decedent was entitled to and claimed compensation during his lifetime as a result of total disability from silicosis. The legislature obviously overlooked the possibility here presented that a person might do all in his power to obtain compensation and even though he were *60entitled thereto, through circumstances beyond his control, he might not obtain an award or payment before his death. Under such conditions, I think the case comes under the spirit and intention of the act if not strictly within its wording. In Union Portland Cement Co. v. Tax Comm., 110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879; Utah Light & Traction Co. v. State Tax Comm., 92 Utah 404, 68 P. 2d 759; Spangler v. Corless, 61 Utah 88, 211 P. 692, 28 A. L. R. 72, this court went a long way to read into a statute the spirit and intention of the act, although the result was directly contrary to its express wording. See also Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 118 Utah, 101; 191 P. 2d 612 and Geneva Steel Co. v. Tax Comm., 116 Utah 170; 209 P. 2d 208; Unless we are to have consistently recurring cases of great hardship and injustice like this one, we must construe statutes in the light of their purpose and the objects to be accomplished thereby, and this should equally be true where the dependents of those who have given their lives to industry are involved as well as in cases where a great industry stands to lose by a strict construction of the statute.
McDONOUGH, J., not participating.