This proceeding was instituted by Clinton water district of Island county to condemn, appropriate, and take from Deer lake 0.155 cubic feet of water per second for domestic uses. The court determined the amount of damages which the riparian land owners would sustain by reason of the appropriation, and the district has appealed. In this opinion, the district will be referred to as the appellant, and the riparian property owners as respondents.
The Clinton water district is approximately one square mile in area and has a population of about three hundred persons. Its water supply is inadequate to meet the needs of those residing within its limits. Deer lake is a natural, nonnavigable body of fresh water, located about one-half mile west of the district. It has an area of about 112 acres and a maximum depth of 50 feet.
*286The land bordering on the lake has been divided into approximately twenty-six privately owned tracts. Some of them are wholly in their natural and unimproved state. Others have been improved and are being used for residential, agricultural and commercial purposes. The tracts most suitable for country lakeside homes are of sufficient area so that a resident may have a garden and domestic animals and fowls. The owners of three tracts use their properties for commercial purposes, such as renting cabins, camping and picnic facilities, and boats. One property owner operates a twelve-acre tract planted to loganberries. This tract slopes toward the lake and requires intensive fertilization.
The lake affords opportunity for boating, bathing, swimming, and fishing by the residents and the patrons of the commercial places. Access to the lake also permits the use of its water by the livestock and fowls of the property owners. The full use of the land will necessarily result in surface drainage and seepage into the lake other than that which is natural.
The state hydraulic engineer refused to issue a permit to appellant to appropriate water from Deer lake until it had' condemned the riparian rights affected by such appropriation. That action was in harmony with Burrows v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 44 Wash. 630, 87 Pac. 937, and In re Martha Lake Water Co. No. 1, 152 Wash. 53, 277 Pac. 382.
The beneficial use of the water of the lake by respondents for consumption and use upon their lands, as defined and' limited in Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 Pac. 114, will' not be affected by the appropriation of the quantity of water desired by appellant, and it does not appear the court con-' sidered such a factor as an element of damage. The court found that there will be no actual physical damage to the: riparian lands by the diversion of the water of the lake due to the lowering of the water level, and therefore we do not have for consideration the elements of damage involved in In re Martha Lake Water Co. No. 1, supra, or Litka v. Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9 P. (2d) 88. The court was of the’ opinion that riparian rights of respondents would be so *287affected by the operation of health laws and regulations in the protection of the water supply sought by appellant that their properties would be depreciated in value, and made awards to them on that basis.
The basic question for our determination is whether the uses of the lake made by respondents in connection with their ownership and occupancy of their riparian lands are such property rights that their loss or limitation constitute a damage for which compensation must be made.
The appellant contends that the use of waters of the lake for swimming, bathing, boating, and fishing are not vested property rights, but are mere incidents of ownership, and if the act having the effect of depriving the riparian owners of such incidental rights is legal, it amounts to nothing more than damage without injury; and even though the state may prevent the use of the lake and its waters in any manner that may cause the water to become contaminated and not suitable for domestic use, such will be the exercise of the police power of the state, for which there can be no •recourse by way of damages for depreciation in the market value of the land.
. When the respondents or their predecessors in interest acquired their patents, they acquired title to the center of the lake, and riparian rights attached and became appurtenant thereto or incidents of their ownership. They became vested property rights and are included in the protection afforded by Art. I, § 16, of the state constitution, providing that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation.
One of such rights is access to the water, which carries with it the rights of boating, bathing, swimming, and fishing. If the land can be used for agricultural purposes, there is incidental thereto the right of drainage into the lake and the right of access by domestic animals and fowls; and if it is capable of use for residential purposes, many rights may be exercised and enjoyed which have always been recognized as riparian rights, reasonable use and due regard for similar rights of others being the standard of conduct. *288Neither the courts nor the text writers have attempted to promulgate an all-inclusive definition of riparian rights, but reference to those referred to may be found in Bowman v. Walthen, 2 McLean 376, Fed. Cas. No. 1740; City of New York v. Wilson & Co., 278 N. Y. 86, 15 N. E. (2d) 408; Soo Sand & Gravel Co. v. M. Sullivan Dredging Co., 259 Mich. 489, 244 N. W. 138; Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 Pac. 239, 83 Am. St. 821, 54 L. R. A. 178; McEvoy v. Taylor, 56 Wash. 357, 105 Pac. 851, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 222; 56 Am. Jur. 808, Waters, §§ 383, 384. Access rights were inferentially recognized in In re Martha Lake Water Co. No. 1, supra.
Rem. Rev. Stat, §§ 2542 and 9474 [P.P.C. §§ 118-169, 423-43], forbid any one to deposit or suffer to be deposited in a lake, the water of which is or may be used for drinking purposes, any matter or thing which can or may pollute the water or do any other act or maintain any condition which might result in such pollution. Regulations of the state board of health forbid fishing, boating, bathing, or wading in a lake from which water is taken for domestic use within a distance of five miles from the intake. Domestic animals may not be permitted to go into such water within that distance from the intake. The board of health is required to enact special rules whenever it becomes desirablé because of local conditions to protect a public water supply. Public authorities are required to take all such action as may be necessary to prevent contamination of the water so used.
If the appellant is permitted to appropriate water from Deer lake for domestic uses, it then becomes the mandatory duty of the board of health to enforce the statutes and the rules and regulations to the end that the domestic water supply will not become contaminated; and if this is done, the property of the respondents will be damaged by depreciation in market values because of curtailment of their riparian rights. It is very clear from the evidence in the record that, if respondents are deprived of the rights of boating, bathing, swimming, and fishing, their property will be less valuable as lakeside homes, or for the commercial uses involving such activities. Enforcement of health *289restrictions will impair the value of property for agricultural and other uses. There is testimony in the record to the effect that, if water is diverted from Deer lake by appellant for domestic uses, the land can no longer be used for raising loganberries because of drainage contamination. We therefore reach the conclusion that the appropriation of the water from Deer lake by appellant for domestic uses will result in damage to the property and property rights of respondents for which compensation must be made.
Whenever the rights of riparian proprietors on a stream or lake come into conflict with the rights of those who are entitled to use the waters thereof for domestic purposes, the courts have been confronted with the problem whether the limitations necessary to be put upon riparian uses of the water in order to prevent its contamination are an exercise of the police power of the state to protect public health for which no compensation can be recovered, or whether, if such limitations have the effect of making the riparian lands less valuable for the uses to which they may be adapted, the appropriator of the water must exercise the right of eminent domain and compensate the land owners. There is much conflict of authority on the 'subject, and a review of the cases would serve no useful purpose. Some of them arose in states in which the common-law doctrine of riparian rights is not recognized; others were governed by the statutory policy of the state, and others arose in states in which the concept of the extent of riparian rights is more restricted, or in which the constitutional provisions relating to acquiring property by eminent domain are not so broad as in this state.
The police power of the state is exercised to promote public welfare by regulating and restricting the use and enjoyment of property by its owners, and in the exercise of the power of eminent domain the public welfare is promoted by taking the property from its owner and either appropriating it to some public use or causing some damage to it for a public benefit. Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), §6. These thoughts were expressed in Conger v. *290Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 Pac. 377, 18 A. L. R. 393, in which we said:
“Eminent domain takes private property for a public use, while the police power regulates its use and enjoyment, or if it takes or damages it, it is not a taking or damaging for the public use, but to conserve the safety, morals, health and general welfare of the public.”
This is followed by a quotation from § 6 of Lewis on Eminent Domain. Nichols in his treatise on Eminent Domain (2d ed.), Vol. 1, § 147, states:
“When the public takes the right to divert the water for a public water supply by eminent domain, it is not exercising a public right, but it is taking the property of the riparian owners, and if the effect of the taking is to destroy a riparian owner’s right to make a reasonable use of the water as it flows past his land, it is impossible to deny that there is a taking of his property, unless riparian rights, or that particular riparian right, are not property. The introduction of the police power into the argument is nonsense. If a city desired to use a man’s house as a hospital, it might not be able to do so if he persisted vi et armis in occupying the whole of it as his residence; but it could not lawfully get possession of the property for hospital purposes by passing an ordinance prohibiting the owner from continuing to use it as a residence, and deny him compensation on the ground that the ordinance was merely a police regulation enacted in behalf of the public health. A private watercourse, apart from the public right of navigation, is as much private property as a man’s home, even if the ownership is, to a certain extent, joint; and if a city desires to acquire a private watercourse for a reservoir, and to prevent the owners of the property from using it themselves, it should take it by eminent domain and pay for it.”
The case before us presents a different approach to the subject than we find in any of the cases cited by counsel, or which we have found by independent research. We are of the opinion that the promotion of public welfare in protecting the water supply which appellant seeks to acquire from the state requires the exercise of the power of eminent domain by appellant and not the exercise of its police power by the state; and if appellant desires to change the status of Deer lake into that of a water reservoir for *291domestic uses, it is required by the constitution to compensate the riparian owners for the depreciation in the value of their lands and properties by reason of restrictions upon riparian uses. In order to acquire water from Deer lake, it was necessary for appellant to secure from the state a permit to do so. It could not appropriate and take the water from the lake as a matter of right. The state, by virtue of its control over the unappropriated water, may impose conditions upon which it will grant such a permit. It did so by requiring the appellant to institute an eminent domain proceeding to have ascertained any damages respondents might sustain by reason of the appropriation and taking of the water from the lake for domestic uses. It now appears by such act respondents will be limited in the exercise of riparian rights which will depreciate the market values of their property. The direct cause of the damage to the lands is the acquirement of the right to appropriate and take the water for domestic uses.
Appellant did not submit any testimony upon the question of depreciation in market values of the lands of respondents, but elected to stand upon its theory that the taking of the water itself deprived respondents of no property and, as there would be no substantial lowering of the lake level and no physical injury done to the land itself, it must follow that respondents were entitled to no compensation. The court accepted the evidence submitted by respondents and made awards based upon the loss or limitation of riparian rights. It may be, as suggested by appellant, that the total award makes the cost to it prohibitive, but this is the situation in which many condemnors have found themselves and have been unable to achieve their objectives. This is a matter over which the courts have no control and with which they can have no concern.
The judgment is affirmed.
Simpson, C. J., Beals, Mallery, Schwellenbach, and Hamley, JJ., concur.