(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In Riggins v Nevada, 504 US 127, 135; 112 S Ct 1810; 118 L Ed 2d 479 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that a state satisfies the due process rights of a criminal defendant if it demonstrates that treatment of the defendant with antipsychotic medication is medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of the defendant’s own safety or the safety of others. The state may also establish that involuntary treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate where it can be shown that it could not obtain an adjudication of the defendant’s guilt or *233innocence by using less intrusive means. Id. Several years before Riggins, this Court held, in People v Hardesty, 139 Mich App 124, 137; 362 NW2d 787 (1984), that “an incompetent accused may be made competent through medicinal agents, and may be tried even though medication must be continued throughout trial to prevent the accused from again becoming incompetent.” However, the state’s interest in safety and trial continuity must be balanced against the defendant’s interest in presenting probative evidence of insanity through his manner and demeanor on the witness stand. Id. at 145.
In this appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to temporarily discontinue perphenazine for the three-day period preceding his taking the stand. At trial, defense counsel expressed concern that the sedative effect of the medication would impair defendant’s ability to show the jury what his demeanor was like on the day of the shooting. Defense counsel noted that defendant seemed “very sedated” and was “dozing” during the trial. However, he acknowledged that defendant had “been very able to assist his attorney in his defense during this week.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant would most likely become incompetent within a couple of days if the medication were discontinued. The court further noted that there had been no showing that defendant’s nonmedicated state would approximate his demeanor at the time of the shooting.
Although the standard of review for this issue has not been set out with clarity, in Riggins the Supreme Court explained that, while review was not to be at the level of strict scrutiny, Riggins, supra at 136, a *234reviewing court must determine whether the record supports a conclusion that the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication was “necessary to accomplish an essential state policy,” such as bringing a competent defendant to trial in a timely manner or maintaining the safety of the defendant or others, id. at 138. See also Woodland v Angus, 820 F Supp 1497, 1509 (D Utah, 1993).
Here, the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medication to defendant advanced the essential state policies of maintaining defendant’s competency during trial and protecting the safety of defendant and those around him. Riggins, supra; Hardesty, supra; Washington v Harper, 494 US 210, 226; 110 S Ct 1028; 108 L Ed 2d 178 (1990) (administration of involuntary medication was meant to ensure that the incarcerated person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or others). According to William Yaroch, M.D., discontinuance of defendant’s medication would result in defendant becoming incompetent within a few days. A return to incompetency would impede defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, force a likely adjournment of trial, and risk the safety and well-being of defendant and others. Indeed, Dr. Yaroch noted that when defendant was previously removed from his medication his delusional thinking spread from “the central delusion about doctors and people who injured his ears” to “the legal people that were involved, to the people in the jail, a lot of other people.” Thus, the safety of defendant and those persons in closest proximity to him would be jeopardized if he were removed from his medication, even for a relatively short time. Moreover, the record does not indicate that defendant’s *235interest in presenting probative evidence of insanity through his manner and demeanor on the witness stand would have been served by removing him from his medication. Defendant failed to present evidence at the pretrial hearing to show that his demeanor while unmedicated would have approximated his demeanor at the time of the shooting. In fact, it appears from the evidence presented at trial that defendant was relatively calm and acted like an ordinary person just before and right after the shooting. Apparently, defendant was also calm while on his medication. Further, because the jury was apprised during defendant’s direct examination that he was currently taking medication and the effects of that medication on him, the jury’s evaluation of his insanity defense did not rest on an “ ‘undisclosed behavioral alteration,’ but was the result of an informed consideration of appellant’s altered behavior.” Lawrence v State, 265 Ga 310, 316; 454 SE2d 446 (1995) (citation omitted). Thus, under the facts of this case, I would conclude that the state’s essential interest in continuing the trial and maintaining the safety of defendant and others outweighed defendant’s interest in presenting evidence of insanity through his demeanor on the witness stand.
Accordingly, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.