dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case on the issue of the verification of the petition for judicial review.
The language in Ind.Code § 4-22-1-14 (repealed by Acts 1986, P.L. 18, recodified as Ind.Code § 4-21.5-1-1 et seq.) provides:
"Any party or person aggrieved by an order or determination made by any such agency shall be entitled to a judicial review thereof in accordance with the provisions of this act. Such review may be had by filing with the cireuit or superior court of the county in which such person resides, or in any county in which such order 'or determination is to be carried out or enforced, a verified petition...."
Although this statute does not expressly state that the affidavit may not be signed by an attorney representing a corporation, the case law interpreting this type of legislation has consistently held that the verification must be made by a corporation's executive or administrative officer. This is recognized by the majority opinion at the top of page 4.
The majority specifically overrules the holdings of the Court of Appeals in Gary Community Mental Health Center, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Public Welfare (1986), Ind.App., 496 N.E.2d 1341 and Community Care Centers, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Public Welfare (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 602. Both of these cases rely on the case law on this subject dating back to Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Carroll (1917), 186 Ind. 633, 117 N.E. 858.
This is a principle of law well-known at the time the present statute was passed by the legislature. It would have been a simple matter for the legislature to have made the change which this Court now seeks to do by judicial opinion. Although I agree that the rationale of the majority makes a great deal of sense, I would not presume to invade the province of the legislature and change the law in this manner.
The Court of Appeals as outlined in the majority opinion was correct in its unpublished opinion. I would deny transfer.
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.