(dissenting) — I dissent. In this condemnation proceeding the State offered the respondent property owners the sum of $123,728 for their property, and deposited the same in court, which was withdrawn by the respon*37dents in consideration for their giving up immediate possession to permit the State to proceed with its highway construction during the period of litigation under the provisions provided in RCW 8.04.090 and .092.
RCW 8.26.180 sets forth guidelines for the acquisition of real property by the State, which must be followed “to the greatest extent practicable”:
(3) Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, the acquiring agency shall establish an amount which it believes to be just compensation therefor, and shall make a prompt offer to acquire the property for the full amount so established. In no event shall such amount be less than the agency’s approved appraisal of the fair market value of such property.
(Italics mine.)
There can be no doubt the State did follow and affirmatively acted upon this guideline, and represented to the respondents that the $123,728 was its approved appraisal establishing the fair market value, and was just compensation for their property. The record shows that the respondents made demand upon the State to comply with the following provision of RCW 8.26.180 (3):
The acquiring agency shall provide the owner of real property to be acquired with a written statement of, and summary of the basis for, the amount it established as just compensation.
(Italics mine.) The State thereupon did respond to this demand by letter dated May 22, 1972, advising the respondents that just compensation was based upon the acquisition of 6.41 acres from a total of 11.09 acres, at $9,200 per acre, $30,505 for improvements taken, and $33,930 for damages to the remainder. This was consistent with the mandate of article 1, section 16, of our state constitution that private property may not be taken without the payment of just compensation. Furthermore, a failure to follow this mandate would be a violation of article 8, section 7, of our state constitution, prohibiting the state from giving away public funds.
The respondents were entitled to rely upon this represen*38tation by the State as being its approved appraisal, establishing the fair market value of their property for the payment of just compensation for its taking. At the trial, however, no evidence of this appraised value was introduced and, instead, two appraisals were introduced, one approximately $37,000 less and the other approximately $30,000 less than the State’s approved appraised value of the property, in the amount of $123,728, represented by the State to the owners. The State’s failure to introduce into evidence the approved appraisal which it had represented to the respondents as just compensation, and instead, introducing only these lower appraisals, was deceptive and grossly unfair to the respondents. The jury brought in a verdict for $107,000. The withholding from the jury of the approved appraisal that it had represented to the owners, unquestionably affected the jury verdict. As a result of the verdict being lower than the amount deposited by the State and drawn down by the respondents under RCW 8.04.090, the respondents were subject to a judgment for reimbursement to the State for the difference. This resulting injustice to the respondents demanded relief. The trial court in its discretion was therefore justified in granting this relief by increasing the verdict by additur to the extent of the money deposited reflecting the approved appraisal of the fair market value and just compensation for the respondents’ property. The judgment of the trial court in its additur should be affirmed in this amount or, in the alternative, a new trial should be granted.
I would grant the respondents’ motion for a new trial in any event for the reason that the trial court improperly permitted the State to consider raw acreage sales as comparable values in determining the appraised value of respondents’ property introduced by the State at the trial.
The trial court made the following finding in a pre-trial order:
[t]he said respondents had sold off parts of their property on a lot basis and had subdivided part of the property and sold off the same as lots and for the balance of the *39property had engaged an engineer who drew up a plat of said property and the same was filed and approved by King County; the respondents have incurred engineering costs, made physical changes of the subject property by bringing in fill dirt, have installed a sewer line to accommodate said subdivision, have laid out some roads and curbing, have stubbed in water lines, have drawn up the final plat which conformed to the King County requirements and that said respondents were informed that the final plat would have to be changed to conform to the right of way alignment established by commencement of these condemnation proceedings and it appearing that the final plat would have been approved as a routine matter had these condemnation proceedings not been commenced . . .
This finding was consistent with evidence thereafter introduced in the case and there was no question that but for the interruption of the condemnation proceedings, the respondents’ final plat would have been approved. Under these circumstances, the use of sales of raw acreage as comparable sales in determining the fair market value of this property was improper. The State should not, by its condemnation action, be able to cut off the finalization of the respondents’ plat and, at the same time thereby restrict the value of the property in determining just compensation to the owner for the taking. This type of conduct by the State should not be tolerated. A new trial should be granted, restricting the State from using comparable sales of raw acreage in determining the value of the respondents’ property. At the new trial the State should be required to introduce its approved appraisal establishing the fair market value of the respondents’ property as just compensation in the amount of $123,728, the sum offered the respondents and deposited into court by the State, in addition to its other appraisals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of *40the trial court in failing to grant a new trial should be reversed accordingly.
Rosellini, Wright, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Hunter, J.
Petition for rehearing denied December 5,1975.