(dissenting).
The penetrating thrust of abolishing governmental immunity is one of equality for all. In effectuating Minnesota’s own Constitution art. I, § 8, mandating that “[ejvery person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs * * *,” there seems no reason for not accepting the abol-ishment of governmental immunity. This the majority has refused to do.
As a reflection of the majority’s attitude in the field of governmental immunity, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (1979), stated that “[t]he state of Minnesota law after Cracraft * * * is at best unsettled.” Id. at 668 (citation omitted). I find the reasoning used by the Iowa Supreme Court persuasive. That case also was concerned with whether a governmental entity may be liable for negligently failing to enforce a fire code. In Wilson the Iowa Supreme Court, after reviewing strikingly similar facts and issues, reversed a trial court’s determination that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a cause of action.1
*289The uncertainty the Iowa Supreme Court found in Minnesota law is further exacerbated by the majority holding in the instant case. The majority opinion reintroduces into Minnesota law the proposition that “the king can do no wrong”2 under the guise of the public-duty rule. The artificiality of the public duty-special duty distinction was also recently recognized by the Alaska and Wisconsin Supreme Courts. In Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976), plaintiffs brought suit against the state, alleging that due to the negligent inspection of an Anchorage fire inspector, a hotel fire occurred in which five people died. As in the instant ease, the state’s attorney argued that the building codes and fire inspection laws enacted by the Alaska Legislature were for the benefit of the general public alone. In rejecting the state’s argument, the court stated:
The purpose of fire inspection is to protect life and property from fire; the purpose of [this] inspection was to discover and alleviate fire hazards endangering users of the hotel. Plaintiffs or their decedents were members of that class; they were the intended beneficiaries of the inspection services provided and the foreseeable victims of the fire hazards left uncorrected.
* * * * * *
Second, we consider that the “duty to all, duty to no-one” doctrine is in reality a form of sovereign immunity, which is a matter dealt with by statute in Alaska, and not to be amplified by court-created doctrine. An application of the public duty doctrine here would result in finding no duty owed the plaintiffs or their decedents by the state, because, although they were foreseeable victims and a private defendant would have owed such a duty, no “special relationship” between the parties existed. Why should the establishment of duty become more difficult when the state is the defendant? Where there is no immunity, the state is to be treated like a private litigant. To allow the public duty doctrine to disturb this equality would create immunity where the legislature has not.
Id. at 241-42.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court used similar reasoning in Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976), in holding that a complaint was not de-*290murrable on grounds that the building inspector was negligent in performing merely a “public” duty. In addition to the persuasive reasons contained in the Iowa, Wisconsin and Alaska Supreme Court opinions, several compelling reasons exist why the Cracraft v. City of St Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn.1979), doctrine should be overruled, or at least modified.
First, until Hoffert and Cracraft this court always held that a violation of a statute may provide the basis for a negligence action if a two-party inquiry is satisfied — the damage suffered by the plaintiff must be of such a nature as was contemplated by the statute, and the plaintiff must be within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute. As Mr. Justice Mitchell succinctly stated almost a century ago:
It is now well settled, certainly in this state, that where a statute or municipal ordinance imposes upon any person a specific duty for the protection or benefit of others, if he neglects to perform that duty he is liable to those for whose protection or benefit it was imposed for any injuries of the character which the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent, and which were proximately produced by such neglect.
Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 104, 41 N.W. 543, 543 (1889).3 Justice Mitchell’s statutory duty analysis was most recently followed in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558-59 (Minn.1977), and Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 139, 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973).
Notwithstanding the long history of deciding statutory duty cases in this fashion, Cracraft established a four-factor test that treats governmental entities differently than private citizens. This important shift in analysis was never commented upon in Cracraft. Instead, the Cracraft court indicated that:
[T]he distinction between public duty and special duty applies to alleged private tortfeasors as well as alleged public tort-feasors. This distinction, therefore, is neither a fiction, nor a relic of the days of sovereign immunity. It is a well-established principle of negligence law applicable to tort actions against individuals as well as governments.
279 N.W.2d at 805-06. However, our recent decision in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.1977), clearly indicates that the Cra-craft doctrine has no application to private tortfeasors. In Pacific Indemnity Co., the court indicated that one of the defendants was negligent as a matter of law for violating “certain ordinances of the city of Rochester which governed the installation of heating systems and provided for certain minimum clearances between furnaces and surrounding walls.” Id. at 558. In so holding, the Pacific Indemnity Co. court never analyzed the distinction between public and special duties. Instead, the court stated:
The trial judge found that the ordinance had been violated by Yale in installing the furnace. Based on the record, reasonable minds could not differ as to that finding. It is well settled that breach of a statute gives rise to negligence per se if the persons harmed by that violation are within the intended protection of the statute and the harm suffered is of the type the legislation was intended to prevent. Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1889); Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947); Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973). This rule is equally applicable to violations of ordinances. See, 13B Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 6976, and cases cited at note 53. The statute or ordinance imposes a fixed duty of care, so its breach constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence. Zerby v. Warren, supra. We hold that the trial court properly *291found as a matter of law that Yale was negligent in its installation of the furnace. In light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to discuss the other issues raised by Yale in this regard.
Id. at 558-59.
The Pacific Indemnity Co. court engaged in the traditional two-factor statutory liability analysis, instead of Cracraft’s four-factor special duty analysis. Consequently, one must seriously question Cracraft’s fundamental premise — that the special duty rule applies to public as well as to private tortfeasors.4
Second, the Cracraft court’s misapplication of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288 (1965) continues to be followed by the majority opinion in the instant case. Three of the Cracraft factors — actual knowledge, reliance, and aggravation of harm have never had any bearing on statutory duty cases. Only the third Cracraft factor— whether a statute or ordinance was enacted for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than for the protection of the public generally — bears any resemblance to the statutory duty analysis contained in cases such as Osborne and Dart. Our Section 288 cases decided prior to Cra-craft followed the traditional statutory duty analysis. See, e. g., Kronzer v. First National Bank, 305 Minn. 415, 424-25, 235 N.W.2d 187, 193 (1975); Nees v. Minneapolis Street Railway, 218 Minn. 532, 535-36, 16 N.W.2d 758, 761 (1944); Comment, Municipal Tort Liability and the Public Duty Rule: A Matter of Statutory Analysis, 6 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 391, 411 (1980).
Third, Cracraft and the majority opinion erroneously divide all statutory duty cases involving a governmental tortfeasor into two categories. In the first category are cases in which a statute or ordinance benefits the general public in any way. Palling within the second category are cases in which a statute or ordinance protects specific individuals. Cracraft and the instant case hold that only cases falling within the latter category are actionable. This analysis ignores the possibility that many statutes, as in the instant case, are intended to protect the general public and specific individuals.5 Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907), discussed this type of statute. In Anderson, contrary to a Minnesota statute,6 the defendant loaned a firearm to a minor who subsequently injured plaintiff with the weapon. The Anderson court held that breach of the statute was actionable negligence. In so holding, the court stated:
*292There are also authorities to the effect that a statute may create, not only a public duty, but a duty to private persons, the breach of which may be actionable negligence * * *. [T]he present general, if not universal, trend of American authorities, is to construe legislative enactments of this type as creating a duty to both the public and to private individuals, and to liberaliy interpret the class of persons for whose benefit the law was made.
Id. at 296-97, 111 N.W. at 279-80 (emphasis added).
Two recent Washington Supreme Court cases also indicate how statutes or ordinances may create both a duty to the general public and a duty to private individuals. In Campbell v. Bellevue, 85 Wash.2d 1, 530 P.2d 234 (1975),7 a city electrical inspector found code violations in outdoor wiring strung through a creek, but made no attempt to initiate corrective action based on the investigation. The plaintiff’s wife was later electrocuted while attempting to save her son, who had fallen into the creek. The court found the city liable, stating that “these [electrical code] requirements were not only designed for the protection of the general public, but more particularly for those persons or class of persons residing within the ambit of the danger involved * * *.” Id. at 13, 530 P.2d at 241. Similarly, in Haivorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978), plaintiff brought an action for negligent building and safety inspection which allegedly resulted in her husband’s death in a Seattle hotel fire. The court imposed liability, stating that the Seattle Housing Code was enacted to benefit a “specifically identified group of persons as well as * * * the general public.” Id. at 677, 574 P.2d at 1193 (emphasis added).
Fourth, until Hoffert and Cracraft this court routinely held that statutes “induced by public considerations of safety” were to be broadly construed to effectuate the general goal sought by the statute. Judd v. Landin, 211 Minn. 465, 470, 1 N.W.2d 861, 864 (1942). For example, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Iron Ranges Natural Gas Co., 289 Minn. 260, 183 N.W.2d 784 (1971), this court broadly construed the class intended to be protected by the statute in question. In responding to the argument that safety statutes not limited by their terms are enacted for the benefit of every member of the public who is exposed to injury or loss by a violation, the court stated that:
As a general rule, a statute is intended to protect those who may normally be expected to suffer particular injury from its violation * * *. To ascertain this protected group the court looks to the statutory language in light of the evils to be remedied or the harm to be prevented.
Id. at 264, 183 N.W.2d at 787-88 (citation omitted). The following Minnesota case law also is indicative of the broad construction previously given to statutes enacted because of public considerations of safety: Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973) (sale of glue to minors); Meshbesher v. Channeilene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428 (1909) (violation of pure food act); Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1889) (violation of statute requiring druggists to label poisons).
Finally, because the Hoffert decision was the underlying basis for Cracraft, an examination of Hoffert ⅛ application of the public duty doctrine is necessary. The Hoffert court relied upon three Minnesota cases: Hitchcock v. County of Sherburne, 227 Minn. 132, 34 N.W.2d 342 (1948) (county not liable for negligent maintenance of a county road); Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W. 435 (1925) (municipality not liable for construction of road); and Roerig v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 231, 175 N.W. 542 (1919) (city not liable for damages sustained by plaintiff resulting from construction delays), to support its holding that a building inspector acts solely for the benefit of the general public. As indicated in Comment, Municipal Tort Liability and the Public Duty Rule: A Matter *293of Statutory Analysis, 6 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 391 (1980), this reliance was misplaced because—
Hitchcock, Stevens, and Roerig * * * were decided prior to enactment of the statute that abrogated the immunity of municipalities from tort claims. The decisions in Hitchcock, Stevens, and Roerig were based upon the rule that a governmental body would not be held liable for the negligent performance of a governmental, as opposed to a proprietary, function.
* ⅝5 * * * *
The distinction between governmental and proprietary functions as applied by the Court in Hitchcock, Stevens and Roerig, was explicitly abolished by the Minnesota Legislature in 1963 when it enacted section 466.02 of the Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act * * *. Thus, the three cases relied upon by the Hoffert court to establish what has become known as the “public duty rule” were declared by the Legislature no longer to be applicable in cases involving municipal tort liability.
Id. at 405, 408 (footnotes omitted). Two recent decisions from the Oregon and Florida Supreme Courts support the above analysis. In Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979), the plaintiff alleged that the city, through its employees, negligently issued a license to a taxicab service that did not possess the minimum liability insurance required by a city ordinance. The city argued that its employees’ duty ran only to the general public, and not to specific individuals. The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the city’s argument in part because the common-law public duty rule could not survive the Oregon Legislature’s abrogation of sovereign immunity.
In Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979), the Florida Supreme Court discarded the public-private duty distinction. In so doing, the Florida Court expressly discarded its prior holding in Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So.2d 70 (Fla.1967), which Cra-craft relied upon. See 279 N.W.2d at 806 n.6. The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that because the Florida Legislature had done away with sovereign immunity the court-made public-private duty distinction also had to be abrogated. In rejecting the argument that a governmental entity owes a duty only to the public in general, the Commercial Carrier court stated:
[W]e believe it to be circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of action exists for a negligent act or omission by an agent of the state or its political subdivisions where the duty breached is said to be owed to the public at large but not to any particular person. This is the “general duty”-“special duty” dichotomy emanating from Modlin * * * [I]t is clear that the Modlin .doctrine is a function of municipal sovereign immunity and not a traditional negligence concept which has meaning apart from the governmental setting.
371 So.2d at 1016. Based on the reasoning expressed by the Oregon and Florida Supreme Courts, I would hold that the anachronistic “public duty” rule does not survive the Minnesota Legislature’s enactment of the Municipal Tort Liability Act, since that act has, in effect, repealed sovereign immunity.
I also believe that the trial court’s summary judgment order should be reversed because the unique facts in this case satisfy at least one or more of the Cracraft factors. The first Cracraft factor is whether the governmental entity had actual8 knowledge *294of the alleged dangerous condition. Concerning this factor, the majority opinion states that “there is no evidence that the state had actual knowledge of any dangerous conditions which were violations of any fire code and which would serve to impose a special duty on the state under the first Cracraft factor.” (Footnote omitted.) I cannot agree with this reasoning.
Since 1965 Deputy Fire Marshal Tallman made inspections of the Stratford almost every year. As a result of these inspections, state employees admitted that they knew (1) that the hotel had only a manual fire alarm; (2) that old hotels, especially wooden ones such as the Stratford, were known to be especially hazardous and inspections of them were a priority in the Office of the State Fire Marshal; (3) that the Stratford alarm was never tested during any inspection; (4) that although Mrs. Stade was in frail health,9 no effort was made to inquire which “responsible employee” would attend the desk to activate the fire alarm if a fire occurred; and (5) that the transoms and open stairwells were fire hazards. In addition to Tallman’s inspections, the state also knew of the Stratford’s allegedly dangerous conditions through the 1973 and 1975 reports of Richard Astrup, Public Health Sanitarian for the Minnesota Department of Health. Astrup’s 1973 report, which bore a caption “Attention Fire Marshal,” noted the fire hazards of open transoms and fire doors. Because the open transoms still were not repaired in April 1975, Astrup again noted these problems, which he again flagged for the Fire Marshal’s attention. Because the Uniform Fire Code was adopted only four months after Tallman’s last inspection, and several conditions at the Stratford violated this code, there is more than an ample basis for a jury to conclude that state agents had actual knowledge of the fire hazards at the Strat-ford Hotel, and that failure to act in the face of such knowledge constituted negligence.
The Cracraft court also indicated that a special duty of care may be created “by an ordinance or statute that sets forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole.” 279 N.W.2d at 807 (footnote omitted). Plaintiffs claim that the annual inspection requirements for hotels set forth in Minn.Stat. § 299F.46 (1976) create a special duty to occupants of hotels.
Minn.Stat. § 299F.46 (1976) declares that it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Public Safety to enforce all laws regarding the prevention of fires. Subdivision 2 of that statute states in part:
*295(1) It shall be the duty of the commissioner to inspect,10 or cause to be inspected, at least once annually, every hotel in this state; * * * and, when, upon such inspection, it shall be found that the hotel so inspected does not conform to or is not being operated in accordance with the provisions of Minnesota Statutes 1945, Sections 157.01 to 157.14, as amended, in so far as the same relate to fire prevention or fire protection of hotels, or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, or is being conducted in such a manner as to violate any other law of this state relating to fire prevention and fire protection of hotels, the commissioner and his deputies or designated alternates shall proceed as provided for in sections 157.01 to 157.14, or otherwise by statute.
(2) The word “hotel,” as used in this subdivision, means any building or other structure, or any part thereof, kept, used, or maintained as, advertised as, or held out to the public to be an inn, an hotel, or other place where sleeping accommodations are furnished persons for hire, whether with or without meals, or a multiple dwelling housing five or more families.
The majority concludes that the statute is analogous to the provisions considered in Cracraft and Hoffert. The majority’s interpretation of the statute at issue effectively rules out the possibility of a lawsuit by a party injured due to the violation of a statute or ordinance requiring building or safety inspections. Thus, the majority holding goes beyond the extreme result this court reached in Cracraft. The Cracraft opinion indicated that a specifically worded law would satisfy the third factor:
We have already indicated that the applicable codes, ordinances, or statutes [in Cracraft ] have not been drawn with sufficient specificity to create an inspection duty in favor of a class of individuals rather than the public as a whole.
279 N.W.2d at 807-08. If it is possible for any statute to create a special duty, the statute at issue should be viewed as meeting the Cracraft test. Minn.Stat. § 299F.46 (1976) is a specific law in which the legislature perceived a special danger to life associated with the operation of hotels. The statute’s definition of “hotel” not only describes the type of buildings that the legislature wished to regulate, but it also specifically describes the class of persons the legislature wished to protect.11 As a result, a statute was enacted singling out hotels for closer scrutiny by the state fire marshall and his staff. The legislature, in passing the statute, placed an affirmative burden on the state to find and eradicate fire code violations in hotels for the purpose of protecting persons in places “where sleeping accommodations are furnished persons for hire, whether with or without meals * * Id. § 299F.46(2).
The only apparent basis for the majority’s reasoning is that this case, Cracraft, and Hoffert “involve the duty of a governmental entity to assure that third persons comply with its laws.” Majority opinion at 8. This statement is derived from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). As stated in this section and by the Cracraft court, there is generally “no duty to prevent the misconduct of a third person.” 279 N.W.2d at 804. However, the Cracraft court added that “[i]f there were no additional considerations in this case, it could be concluded at this point that the defendant municipality had no duty * * * to inspect. There are additional considerations * * *. *296The municipality's own ordinances require that it undertake inspections * * *.” Id. at 804-05. This language indicates that a statute may create a special relationship between the state and a third party. Thus, if a particular statute is drafted specifically enough to satisfy the Cracraft court’s third factor, a duty arises under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). Because the statute in question obviously satisfies the third element of the Cracraft test, the general rule that there is no duty to prevent the misconduct of third persons becomes irrelevant.
For the reasons discussed above, I would hold that the trial court’s summary judgment order be reversed, and that this matter be remanded for a trial on the merits. At that trial I would permit plaintiffs to use the alleged breach of Minn.Stat. § 299F.46 (1976) as a basis for proving that the state breached its statutory duty of care. Permitting application of that statute, however, would not be equivalent to imposition of strict liability. Any person attempting to use a statute to establish a standard of care must still satisfy the elements of foreseeability and proximate cause.12 See, e. g., Kronzer v. First National Bank, 305 Minn. 415, 426, 235 N.W.2d 187, 194 (1975) (violation of statute that prohibited unauthorized practice of law not proximate cause of injury); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 372, 43 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1950) (although decedent’s death caused by thief’s negligent driving, owner of vehicle had no liability because leaving keys in vehicle in violation of state law not proximate cause of death).
If this case were to be tried on the merits, it would be very difficult for the plaintiffs to prove all the elements of a negligence action. Notwithstanding this difficult burden, the Minnesota Constitution mandates that the plaintiffs at least be given an opportunity to prove that they are entitled to their requested relief. See Minn.Const. art. 1, § 8; cf. Cracraft v. City of St Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808 (Minn.1979) (sovereign immunity is inconsistent with the protection offered tort victims under the Minnesota constitution).
The parties deserve their day in court.
. The Wilson court stated:
These ordinances and statutes obviously were designed for the protection of a special, identifiable group of persons — lawful occupants of multiple dwellings — from a particular harm, injury or death from fire. * * * They do not fall within the principle of Restatement section 288(b). Their exclusive purpose is not securing rights or privileges to which all members of the public are entitled. The specificity of statutes relating to fire es*289capes and exits together with the location, classification, construction, arrangement, signing, and lighting thereof, §§ 103.3-.9, coupled with statutory directions to municipal inspectors to “carefully inspect” for violations and serve notice on noncomplying owners, §§ 103.13-.17, evidences a purpose to protect occupants of multi-family dwellings and other specified structures (the only persons endangered by faulty or nonexistent fire escapes or exits), not members of the public generally.
282 N.W.2d at 672 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
. The doctrine of sovereign immunity derived from this maxim. See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 238 (1765); 3 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 463-69 (5th ed. 1942). In Nieting v. Blondell, 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975), we stated that “[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is an exception to the fundamental concept of tort law that liability follows tortious conduct * * * [and that] we [were] aware of no substantial reasons * * * which support the continuation of this exception to the well-established principle of tort law.” Id. at 128, 235 N.W.2d at 601. Why the majority opinion has decided to abandon the philosophy expressed in Nieting is never clearly articulated here or in Cracraft.
Today’s holding is also inconsistent with Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn.1979), wherein we stated that the application of different standards “in effect draws a distinction between municipal and private tortfeasors and consequently distinguishes between victims of governmental and nongovernmental wrongdoers.” Id. at 34.
Although Cracraft and the majority opinion in the instant case stress that the public duty-special duty distinction creates no special rule for governmental entities, and places them on the same footing as any other tortfeasors, recent caselaw from other jurisdictions reveals that a private tortfeasor would undoubtedly be subject to liability if it had negligently inspected the Stratford Hotel. See, e. g., Hill v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 428 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 564, 27 L.Ed.2d 621 (1971); Beasley v. MacDonald Engineering Co., 287 Ala. 189, 249 So.2d 844 (1971); Sims v. American Casualty Co., 131 Ga.App. 461, 206 S.E.2d 121 (1974); Buszta v. Svather, 102 R.I. 609, 232 A.2d 396 (1967).
. The two-pronged statutory duty test enunciated by Mr. Justice Mitchell in Osborne has its genesis in the leading English case of Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. 125 (1874). Commentators often cite Osborne and Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947), which contains similar reasoning, as providing a scholarly analysis of statutory duty problems. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
. A similar conclusion was reached in Comment, Municipal Tort Liability and the Public Duty Rule: A Matter of Statutory Analysis, 6 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 391 (1980):
The approach adopted by the court in Hoffert and modified by the Cracraft court’s four-factor analysis creates a double standard distinguishing cases involving public tortfeasors from cases in which only private parties are present.
Id. at 412. Arguably, if the Minnesota Legislature had enacted legislation establishing such a “double standard,” it would violate the equal protection clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Cf. Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30 (Minn.1979) (declaring unconstitutional the commencement-of-suit requirement contained in Minn.Stat. § 466.05 (1978).
. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288 (1965), a statute cannot be the basis of a negligence action if it is intended to protect the public exclusively. This is the “common law” basis for the public duty special duty distinction in Cracraft. Yet today the majority admits that the statute now under consideration is intended to protect a limited class of hotel patrons and the public generally. The majority opinion states that “[i]t is apparent that the statute protects not only persons who pay to sleep in hotels, but also hotel restaurant patrons, persons who visit the hotel, persons who attend meetings there, and even neighboring buildings which are potentially harmed by hotel fires.” Majority opinion at 287. Thus, there can be no doubt that this court is willing to permit a double standard when the state is a defendant.
.The Anderson court indicated that:
The statute (section 6946, G.S.1894) in force at the time when the facts in this case occurred provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any minor person under the age of fourteen years to handle or have in his possession or control, except while accompanied by or under the immediate charge of his parent or guardian, any firearm of any species whatever, for hunting or target practice; or any other purpose whatever.
100 Minn. at 295, 111 N.W.2d at 279.
. The Bellevue decision was cited with approval by the Cracraft majority opinion as an example of “a statute containing mandatory acts for the benefit of a class of persons.” 279 N.W.2d at 807 n.10.
. Cracraft specifically requires “actual knowledge of a dangerous condition.” 279 N.W.2d at 806. The majority opinion in the instant case also holds that liability may not be imposed “on a finding of constructive knowledge on the part of the state or its agent.” Majority opinion at 288 n.2. Such reasoning, however, is inconsistent with Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96 (Minn.1977), in which this court stated:
The principle is that a government unit owes a particular individual a duty of care when its officer or agent, in a position and with authority to act, has or should have had knowledge of a condition that violates safety standards prescribed by statute or regulation, and *294that presents a risk of serious harm to the individual or his property. When such serious injury is reasonably foreseeable, the governmental unit has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the individual’s safety.
Id, at 102 (emphasis added).
The majority’s reasoning is inconsistent with basic notions of tort law. As indicated in Comment, supra, at 402 n.84:
When the cause of action is alleged negligence, the plaintiff does not have to show that the private defendant actually knew of the dangerous condition. It is sufficient if the plaintiff shows that the defendant knew or should have known of the condition. See, e. g., Dean v. Weisbrod, 300 Minn. 37, 43, 217 N.W.2d 739, 743 (1974); Hollinbeck v. Dow-ney, 261 Minn. 481, 486, 113 N.W.2d 9, 12-13 (1962); Slinker v. Wallner, 258 Minn. 243, 247-48, 103 N.W.2d 377, 381 (1960); Johnson v. Clement F. Sculley Constr. Co., 255 Minn. 41, 50, 95 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1959).
. On the night of the fire, Catherine Stade, the 81-year-old owner of the hotel, was the only person stationed at the hotel’s desk. Because of her crippled condition, she had not been able to climb the hotel stairs for several months prior to the fire. She was overcome by smoke before she was able to activate the hotel’s manual fire alarm, which was located approximately ten feet from her desk in the hotel lobby.
These facts indicate two potential violations of the Uniform Fire Code. First, that code requires that a switch to activate a manual fire alarm be “immediately adjacent” to a hotel’s switchboard. Second, any “alarm sending station shall be provided at the hotel desk under continuous supervision of responsible employees.” Life Safety Code § 11-2343 (emphasis added). During Deputy Fire Marshall Tall-man’s various inspections of the hotel, Mrs. Stade was unable to accompany him because of her frail health. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Tallman never inquired which “responsible employee” worked at the hotel desk.
. It is difficult to perceive why the legislature would state that “[i]t shall be the duty * * * to inspect” if the inspectors then had no duty to perform inspections with reasonable care and the state had no liability in tort when the inspectors deviated from the statutory standard.
. The Minnesota Legislature’s special concern about the safety of hotels and the protection of hotel patrons is longstanding, and is apparent from statutes in effect long before Minn.Stat. § 299F.46 was enacted. For example, 1903 Minn.Laws, ch. 301 required all hotel bedrooms to have ropes or metal fire escapes. 1905 Minn.Laws, ch. 343 authorized hotel inspectors to issue certificates of compliance which had to be posted in each hotel. Additional safeguards were added in 1913 when the legislature required fire extinguishers or standpipes and hoses in hotels. 1913 Minn.Laws, ch. 569.
. Any predictions that the state or any other governmental entity would face financial disaster by permitting plaintiffs to attempt to prove that the state was negligent are made “as if there were no such legal principles as fault, proximate cause or foreseeability, all of which operate to keep liability within reasonable bounds.” Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 586, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902, 240 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1968); cf. Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d at 811 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (if suit permitted against municipalities, the “cities will be held only to a standard of due and reasonable care, liability being limited by such principles as proximate cause and foreseeability”); Comment, supra at 400 n.68.