I concur in the judgment of reversal, not for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion but solely for the following reasons:
The owner of property on which an independent contractor has contracted to do work is not liable for injuries received by an employee of the independent contractor unless (1) such employee was injured by some condition of the premises over which the owner remained in control; (2) the owner furnished the equipment or was obligated by contract to do so, and the equipment proved to be defective, causing injury to the employee of the independent contractor; or (3) the owner actively interfered with or arbitrarily assumed to direct the employees of the independent contractor as to the manner and method of performing the work. (McDonald v. Shell Oil Co., 44 Cal.2d 785, 788 [3], 790 et seq. [285 P.2d 902] ; Gonzales v. Robert Hiller Constr. Co., 179 Cal.App.2d 522, 527 [2] et seq. [3 Cal.Rptr. 832] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., 172 Cal.App.2d 401, 408 [5] [342 *414P.2d 495] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; cf. Sabin v. Union Oil Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 606, 608 [1] [310 P.2d 685] ; 44 A.L.R. (1926) 932, 950.) Further exceptions are made where the allowance of work on the property constitutes a nuisance (Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 Cal. 622, 625 [299 P. 720]) and in cases involving a nondelegable duty imposed upon a public utility (Snyder v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal.2d 793, 799 [2] [285 P.2d 912]).
Applying the foregoing rule to the facts of the present case, it is clear that defendant was not liable for the death of Mr. Woolen. It is undisputed that (a) defendant’s premises, including its tank in which the explosion occurred, were safe and contained no hidden danger; (b) no material or equipment of any nature whatsoever was furnished by defendant, all material and equipment being furnished by Zelinsky, an independent contractor; (c) no instructions or directions with respect to the work to be done were given by defendant, directly or indirectly; (d) this was not a situation in which the allowance of the work constituted a nuisance; and (e) there is no question of any nondelegable duty, since the factors for the application of that rule were not present.
The explosion occurred solely because of the negligence of Zelinsky, who failed to furnish a safe place for his employees to work by not adopting means to prevent the formation in the tank of an explosive combination of air and the gases exuding from the paint.
Under the facts of this case, defendant was not responsible as an employer under section 6304 of the Labor Code, defining ' ‘ employer, ’ ’ for injuries to a contractor’s employees suffered while doing the work contracted for, because the dangerous condition that caused the injury did not exist in the place of employment when defendant turned it over to the contractor. (Gonzales v. Robert Hiller Constr. Co., supra, 179 Cal.App.2d 522, 529 [5].)
Plaintiffs argue that defendant is liable under sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts (1934), which provide that under certain circumstances involving an unreasonable or peculiar risk of bodily harm to “others” unless special precautions are taken, the owner shall be liable to them for the negligence of an independent contractor. An employee of the independent contractor, however, does not come within the meaning of the word “others” as used in those sections. (Bedford v. Bechtel Corp., supra, 172 Cal.App.2d 401, 414.)
*415Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal.2d 448 [334 P.2d 870], is not applicable to the facts in the present ease, since it deals with the duty of the owner of premises to third persons, not' employees of an independent contractor engaged in the performance of the work. The references in the opinion to sections 413 and 416 of the Restatement were made solely to indicate that' if it were found that the person who performed the negligent act which resulted in the plaintiff’s injuries was an independent contractor, rather than an employee of the defendant landowner, such fact would not in and of itself relieve the defendant landowner from responsibility.
Schauer, J., concurred.